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LEGAL AID FOR THE POOR: A CONCEPTUAL
ANALYSIS
MARSHALL J. BREGERt
In this Article Professor Breger examines the competingiust#Fca-
tions that have been advancedfor theprovision offree legal aid to those
who cannot afford to engage a private attorney. Professor Breger ar-
gues that every citizen has the right to effective access to the courts to
resolve disputes in that they are the only state-sanctioned dispute resolu-
tion mechanism. Because of the complexity of our legal system, effec-
tive access to the courts often requires the services of an attorney.
Under this theory of "access rights"aperson is entitledtofree legal aid
when necessary for the enforcement of a legal claim, regardless of the
moral or social utility of vindicating that particular claim. This ap-
proach constitutes a radical departure from the more commonly ac-
cepted utilitarian framework. Under utilitarian analysis legal aid is
provided to a particular poor person solely because of the benefit that
will accrue to thepoverty communityfrom the enforcement of that par-
ticular claim. Professor Breger observes that the adoption of the theory
of access rights will entail a shift in the involvement of the client, the
poverty community, and the attorney in the determination of how re-
sources are to be distributed The theory of access rights also will set
different limits on the nature and extent of the government obligation to
subsidize legal aid activity. In the conclusion of the Article Professor
Breger explores the inescapablefact that the demandforfree legal aid
far outweighs the supply and suggests several methods of distribution
that do not violate the princple of access nghts.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ALLOCATION OF WELFARE GOODS
Legal Services in America is presently undergoing a considerable reevalu-
ation both as to its organization and purpose. Reagan administration propos-
als for the restructuring of federal subsidies' for legal aid have occasioned
Copyright 1981 by Marshall Breger. All rights reserved.
t Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School. B.A.,
M.A. 1967, University of Pennsylvania; B. Phil. (Oxon.) 1970, Oxford University; J.D. 1973, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. From 1975-78 the author served as a member of the Board of Directors
of the Legal Services Corporation, Washington, D.C.
1. The Reagan administration has proposed the elimination of direct federal funding for
legal services. Instead, funds for legal services will be available to the states, at their discretion,
from the human services block grants. See Office of Management & Budget, Fiscal Year 1982
Budget Revisions 84-85, 156 (March 1981). While states would have the power to allocate their
block grants for legal services purposes they would be under no compulsion to do so, nor would
conditions be placed on any state allocation procedures. See generally, America's New Beginning:
A Program for Economic Recover, in Mess age from the President of the United States Transmit-
ting a Plan to Achieve Recovery for the Nation's Economy, H. Doc. No. 21, 97th Cong., 1st Sesi.
(1981).
Legislation to reauthorize the Legal Services Corporation was introduced in the Houme by
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extensive debate on the program's structure and organization. The debate has
reflected political attitudes towards the fruits of legal services lawyering and
has failed to provide a conceptual analysis of the program as an object for
government subsidy or to develop criteria for analyzing the proper limits for
government subsidy. This Article will attempt such an analysis by viewing the
distribution of lawyers' services in civil cases through government-funded le-
gal aid programs as a problem in the allocation of welfare goods.
Historically, private practitioners provided legal assistance as a charity,
and its provision was considered the responsibility of the profession, not the
government. Not until 1945 in England2 and 1964 in this country,3 did gov-
ernment recognize a responsibility to provide civil legal assistance to those in
need. Providing legal aid in the context of mounting fiscal limitations requires
complex trade-offs. Scarce resources and rising costs have compounded the
already difficult choices inherent in distributing welfare goods among mem-
bers of society 4 While some economists would withdraw government from
many of these allocation determinations, few would allow the market to re-
Representative Kastenmeier-H.R. 3480, 97th Cong., 1st Sess (1981). An amended version passed
the House on June 18, 1981. See 127 Cong. Rec. H. 3127-28 (daily ed. June 18, 1981). A Senate
reauthorization bill, S. 1533, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), was reported out of the Labor and
Human Resources Committee on July 29, 1981. S. Rep. No. 171, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
There is no indication when the Senate will act on these bills.
In addition, H.R. 4169, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1982, H.R. 4169, 97th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 26 (1981), incorporates the restrictions of H.R. 3480. The House appropriations bill is
presently before the Senate. See discussion of legal services at Cong. Rec. S. 13,345-68 (daily ed.
Nov. 13, 1981).
Recent criticisms of the Legal Services Corporation are reviewed in Cramton, Crisis in Legal
Services for the Poor, 26 Vill. L. Rev. 521, 531-43 (1981).
2. Legal Aid and-Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Gee. 6. The Act has been revised numerous
times, most recently in 1974. See Legal Aid Act, 1974, ch. 4. The historical developments leading
up to the introduction of the British scheme are sketched in S. Pollock, Legal Aid-The First 25
Years 9-25 (1975).
3. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2701-995 (1970) (repealed in part,
Act of Dec. 28, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-203, 87 Stat. 839, and Act of Aug. 23, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
386, 88 Stat. 742) authorized federal grants to community action programs. This warrant was
taken to encompass legal aid. Statutory approval of legal aid funding came in the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-253, § 12, 79 Stat. 973 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2785(a)
(1920)).
An early exercise in public funding for legal aid occurred under the aegis of the Freedman's
Bureau during Reconstruction. See Westwood, Getting Justice for the Freedman, 16 How. L. J.
492 (1971). The development of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) program is chroni-
cled in E. Johnson, Justice and Reform 37-70 (1974).
4. The problem of distribution is, of course, the central theoretical issue for welfare econom-
ics. See I. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics 86-120 (1950); Hicks, The Foundations of
Welfare Economics, 49 Econ. J. 696-712 (1939); Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and
Inter-personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 Econ. J. 549-52 (1939). The search for "Pareto optimal-
ity" and allocative efficiency has been a major quest for those wishing to apply welfare economics
in legal analysis. Rather than engage in the "loose talk of efficiency, cost-minimization, and the
liability rule/property rule distinction... that... punctuates faculty lounge discussions," Cole-
man, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic As of the Economic Approach to Law,
68 Cal. L. Rev. 221 (1980), this Article, while iormed bythe implications of the economic ap-
proach to law, will not address those concerns. Some useful discussions of allocative efficiency,
however, may be found in id. at 223-31; Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5
Philosophy & Pub. Af. 3, 4-7 (1975); Lefl Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451, 462-69 (1974). Richard Posner, a respected practitioner of the
genre, now distinguishes his quest for allocative efficiency from utilitarian methodologies. Com-
19821
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solve them all.5 Even the Reagan administration's proposed restructuring
does not suggest a total abandonment of the legal aid principle.6 Whether
legal aid is controlled and financed through the federal government or through
the individual states7 similar problems of justification and orientation emerge.
Whatever the future direction of legal services, important lessons remain to be
learned from the experience of the Legal Services Corporation.8
The Legal Services Corporation is the autonomous9 federally-funded
public corporation charged by Congress with providing legal assistance to
those persons whose income is below prescribed limits. The Corporation
makes grants to local legal aid programs that employ attorneys for this pur-
pose. While not a public agency,' 0 the Corporation's budget is largely drawn
pare R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 12, 20 (2d ed. 1973) with Posner, Utilitarianism, Eco-
nomics and Legal Theory, 8 J. Legal Stud. 103, 111-35 (1979).
5. Opposition to use of the market mechanism for social welfare allocations is forcefully
argued in R. Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare 138-52 (1968). The normative role of markets in
the distribution of goods and services is discussed in Markets and Morals 5-9 (G. Dworkin, G;
Bermant & P. Brown eds. 1977). Kenneth Arrow has pointed up the inapplicability, from the
perspective of efficiency, of the market model to one social service, health care. See Arrow, Un-
certainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 941-73 (1963). Many of
his insights may be applied fruitfully to the legal profession.
6. Some conservative critics have urged -that those legal services needed by the poor be
funded by providing a charitable tax deduction to'attorneys who render legal services. E.g., Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the
House Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (statement of Howard Phillips). See
H.R. 3929, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (bill to provide a tax credit for certain types of voluntarily
contributed legal services to the poor).
Another conservative critic has argued that the "Corporation is so basically flawed that it is
beyond reform sufficient to justify its continuation" without offering alternative structures for le-
gal assistance to the poor. Regnery, Action, Legal Services Corporation and Community Services
Administration, in Mandate For Leadership: Policy Management In a Conservative Administra-
tion, 1057, 1061 (C. Heatherly ed. 1981) (Heritage Foundation).
7. A similar controversy over federal or state control of legal services occurred in Australia.
After much debate the federal option was severely limited and legal aid is essentially controlled by
the various Australian states. The early position is developed in R. Sackville, Legal Aid in Aus-
tralia (1975). Recent developments are sketched in Jones, New Era in the Organization and De-
livery of Legal Aid in Australia, 54 Aus. L. J. 502 (1980).
8. A useful review of the activities of the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to date may be
found in Hollingsworth, Ten Years of Legal Services For the Poor, in A Decade of Federal Anti-
poverty Programs: Achievements, Failures and Lessons 285-314 (R. Haveman ed. 1977).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2996d(e)(l) (1976). See S. Rep. No. 495, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 24 (1973);
Conf. Rep. No. 845, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974). The Corporation's position is laid out in an
LSC Gen. Counsel opinion dated July 30, 1980, arguing that funds of LSC grantees may properly
be used to satisfy the "non-Federal share" requirement of grants under the Older American Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3024(d)(l)(B). Letter from Mario Lewis to Joseph Dailing (July 30, 1980). See also
Spokane Legal Servs. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 614 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1980); Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Ehrlich, 457 F. Supp. 1058, 1151 (D. Md. 1978) (decisions not reviewable under APA); Comptrol-
ler of the Currency Opinion Letter from John Shockey to Samuel Foggie (date unavailable) (bank
deposits of LSC do not constitute "public money" under 12 U.S.C. 90 (1970)).
10. White v. North La. Legal Assistance Corp., 468 F. Supp. 1347, 1350-51 (W.D. La. 1979)
(local legal services organizations autonomous and not agents of Corporation as regards employ-
ment decisions). But see Dixon v. Georgia Indigent Legal Servs., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1156 (S.D.
Ga. 1974); Gurda Farms, Inc. v. Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., 358 F. Supp. 841
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (attorneys in program founded by OEO deemed to be "persons arising under" a
federal office within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1976) (removal statute) due to perva-
sive OEO control of local program through evaluation process). See also Lefcourt v. Legal Aid
Society, 445 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1971) (criminal defense).
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from federal sources.I' In fiscal 1982 its congressional authorization was over
240 million dollars.' 2 This figure, while substantial, is insufficient to provide
comprehensive service to the poor.' 3 Whether funded by the states or by the
federal government, legal assistance, for the foreseeable future, is and will
continue to be a scarce resource.'
4
The distribution of limited resources includes issues of both macro- and
micro-allocation. Macro-allocation issues of legal aid funding settle the por-
tion of the federal budget devoted to legal aid.'5 The micro-allocation issues
concern how legal aid is to be distributed and to whom. 16 While the debate
over macro-allocation depends primarily on political factors, 17 micro-alloca-
11. In 1981 over 48 million dollars in non-Corporation funds were available for use by LSC
programs. Thirty-two million of this amount was non-Corporation federal money while 16 mil-
lion came from private or state and local sources. Legal Services Corporation, Characteristics of
Field Programs Supported by the Legal Services Corporation Staff of 1981-A Fact Book 18-19
(Feb. 1981). In 1977 the GAO estimated that 33 million dollars of non-federal funding was avail-
able. GAO, Free Legal Services for the Poor-Increased Coordination, Community Legal Educa-
tion and Outreach Needed, H.R. Doc. No. 164, App. I, at 24 (1978).
12. This fiscal 1982 figure is based on a continuing resolution providing interim funding
through November 20, 1981. H.J. Res. 325, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The fiscal 1982 funding
for LSC will be included in H.R. 4169, which is still under consideration by the House-Senate
Conference Committee. The fiscal 1981 figure was $321.3 million. See Pub. L. No. 95-536, 94
Stat. 3166 (1980). The fiscal 1980 allocation was $300 million. Budget of the U.S. Govt.-F.Y.
1981, H. Doc. No. 246, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 593 (1980).
13. See Legal Services Corporation Annual Rep. 1977, at 15 (1978). Inflation has made these
figures unrealistic.
14. Like medical care, legal care contains the interesting feature that the more you look for a
problem the more likely you are to find one. Legal care and medical care are "moral hazards" in
the insurance sense of the tera. See Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-
offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 6 (1975).
15. This macro-allocation problem is resolved chiefly through political compromise not prin-
cipled choice. See M. Gordon, The Economics of Welfare Policies (1963); Gorham, Allocating
Federal Resources Among Competing Social Needs, in H.E.W. Indicators 1, 6 (Aug. 1966). To
succeed in the budgeting process one needs to cultivate a clientele and "to develop fairly wideinter st in the program." A. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process 66 (1964). But see
generally A. Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgeting Processes (1975); J.
Havemann, Congress and the Budget 136-38, 196-208 (1978). At least one commentator has sug-
gested that "increased competition between age groups [for public benefits] will generate an in-
crease in the total resources expended in federally assisted socia programs." Schuck, The
Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 89 Yale L.J. 27, 90 n.290
(1979). It is unclear why this should be the case.
16. The macro-political battle reaches congressional ears and is not merely a problem in the
Administration, as recent events have suggested. The Corporation has had the freedom to make
its budget request directly through Congress. While the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has authority "to review and submit comments" on the Corporation's budget request, 42
U.S.C. § 2996d(e)(2) (1976), it may not control the amount of the request. This provision was
rearfimed as underscoring "the critical importance of the Corporation's independence from con-
trol by OMB." H. Rep. No. 310, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4503, 4508. This independence was provided due to perceived politicization of OMB since
the Nixon presidency. See Berman, OMB and the Hazards of Presidential Staff Work, 38 Pub.
Ad. Rev. 520 (No. 6, 1978); Heclo, OMB and the Presidency: The Problem of "Neutral Compe-
tence," 38 Pub. Interest 80 (1975).
17. This is only partially correct. If there were no constraints on the amount of money avail-
able for legal aid, at some point one would have to ask whether the ethical limits of legal aid
funding had been reached. In answering that question one would have to consider (1) whether the
structure for providing legal assistance encouraged overuse and; (2) what sorts of legal jobs and
work done by lawyers it is appropriate for government to fund. It should be obvious that the
point of overuse of legal aid has not been reached and conceivably will not be reached in the
foreseeable future.
1982]
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tion concerns choices between competing ethical and social principles. It re-
quires concrete decisions about the eligibility of recipients, the kind of cases
that should be handled and the location of offices. This Article will provide a
methodological framework for answering questions of this type.
There are two conflicting approaches to the allocation of legal assistance.
The first, a social utility model, uses the principles developed in welfare eco-
nomics to maximize total benefits to the poor. The other may be called a
theory of access rights. It focuses on an individual's right to a lawyer, as a
citizen of a country in which there is a state-sanctioned dispute-resolution sys-
tem. It is an attempt to allocate legal assistance on a formula of distributive
justice. Through an exploration of the conflict between these approaches, this
Article analyzes the selection process for clients and cases in legal aid. It re-
views how resource allocation decisions were made before the establishment
of the Legal Services Corporation, and how they are now made.18
This analysis of the principles of legal aid distribution is focused on the
problem of ensuring formal justice within the existing legal system of the
United States. As such, it deals with questions of procedural fairness in the
application of available legal resources and not with general questions of so-
cial justice. It is concerned that "the distribution of lawyers should not create
advantages or disadvantages in those social interactions where law is in-
volved."'19 This Article starts from the proposition that some approximation
of the ideals of procedural justice is possible in our existing legal system20 and
that the benchmark of procedural justice is an important criterion for judging
any proposal for providing lawyers for the poor.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY OF LEGAL AID
The conventional justification for the federal government's provision of
legal aid is the utilitarian proposition that the state's duty to provide legal
18. This Article was substantially completed before I read B. Garth, Neighborhood Law
Firms For the Poor A Comparative Study of Recent Developments in Legal Aid and in the Legal
Profession (1980). While this comparative study of staffattorney legal services programs in North
America and Western Europe reaches radically different conclusions about the role of law and
legal services lawyers than I do, it is perhaps the most comprehensive study of legal services to
date and will be an invaluable guide to future analysis.
While Garth traces "the development and institutionalization of new [activist] roles for legal
aid lawyers," id. at 228, his is a normative as well as a descriptive analysis. He argues that neigh-
borhood law firms (his term for salaried legal aid attorneys) should "evolve toward the kind of
legal aid agency that will maximize 'social change."' Id. at 231. In so doing he recognizes and
approves the inextricable relationship between that goal and "a focus away from individual
casework." Id. at 233. In part, this Article can be taken as a contribution to the continuing collo-
quy over the role and function of legal services in which Garth is among the most articulate
participants.
19. See Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession, I Law & Policy Q. 5, 6 (1979). As such it is
not concerned with efficiency considerations except insofar as they have an impact on the quest for
procedural justice.
20. In contrast, Abel believes that "the legal system in a capitalist society cannot attain the
ideal of formal justice." Id. at 7. This view reflects the deep-set belief of many critics of legal aid
and proponents of an activist perspective for legal aid lawyers. The distinction between formal
and procedural justice in analyzing legal systems is drawn in M. Weber, Law in Economy and
Society 61-64 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
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assistance exists to the extent that legal aid maximizes the general welfare.
Considerations of social utility govern the amount and kind of services pro-
vided and the choice of persons to receive it.21 Under this theory, the provi-
sion of legal assistance is an instrumental good, and its significance stems from
the results achieved through the service provided. Access to legal aid in and of
itself is seen as an empty shell, important only because law is viewed as a
method of promoting social change. Thus justification of legal aid lies, for
example, in its capacity to change substantive rules of law in favor of the poor
and to shift wealth and power relationships in society.
In contrast, this Article argues for an alternate justification of legal aid
based on a non-utilitarian approach. This justification derives from a theory
of access rights, which requires the state to provide legal assistance to individ-
uals wishing to make effective use of society's dispute resolution processes. As
members of society, individuals are entitled to effective access to the law.
22
Legal aid is a means of providing such access to those who cannot otherwise
afford it.23
The justification for access rights derives from an analysis of the role of
courts and the legal system in society. In the modern state, the legal system
provides a "general normative code" performing integrative functions in the
social system24 by use of formal dispute resolution mechanisms. By its control
over the enforcement of judgments, the state maintains a monopoly over for-
mal dispute resolution processes. In theory, at least, "[b]ehind every final
judgment procured in any court . . . stands, ultimately, the United States
Army."25 This monopoly limits the extent to which individuals can engage in
21. "Choosing among clients and cases requires a relatively sophisticated political view about
what legal assistance can or should be attempting." Bellow, Legal Aid In the United States, 14
Clearinghouse Rev. 337, 343 (1980).
22. One caveat: "There is, of course, no 'true' definition of law. Definitions flow from the
aim or function of the definer." L. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective 10
(1975). See generally id. at 1-25; L. Friedman, Law and Society: An Introduction 3-5 (1977);
Bohannon, The Differing Realms of the Law, in 67 Am. Anthropologist 3, 35 (1965). See also
Gibbs, Definitions of Law and Empirical Questions, 2 Law & Soc'y Rev. 429 (1968); Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 460-61 (1897). This point is central to our enterprise. Only
if we can define what we mean by law can we begin to stake out the areas where we arguably wish
to ensure people access to a lawyer. Not all social problems are legal problems. Nor should they
be treated as such.
23. It could be argued that the access right to legal assistance need not be triggered by a
poverty standard but should be available to all citizens rich or poor. See M. Frankel, Partisan
Justice 122-29 (1980); P. Stern, Lawyers on Trial 197 (1980) (arguing that we should "place
legal help on a par with all the other parts of the justice system [the judges, the courts, the prosecu-
tors, the police] and make it equally available, free of charge to all citizens regardless of wealth or
station.").
While a public good analysis of legal services may well lead to a proposal for a statutory
entitlement regardless of wealth, the issue is not likely to arise as a practical matter. Those who
can afford their own attorneys are likely to opt for the private sector. Those who are legally needy
(however that right is defined) will seek government subsidy. The micro-allocation problem
remains.
24. T. Parsons, The System of Modem Societies 8 (1971).
25. Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 Yale L.J. 1,
8 (1970). As a description of the real world the statement is surely overdrawn. As Professor Leff
points out "[E]ven the intermediate merceneries one buys-sheriffs, marshalls, judges-are usu-
ally sufficient unto the day." Id.
1982]
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self help. In our pluralist society private forms of dispute resolution do exist,
such as religious courts,26 but they depend on voluntary submission to author-
ity. Informal modes of adjudicating disputes also exist, such as commercial
arbitration and labor mediation, but these techniques are backed by recourse
to legal authority through arbitration statutes and labor contracts. Only
through recourse to state-approved adjudication can citizens ensure them-
selves of the full protection of the law. Because individuals living in our soci-
ety must exchange recourse to self help for police and judicial protection, they
should be provided the opportunity to use the courts effectively to resolve
disputes.
Access to the courts requires that the state waive or subsidize filing, ap-
pearance and other court fees where necessary. 27 But informapaueris28 stat-
utes alone only ensure formal access to the legal system. The rules of law
governing the modem state are so complex that lawyers are required to inter-
pret legal rules for indigents to determine if a valid claim exists and to aid
them in navigating the shoals of the legal system. Indeed, effective access may
also require claims for assistance in securing the "equipage of litigation,"
29
those experts and investigators necessary to prevent the right to counsel from
remaining an empty vessel.
Recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights support the
view that the state does not provide citizens effective access to the legal system
unless it proffers the opportunity of counsel. 3° The European Convention
"does not guarantee any right to free legal aid as such."' 31 Nevertheless, in
Airey v. Republic of Ireland32 the Court found that article 6 section 1 of the
26. See L. Landman, Jewish Law in the Diaspora: Confrontation and Accommodation, 86-
103 (1968); I. Singer, In My Father's Court (1962); J. Yaffe, So Sue Me! (1972); Note, Rabbinical
Courts, Modem Day Solomons, 6 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 49 (1970); Note, Conflict Resolution
and the Legal Culture: A Study of the Rabbinical Court, 9 Osgoode Hall L.J. 335 (1971). Before
emancipation exclusive authority was delegated to Jewish courts in a number of areas. See Lindo
v. Bellsario, 1 Hag. Con. 216 (1795); D. Shohet, The Jewish Court in the Middle Ages (1939).
27. H.R. Rep. 1097, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1892). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1976). See generally
Note, Petitions to Sue in Forma Pauperis in Federal Courts: Standards and Procedures for the
Exercise of Judicial Discretion, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 745 (1976). See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971).
28. See notes 397-403 and accompanying text infra.
29. Frank Michelman terms "important impediments to effective litigation" as "equipage" in
The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part 1, 1973
Duke L.J. 1153, 1164.
"The extent to which litigants pay to use the courts varies widely between jurisdictions."
Spector, Financing the Courts Through Fees: Incentives and Equity in Civil Litigation, 58 Judi-
cature 330, 333 (1975). The general problem of financing court costs is reviewed in American Bar
Foundation, Public Provision for Costs and Expenses of Litigation (1966); Saari, An Overview of
Financing Justice in America, 50 Judicature 296 (1967).
30. Note that by "citizen," I include all persons fully participating in a society and who have
accepted the obligations of membership and concomitant benefits from that society. While this
definition would include resident aliens, it is unclear whether it would include nonresident or
illegal aliens.
31. Airey Case, Judgment of Oct. 9, 1979, Eur. Ct. Human Rights, Series A No. 32, at 14.
See also Z. Nedjati, Human Rights Under the European Convention, in 8 European Studies in
Law 105 (1978).
32. Judgment of Oct. 9, 1979, Eur. Ct. Human Rights, Series A No. 32.
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European Convention 33 "may sometimes compel the state to provide for the
assistance of a lawyer when such assistance proves indispensable for effective
access to court either because legal representation is rendered compulsory...
or by reason of the complexity of the procedure or of the case." 34 At least in
matters of legal complexity, effective access requires the assistance of
counsel.
35
Modern discussions of citizenship reinforce the centrality of legal assist-
ance to full membership in society? 6 While the contemporary rendering of
the term "furnishes. . .a rather sketchy specification of rights and duties,"
37
the right to legal assistance has been declared an "inherent right of a citizen"
in that "individuals can hardly be expected to live under and respect the law
unless they have an opportunity to use it.'' 38 Thus the right to counsel may be
defined as a civil or juridical right3" rather than as a welfare right.4 °
33. Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights reads in relevant part: "In
the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, every-
one is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impar-
tial tribunal established by law." In Golder v. United Kingdom, Judgment of Feb. 21, 1975, Eur.
Ct. Human Rights, Series A. No. 18, the European Court found that Article 6 § I secures the right
to have claims relating to one's civil rights decided by a court or tribunal.
34. Airey Case, Judgment of Oct. 9, 1979, Eur. Ct. Human Rights, Series A No. 32, at 15-16.
35. Airey concerned a woman who applied for a legal separation in Ireland, which decree can
be obtained only in the high court. The procedure was admittedly complex and no separation
proceeding initiated from 1972-78 was handled pro se. There was no legal aid in Ireland at the
time of the case. The aase is analyzed in Thomberry, Poverty, Litigation and Fundamental
Rights, 29 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 250 (1980).
36. The concept of citizenship has been explored in T. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class
in Class Citizenship and Social Development (1964) where "the right to justice" is deemed one of
the central elements of citizenship. Id. at 71. See G. Almond & S. Verba, The Civic Culture
(1963); R. Bendix, Nation Building and Citizenship (1964). A useful linguistic analysis of the
concept of citizenship may be found in Kelly, Who Needs A Theory of Citizenship?, Daedalus,
Fall 1979, at 21, 27-28.
37. R. Pranger, Action, Symbolism and Order 199 (1968).
38. Ehrlich, A Year in the Life ... the Legal Services Corporation, 34 NLADA Briefcase 63,
65 (Dec. 1976). See Cramton, Promise and Reality in Legal Services, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 670
(1976). "In a free society, the system of justice rests on a fundamental notion of social contract:
we give up our right to resolve disputes by force because a substitute arena--the courts-exists to
decide such disputes. But if this arena is to be a meaningful substitute, all must have an equal
opportunity to enter and to prevail there." Id. at 677.
39. This term is drawn from James Gordley, who distinguishes that justification from the
welfare right justification for government subsidy. Gordley, Variations on a Modern Theme, in
Toward Equal Justice: A Comparative Study of Legal Aid in Modern Societies 77-132 (M. Cap-
pelletti, J. Gordley & E. Johnson eds. 1975). The former is a right granted to citizens to protect
their interests, while the latter links legal aid to "the modern struggle against poverty and hence to
such modern 'social rights' as the rights to an adequate diet, to decent housing, and to medical
care." Id. at 109. As Gordley would trade off welfare rights to maximize social utility, his use of
the term "right" in this context may be confusing.
40. The essence of the welfare state justification for government subsidy for legal assistance is
the view that "[a]mong the normal welfare services that a modern state provides for the needy is
legal aid." Israel Legal Aid Law, H.H. no. 907, at 21 (1910), cited in Lieberman, 9 Isr. L. Rev.
413, 417 (1973). This argument is based on the general claim that governments in a complex
industrial society have a responsibility to provide for the basic welfare needs of citizens. In some
versions of this argument the right to counsel is included among such basic needs as food, housing
and health care that the citizen may claim from the state. The basic needs argument is developed
from an American constitutional perspective in Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare
Rihts, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962 (1973). See also the earlier version of the Michelman thesis in
Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L.
Rev. 7 (1969). But see Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause,
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Legal doctrine concerning the right to counsel is ambiguous. The Consti-
tution requires that defendants in criminal contexts receive the assistance of
counsel. Although legal aid supporters have long asserted that an individual
has a parallel constitutional right to legal services in civil cases, 41 the courts
have consistently rejected that right except under special circumstances.
42
However, the counsel claim does not turn on constitutional argument alone.
Justification of government subsidy can be based on an access right claim,
which flows from variants of social contract theory. As this right to counsel is
1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41. A weaker formulation may be found in Grey, who suggests the basic needs
justification "does not necessarily suggest that the right to have basic material needs met is, or
soon will be or even should be, a judicially-enforceable constitutional right" but rather that the
principle--"that basic material needs be guaranteed by government to those who cannot meet
them through their own efforts" is like a constitutional principle in that it "has come to have an
entrenched status as one of the fixed moral imperatives governing our political life." Grey, Prop-
erty and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 877, 900-
01(1976).
This position conflicts with the view articulated by David Stockman, Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, that: "I don't believe that there is any entitlement, any basic right to
legal services or any other kind of services and the idea that's been established over the last ten
years that almost every service that someone might need in life ought to be provided, financed by
the government as a matter of basic right, is wrong. We challenge that. We reject that notion.'
Cited in R. Evans & R. Novak, The Reagan Revolution 134-35 (1981). Stockman's inclusion of
legal services with other welfare programs is only one approach to the problem of access right
claims and the derivative claim for legal assistance. See note 39 supra.
41. E.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-42 (1967)
(juvenile delinquency proceeding); In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Heryford v.
Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Vail v.
Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Danforth v. State Dep't of Health and Welfare, 303
A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); Reist v. Bay County Circuit Judge, 396 Mich. 326, 241 N.W.2d 55 (1976); In
re Ella R.B., 30 N.Y.2d 852, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972); People ex rel. Menechio v.
Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971); Rudd v. Rudd, 45 A.D.2d 22,
356 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1974) (civil proceedings that may involve possible incarceration); In re Fisher,
39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974) (various parole and probation proceedings and revoca-
tion contexts); State v. Jamison, 251 Or. 144,444 P.2d 15 (1968); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lasaro, 157
W. Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974).
42. The claim that counsel is a constitutional right in a divorce proceeding was rejected by a
state court of appeals, In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975), al-
though the United States Supreme Court required Connecticut to waive filing fees for divorce
proceedings for parties unable to pay such costs. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971);
accord, Kiddie v. Kiddie, 563 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1977). The Boddie precedent however, has been
construed narrowly even as regards filing fees and other court costs. See United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973) (filing fees in bankruptcy discharge); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973)
(requirement of $25 appellate court filing fee for judicial review of adverse state administrative
decisions upheld even as applied to welfare claimants). No constitutional right to counsel was
found in a variety of welfare hearing contexts. See, e.g., In re Brown v. Lavine, 37 N.Y.2d 317,
333 N.E.2d 374, 312 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975); Aiello v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 358 Mass. 91,
260 N.E.2d 662 (1970); in prison disciplinary proceedings, see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308
(1976); in deportation proceedings, see Burquez v. United States Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 513 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1975); Murgia-Melendrez v. United States Immigration and Natu-
ralization Serv., 407 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1969). But see Aguilera-Enriquez v. United States Immi-
gration and Naturalization Sere., 516 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1975). See also La France,
Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor: Bodd'e v. Connecticut, 1971 Duke L.J. 487; McCanich,
A Constitutional Right to Counsel for Divorce Litigants, 14 J. Fain. L. 509 (1976); McKay &
Kirklin, Legal Aid To the Poor in Civil Cases-Why Not? N.Y.L.J., July 23, 1976, at 1, 4; Note,
The Indigent's "Right" to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 989 (1975); Note, The
Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 Mich. J. L. Ref. 554
(1976); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yale .J. 545 (1967). See gener-
ally Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981) (no constitutional right to
counsel in parental rights termination case); Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indi-
gent Parent's Right to Counsel after Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 Faro. L.Q. 205 (1981).
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necessitated by the complexity of the legal system, it is neither a universal 43
nor a natural right.44 It will expand or contract in different cultures depending
upon the roles attorneys play in them. The American adversary system, domi-
nated by lawyers,45 puts those without adequate counsel at a distinct disad-
vantage. In a European "inquisitorial" system, the need for lawyers might be
less.46 Similarly, in primitive societies less wedded to notions of a "formal
rationality," the lawyer's role may be even less important.
The notion of an individual right of access to the legal system can best be
understood against the background of a general theory of rights. According to
Dworkin a right is an individual entitlement or claim independent of consider-
ations about collective goals such as utility.47 Thus, "a right is a kind of in-
dependent guarantee of a benefit." 48 A person's rights are what belongs to
him as his due, what he is entitled to, hence what he can rightly demand of
others.4
9
The tension inherent in the conceptual distinction between utilitarian the-
43. More attention has been paid to the claim of universal "right" to medical services than to
that of a "right" to legal care. For an analysis of the extent to which a right to health care is
culture-specific and a discussion of the implication of "health rights" to resource allocation, see A.
Campbell, Medicine, Health & Justice: The Problem of Priorities 27 (1978); Beauchamp & Faden,
The Right To Health and the Right to Health Care, 4 J. Med. & Philosophy 118 (1979); Bell, The
Scarcity of Medical Resources: Are There Rights to Health Care? 4 J. Med. & Philosophy 158
(1979); Daniels, Right To Health Care and Distributive Justice: Programmatic Worries, 4 J. Med.
& Philosophy 174 (1979); Outka, Social Justice and Equal Access To Health Care, 2 J. Religious
Ethics 11 (1974).
44. Thus, the claim that individuals have a right to legal assistance and that society has a
correlative duty to provide such a service cannot be understood as a "natural" right. The claim is
based on a notion of fairness in a culture-specific context-a society of complex laws and formal
dispute resolution processes.
At the same time it cannot be argued that any duty society may have to furnish legal assist-
ance to the poor is a duty to provide lawyers "on the traditional model to all who desire it .. "
C. Fried, Right and Wrong 182 (1978). Government may choose to provide legal aid on a staff
attorney model (Fried calls this the "bureaucratic model," id. at 182), or through private attorneys
reimbursed by the state (the judicare model). Centralized or federalist operating structures can be
used. Indeed, the state may even use such experimental techniques as paralegals or lay advocates
to meet its duty to provide access (if such modes prove to be generally effective). Considerable
effort is presently being expended to develop alternative modes of dispute resolution designed to
reduce or eliminate the need for lawyers in "minor" disputes. See E. Johnson, V. Kantor & E.
Schwartz, Outside The Courts: A Study of Diversion in Civil Cases (1977); D. MeGillis & J.
Mullen, Neighborhood Justice Centers: An Analysis of Potential Models (1977). See also text
accompanying notes 416-17 infra.
45. Fuller, The Adversary System, in Talks on American Law 34 (H. Berman ed. 1971). See
generally J. Thibaut & L. Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis 22-28, 67-81
(1975); Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure- A
Comparative Study, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 506 (1973); Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary
System, I1 J. Conflict Resolution 52 (1967).
46. See Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure I, 71 Harv. L.
Rev. 1193 (1958); Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure II, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 1443 (1958). But see Wyzanski, An Activist Judge: Mea Maxima Culpa. Apologia
Pro Vita Mea., 7 Ga. L. Rev. 202 (1973); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility,
65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1952).
47. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 94-96 (1977); see also Nickel, Dworkin on the Na-
ture and Consequence of Rights, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 1115 (1977).
48. Nickel, supra note 47, at 1117.
49. Id. at 1116-19.
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ory and the principle of rights is a classic tension in ethical theory.5 0 For if
"rights-talk" serves any purpose, it places a brake on the use of social utility
criteria. It sets the outer limits beyond which that calculus may not stray. To
say that X has a right to Y is to give X a claim to Y regardless of the social
utility of doing so. This is not to suggest that rights are inviolate. Most rights
theorists would argue that rights are defeasible5 l and can be overridden by
other competing rights. Dworkin concedes that rights may sometimes be in-
fringed on policy grounds, but he insists that a right must have "a certain
threshold weight against collective goals in general."'52 The balance is not eas-
ily tipped.
John Rawls, perhaps the most influential modem social contract theorist,
has proposed a theory of justice that attempts to develop principles for the just
distribution of goods and liberties in society. Rawls' version of social contract
theory implicitly supports the view that the state has a responsibility to subsi-
dize legal aid for individuals in need.
53
50. Robert Keeton considers that the two contrasting modes of thought find expression in
different areas, one based on individual entitlement and the other on social calculus. As examples
of this dichotomy he cites Fried's distinction between asserting an interest and asserting a right or
entitlement, Rawls' distinction between "the liberties of equal citizenship" and the welfare of soci-
ety as a whole, and Okun's distinction between giving priority to equality among individuals and
giving priority to economic efficiency. Keeton, Entitlement and Obligation, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1,
10-12 (1977). Albert Weale applies the distinction to political theories. "It is indisputable that
there is a substantive difference between political theories which are rights-based, and therefore
have a principle of respect for individuality underlying them and political theories which use a
criterion of collective welfare as the basis for making choices." A. Weale, Rational Choice and
Political Principles, in Rational Action 105 (R. Harrison ed. 1979).
51. On the concept of defeasibility generally as developed from the notion of contract, see 0.
Baker, Defeasibility and Meaning in Law, Morality and Society 26-57 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds.
1977); Feinberg, Action and Responsibility, in Philosophy in America 134-43 (M. Black ed. 1964);
Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, in 49 Proc. Aristotelian Soc'y 175 (1948-49).
Grey applies the concept of defeasibility to rights.
To say the right created by a promise can be overridden by sufficiently compelling
competing considerations does not imply that the right means nothing at all, or that we
have retreated to utilitarianism. . . . In general, reference to the supposed balance of
pains and pleasures involved or to the intensity of competing preferences, is not a suffi-
cient ground for violation of a right.
Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 Stan. L.
Rev. 885 (1976). See also R. Dworkin, supra note 47, at 92.
52. R. Dworkin, supra note 47, at 92.
53. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 239 (1971). While Rawls' conception of the "well-ordered"
state focuses on substantive principles ofjustice, e.g., the just distribution of goods in a society, his
conception of natural justice as a mechanism that preserves "the integrity of the judicial process"
requires the availability of counsel in a well-ordered modem legal system. In Rawls' words:
[A] legal system must make provisions for conducting orderly trials and hearings; it must
contain rules of evidence that guarantee rational procedures of inquiry. While there are
variations in these procedures, the rule of law requires some form of due process: that is,
a process reasonably designed to ascertain the truth, in ways consistent with the other
ends of the legal system, as to whether a violation has taken place and under what cir-
cumstances. For example, judges must be independent and impartial, and no man may
judge his own case. Trials must be fair and open, but not prejudiced by public clamor.
The precepts of natural justice -are to insure that the legal order will be impartially and
regularly maintained.
Id. Impartially and regularly maintained legal order requires the assistance of counsel in an ad-
versary system.
It should be noted that Robert Nozick, in developing his theory of a "minimalist" state sug-
gests that
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While Rawls refers only infrequently to legal aid in specific terms, three
aspects of his theory may justify claiming legal assistance from the state. 54
First, access to legal institutions could be deemed a "primary social good '55
parallel to those basic liberties Rawls regards as primary.56 Like those enu-
merated basic liberties, the legal system is an aspect "of the social system that
define[s] and secure[s] the equal liberties of citizenship. '57 Under Rawls'
scheme all basic liberties are required to be equally protected,58 and the state
is charged with insuring the "fair value" of such liberties.59 To the extent that
access to the legal system is a primary social good it follows that there will be a
right to legal assistance.
Second, access to the court system, like public education, is clearly a pre-
requisite of the realization of other rights and interests. Thus, such access may
be justified as stemming from Rawls' Second Principle giving a priority to
goods that ensure fair equality of opportunity.60 Since the right of effective
access to legal institutions is a precondition for the vindication of all legal
rights, individuals may claim this service from the state.
Third, Rawlsian analysis calls for individuals to determine principles of
Every individual does have the right that information sufficient to show thai a procedure
ofjustice about to be applied to him is reliable and fair (nor no less so than other proce-
dures in use) be made publicly available or made available to him. He has the right to
be shown that he is being handled by some reliable and fair system.
R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 102 (1974).
54. For an application of Rawls' theory ofjustice as fairness to health care see Green, Health
Care and Justice in Contract Theory Perspective, in Ethics and Health Policy 111-25 (R. Veatch &
R. Branson eds. 1976). For difficulties inherent in this application see Daniels, supra note 43, at
174.
55. Primary social good is defined in J. Rawls, supra note 53. "[P]rimary goods... [are]
things that every rational man is presumed to want. These goods normally have a use whatever a
person's rational plan of life. For simplicity, assume that the chief primary goods at the disposi-
tion of society are rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth.. . . These
are the social primary goods." Id. at 62.
56. See Raws' discussion of what are basic liberties, id. at 201-05. As Professor Hart points
out, to understand Rawls' theory of liberty, you must consider his views on such issues as the
principle of fairness, the common good among others. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and its Priority, in
Reading Rawls 230, 234 (N. Daniels ed. 1975). Also, Hart acutely notes that "there are important
forms of liberty-sexual freedom and the liberty to use alcohol or drugs among them-which
apparently do not fall within any of the roughly described basic liberties." Id. at 237.
57. J. Rawls, supra note 53, at 51.
The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (the right to vote
and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty
of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold
(personal) property;, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the
concept of the rule of law.
Id. Rawls notes that "[a]t this stage it would serve no purpose to classify systematically the
various liberties." Id. at 205.
58. Id. at 61. They are not however strictly equal in value or worth. Id. at 204, 224-26, 277-
78. As Scanlon notes, "[S]ignificant inequality in wealth, income or authority... will represent
an inequality in the ability of citizens to make use of their liberty in order to advance their
ends. . . ." Scanlon, Rawls' Theory of Justice, in Reading Rawls 181 (N. Daniels ed. 1975).
59. J. Rawls, supra note 53, at 225. See the criticism of constitutional government for its
failure to ensure popular participation in government. Id. at 226.
60. "The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that
of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle."
Id. at 302-03.
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justice for the basic structure of their society through an original agreement
defining the basic terms of their association.61 This basic agreement is made
through a thought experiment in which individuals imagine themselves behind
a veil of ignorance, ignorant of their actual social and economic positions.
The principles they choose, Rawls asserts, will be fair in that they will be cho-
sen without self-interest after general principles of justice are chosen. In
Rawls' "original position" persons meet again to adopt specific political forms
and to choose a constitution. "Since the appropriate conception of justice has
been agreed upon, the veil of ignorance is partially lifted."'62 Thus, they know
"general facts about their society" 63 and will take those facts into account in
choosing constitutional rules. Given the vital importance of attorneys in
resolving disputes in our society and the general uncertainty about when, if
ever, one's rights or interests might require vindication in the courts, it is likely
persons in the constitutional stage would ensure the general availability of
counsel by recognizing a right against the state for access to legal counsel.
The quantitative implications of the contractarian and the utilitarian jus-
tifications sketched above differ in terms of the amount of legal services that
the state has a responsibility to provide its citizens. Under the utilitarian ap-
proach the state's responsibility is limited to that amount of legal services that
will maximize the welfare of the poor. Under access rights principles the state
has an affirmative duty to provide enough legal services to meet the just de-
mands of citizens. If not enough resources are made available to satisfy claims
to legal aid, it is incumbent on the legislature to make more funds available,
even at the cost of monies for social welfare purposes. The institutional frame-
work under which those services are provided is irrelevant. Rights theory can
demand that the state provide legal service adequate to satisfy the needs of all
citizens; utilitarian theory cannot.64
The practical reality is that the modern state has failed to provide suffi-
cient legal services to satisfy either the utilitarian or the rights theory.65 This
legislative failure, however, does not vitiate the power of access rights theory
in developing distributional principles for allocating the available funds for
legal services. This Article suggests that the theoretical justification for gov-
ernment subsidy of legal aid will control the method by which legal aid should
be distributed. The view that government subsidy is justified by a theory of
61. J. Rawls, supra note 53, at 118-30.
62. Even if a person wishes to avoid litigation, he may not be able to avoid being named a
defendant in a lawsuit. Thus on traditional Rawls' maxi-min principles a right to counsel would
be claimed even if one were unaware of one's wealth-position in the real world. Id. at 197.
63. Id. Like the right to vote, claims regarding access to the legal system relate to fundamen-
tal ways of ordering a liberal society. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
64. R. Dworkin, supra note 47, at 90-91.
65. Under both theories, resource allocation must take place under conditions of scarcity.
This scarcity is of two kinds, natural scarcity in which insufficient funds are available for legal aid
and artificial scarcity, when the legislature chooses to provide insufficient funds for this purpose.
The fact of scarcity is a problem for both theories. Natural scarcity affects both rights and utilita-
rian theory. Artificial scarcity presents a special difficulty for rights theory. It suggests that the
legislature has failed in its duty to provide for just claims by the population for legal assistance.
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access rights results in a different service distribution than would occur under
a social utility justification. As Dworkin says, rights theories encompass distri-
butional implications that social utility theories lack. Because utilitarian dis-
tribution principles subordinate individual to collective needs, any policy
based on collective goods "will suggest a particular distribution, given particu-
lar facts"166 but does not call for the provision of specific opportunities for any
given individual.
The rejection of the use of social utility criterion in determining distribu-
tion of legal services is based on the principle that every person has a right to
equal concern and respect. According to Dworkin,
government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is,
as human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, ...
and with respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of form-
ing and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be
lived. Government must not only treat people with concern and re-
spect but with equal concern and respect.
67
If the right of access to the legal system is one held by citizens, then each
citizen should have an equal claim to legal assistance when such assistance is
necessary to vindicate significant interests. 68 If we are to treat the wants and
desires of each individual as equally worthy of respect, then we cannot select
the recipients of legal aid by making distinctions among persons based on
their moral worth or the social worth of the claims they wish vindicated.
Therefore, a person cannot be rejected as a client because of the compara-
tive social utility of his case.6 9 Admittedly, the claim that more people can be
served and more legal assistance dispensed if aid is allocated according to so-
cial utility criteria should not be lightly denied. Such distributions, however,
violate the access rights upon which supporters have based their claim to gov-
ernment subsidy. In circumstances in which all requests for legal aid cannot
66. Dworkin, supra note 47, at 91. Dworkin underscores the notion that the distribution
principles of social utility theories are "subordinate to some conception of aggregate collective
good, so that offering less of some benefit to one man can be justified simply by showing that this
will lead to a greater benefit overall." Id.
67. Id. at 272-73.
68. This theme pervades constitutional literature. For a probing analysis of the values inher-
ent in one variant of a claim of right to access, see Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28 (1976).
69. The classic articulation of this view has been put forward by Jonathan Weiss, a practicing
legal services attorney who proposed the following neighborhood lawyer's credo:
Cases cannot be selected according to a scheme established by a poverty program or by
any other group. .. To reject clients whose cases do not seem to make the legal points
sought to win some social revolution, that they lack the social impact desired by a theore-
tician, however well intentioned, who holds a position on an advisory board, is to play a
very immoral type of god .... Once the lawyer-client relationship has been estab-lished, h w can any lawyer, especially a neighborhood lawyer dealing with a personwhose total past experience has been one of rejection from the officials of the court andthe rest of the establishment, say to this client across his desk: "Your cause is just, but itlacks the social utility without which we cannot represent you"
Matthews & Weiss, What Can Be Done: A Neighborhood Lawyer's Credo, 47 B.U.L. Rev. 231,
241-42 (1967).
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be granted, an individual's right is not respected when his request is denied on
grounds of social utility. Of course, an individual may decide to sacrifice his
own claim for the common good of his "class" or community.7 0 That supero-
gatory decision, however, is the individual's prerogative and not a decision for
his neighbor or community.
7 '
Respect for persons need not be vitiated by the fact that scarce resources
require some form of rationing. The inability to provide service to all who
need it does not necessarily violate a right to treatment as an equal. Thus,
respect for persons means that "interests should not be disregarded and arbi-
trarily violated" and that there should be "certain procedural guarantees that
70. What is important is that he not be under any obligation to make such a sacrifice to the
general welfare. Indeed it is that very lack of obligation that makes such conduct praiseworthy.
See Urmson, Saints and Heroes, in Essays in Moral Philosophy 198 (A. Melden ed. 1958). But see
Daube, Limitations on Self-Sacrifice in Jewish Law and Tradition, 72 Theology 291 (July 1969).
This point is a key to this Article's analysis. For as Charles Fried suggests, "A claim of right...
is peremptory. It says that because I have this right you must do (or forbear doing) this thing
irrespective of whether recognizing my right would maximize the sum of advantages." C. Fried
supra note 44, at 85.
71. One variant of utilitarianism-act-utilitarianism--can be used to justify individual
claims of access to the legal system. Under this view, the right to the assistance of counsel is based
on the extent to which access to justice is at least partly a public good providing external benefits
to society. Thus, it is the public benefit derived from legitimatizing individual claims of access to
the legal system which justifies the protection of individual access claims. The public good aspects
of legal services are sketched out in Bush, the Economic Significance of Access to Justice: An
Analysis of Resource Allocation to Dispute Resolution Services in Relation to Public-Policy Mak-
lng and the Public Interest, in 3 Access To Justice 191, 201-20 (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds.
Legal services can also be considered a "merit good," which means a good that is meritorious
for persons to possess even when its provision does not meet individual preferences. Examples
include government provision of free school lunches and housing subsidies. While the concept
requires an imposition of preferences it has been justified as a correction for deficiencies in the
exercise of consumer choice due to lack of information. By analogy, legal services are provided
free to people who otherwise would not choose to spend their own money on them, because for
example, they do not realize that their problems can be solved through the legal process. But it
may be inaccurate to describe legal services as "merit goods," which go against the poor person's
natural preferences, since many people do want legal services and would choose to spend a por-
tion of their income on them if they were not priced so high. Similarly, it is hard to see the
example of low cost housing as something that goes against preferences. R. Musgrave & P. Mus-
grave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 80-81 (1973). See also Musgrave, Provision for
Social Goods, in Public Economics: An Analysis of Public Production and Consumption and
Their Relations to the Private Sectors 124, 143-44 (J. Margolis & H. Guitton eds. 1969), where the
concept is discussed in terms of "merit wants." For an argument that there is no fundamental
difference between social and merit wants and that the concept of merit goods should be aban-
doned, see I. Garfinkel, Merit Goods, Consumer Sovereignty and Efficiency: A Suggested Appli-
cation of Occam's Razor (1970). Some commentators have suggested that legal aid should be
viewed as a modified "merit good" in that an equal distribution of the merit good is not intended
but rather that an assurance of a universal minimum is contemplated. Tobin, On Limiting the
Domain of Inequality, 13 J.L. & Econ. 263, 275-6 (1970).
It should be stressed that adjudication clearly encompasses significant private good aspects.
See Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. Legal Stud. 235 (1979), drawing useful
analogies from the early English practice of financing lighthouses out of user fees pad-by the
shipping industry. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & Econ. 357 (1974). The prob-
lem bears further investigation as the responses and comments to the Landes & Posner article
suggest. See generally 8 J. Legal Stud., No. 2 (1979) (entire issue); R. Posner, A Theory of Primi-
tive Society, with Special Reference to Law 41-42 (Working Paper No. 007, Center for the Study
of the Economy and the State, Univ. of Chicago 1979); Landes & Posner, The Private Enforce-
ment of Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1975). The justification of personal contributions to legal aid as
in England depends in part on the claim that the service is, to some degree, a private good.
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express fairness"72 by the state in the distribution of goods and services. As
has been suggested, "the requirements of fairness and due process flow from
the right to treatment as an equal even when equal treatment is not
possible.
'73
The access right approach outlined in this Article accepts that certain
emergency considerations override any one individual's claim to equal treat-
ment in the distribution of legal aid. This is in keeping with the view that a
right can sometimes be infringed on compelling policy grounds, but "cannot
be defeated by appeal to any of the ordinary routine goals of political
administration." 74
In locating the conceptual justification of legal aid in a right of access, this
Article advocates the adoption of a client-oriented perspective toward legal aid
in which the interests of the individual clients determine the substance and
scope of legal services offered. This client orientation is a direct consequence
of the theory of access rights. Such a perspective expresses "respect for the
capacity of persons, as such, for rational autonomy--to be, in Kant's memora-
ble phrase, free and rational sovereigns in the kingdom of ends, . ....
to take ultimate, self critical responsibility for one's ends and the way they
cohere in a life."
7 5
III. THE STRUCTURE OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN LEGAL ASSISTANCE
Many decisions at different levels affect who receives legal assistance,
which services will be made available, the types of clients represented, and the
substance of cases handled. This section will describe the parts played by
Congress, by the Corporation, by program attorneys and by the client commu-
nity in the allocation process and will assess how far the decisions of each
fulfill the client-oriented perspective outlined above.
Any discussion of resource allocation in the legal assistance context must
recognize that much of the debate has been principally rhetorical. Whatever
allocation of responsibility is made for the setting of priorities, significant im-
plementation problems persist.76 As with all bureaucracies, local programs
often resist directives from central authorities and field workers may adapt
programmatic rules. In discussing each level of resource allocation, this sec-
tion will both analyze its conceptual justification and describe how resources
are, in fact, allocated.
72. Childress, A Right to Health Care, 4 J. Med. & Philosophy 132, 138 (1979). Various
solutions to the problem of limited resources are discussed later in this Article. See section V
infra.
73. Id. The distinction is drawn from I Dworkin, supra note 47.
74. I Dworkin, supra note 47, at 92.
75. Richards, Human Rights and the Moral Foundations of the Substantive Criminal Law,
13 Ga. L. Rev. 1395, 1407 (1979). See generally I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals (L. Beck trans. 1959).
76. See J. Pressman & A. Wildavsky, Implementation (2d ed. 1973).
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A. 4 Historical Perspective. Allocation Prior to the Legal Services
Corporation
In order to understand current attitudes about the structure and alloca-
tion of legal assistance for the poor it is necessary to review the history of
allocation criteria used until the creation of the Legal Services Corporation in
1974. The legal aid movement began in the United States in 1876. Until 1964
it was funded mainly by private philanthropy or the volunteer assistance of
private counsel.77 When the right to counsel in criminal cases assumed consti-
tutional status, criminal legal aid became the responsibility of the prosecuting
jurisdiction.78 Civil programs, however, were funded by the federal govern-
ment as part of the War on Poverty. Thus the Legal Services Corporation has
two forebears: the voluntary legal aid movement and the federally-funded
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) Legal Services program. Both re-
flected institutional and ideological concerns that militated against the notion
that legal assistance should be distributed according to principles of access
rights.
79
The problem of scarce resources has always plagued the legal aid move-
ment. When the obligation to provide legal aid was seen as a responsibility of
private charity and the profession, the sums provided were never equal to the
task. Throughout the early history of the legal aid movement local programs
restricted service to certain functions, subject matter categories and population
groups. For the most part, however, the criterion for service was neither the
most efficient use of available resources nor a recognition of a right of access to
the legal system for all poor persons, but rather a concern that funds not be
used to support clients or causes that were in some sense unworthy. This con-
cern reflected a general attitude toward philanthropy that pervaded American
social welfare until the War on Poverty.80 Allocation decisions usually were
77. E. Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States ch. 7 (Ist ed. 1951). See generally J. Maguire,
The Lance of Justice (1928).
78. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
79. Smurl, Eligibility for Legal Aid: Whom to Help When Unable to Help All, 12 Ind. L.
Rev. 519 (1979), reviews the secondary literature on the development of legal aid and argues that
"of the several alternative [eligibility] standards, those which are egalitarian are more relevant and
morally justifiable in the determination of eligibility for free legal service--than, standards of
merit or desert and of social contribution." Id. at 538. Smurl focuses on subject matter and eligi.
bility restrictions under the traditional legal aid scheme. He fails to extend his analysis to (and
indeed studiously ignores) the contemporary allocation issues raised by the use of social utility
criteria discussed in this Article.
80. See W. Trattaer, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in
America 67-69 (2d ed. 1979). American social welfare in the latter half of the nineteenth century
was strongly influenced by Social Darwinism and Herbert Spencer. Social theorists "feared that
social welfare methods that supported dependency and misfits would end in the weakening of
mankind." J. Axinn & H. Levin, Social Welfare: A History of the American Response to Need 89
(1975). Symptomatic of the self-reliance philosophy equating poverty and personal inadequacy,
relief was restricted to the aged, injured, sick or substandard unemployed, not to vagrants. Id. at
89-90. H. Wilensky & C. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social Welfare 41-42 (1965). "[Only in
a post-Freudian age could one] understand, accept and forgive the frailties of the client, for they
were, except in detail or severity, the same as those of the [social] worker." P. Klein, From Philan-
thropy to Social Welfare 259 (1968).
[Vol. 60
LEGAL AID AND ACCESS RIGHTS
made by a program's board of directors consisting almost exclusively of prom-
inent local attorneys. Program staff, however, had considerable discretion in
allocating program resources; little review or appeal existed as a check against
their intake and service determinations. These local legal aid societies often
shrank from controversial litigation, fearing adverse public reaction. Indeed,
the philanthropic legal aid groups often sought first to resolve disputes by non-
adversary proceedings. Only after negotiation failed would court proceedings
ensue.81
One area of controversy arose in response to the question whether the
legal aid lawyer should be "satisfied that the position of [the] client is correct
in fact and in law' 82 before agreeing to represent him in court. For some, "a
[1legal [a]id representative should only present a case that was so absolutely
sure and so overwhelmingly in favor of the [l]egal [a]id client, that to find
against him would be the clearest violation of justice."8' 3 Thus the legal aid
lawyer would take only technically meritorious cases.84 Some legal aid law-
yers went even further and required that a client have substantial equity on his
side as well as a strong legal position. One director pointed out:
Inthis office, we have steadfastly required that a person have a
good claim, both morally and legally. In fact, we have more readily
accepted a case weak legally and strong morally than one strong le-
gally and quite weak morally. We have been accustomed to follow
the maxim in the court of equity that all who seek equity must come
with 'clean hands.'8 5
The attitude of legal aid agencies toward divorce cases reflects a tension
between the principle of universal eligibility and case selection on the basis of
moral propriety. This tension was well articulated by an early proponent of
legal aid:
In theory, a Legal Aid Organization is a poor man's law office.
If the law entitled a man to a divorce, it would seem improper to
deny him the divorce merely because he is poor, when a wealthy
man, upon the same set of facts, might obtain it. If, therefore, the
Legal Aid Organization is to be the poor man's law office, it must
take divorce cases.
In opposition to this line of reasoning we have certain cogent
arguments. We are told that divorces should not be encouraged, and
that to open the way to a flood of divorces among the poor would go
81. Statement of Policy in Representing Poor Persons in Court Actions and in Referring
Cases to Members of the Bar, Legal Aid Rev., Jan. 1944, at I.
82. Id.
83. Fabricant, Should Representation in (court by a Legal Aid Office Imply Anything More
Than a Justiciable Issue?, National Association of Legal Aid Organizations [hereinafter NALAO]
Comm. Rep. & Proceedings A-79 (1946).
84. Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 381, 413-
415 (1965); Silverstein, Eligibility for Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. Urb. L. 549, 574
(1967).
85. NALAO, Rep. of Comm. 5 (1934-35) (remarks of Mr. Theophilus). See also Report of
Committee on Relations with the Bar of the National Association of Legal Aid Organizations,
NALAO, Rep. of Comm. 77 (1924).
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far to disrupt the family as the basis of society. We are also told that
a divorce is so expensive in many jurisdictions that any one who can
afford it can also afford to pay the attendant lawyer's fee.
86
The uncertainty over how to approach divorce carries through the entire pre-
Corporation period. In some areas it was argued, "ITihe bar looks upon di-
vorce as a luxury,"87 and it was felt "that two adults, without children, ought
to be able to find some way out of their dilemma without the help of legal
aid."88 The prevailing view was "that it is against public policy to make di-
vorce too easy by making it too cheap."89
Client service was limited by other subject matter restrictions. Service
was prohibited in paternity cases because the state theoretically brought such
support proceedings. 90 Representation of bankrupts was problematic.91 Libel
86. NALAO, Rep. of Comm. 82 (1924). The NLADA and its predecessors took a variety of
views regarding divorce. An early version of the organization's statement of ideals required that
[elvery Legal Aid Organization should; as far as local conditions permit, endeavor to:
Accept divorce cases on behalf of indigent persons, whether plaintiffs or defendants in
those instances in which there are social reasons which appear to make such an action
both necessary and desirable from the standpoint of the client as well as of the family.
Id. at 70 (1934).
In 1947 a substantially similar idea was adopted. NALAO, Comm. Rep. & Proceedings B-4
(1947). The Committee on Policies, Standards and Statistics approved a request proposing that
legal aid organizations "should accept a divorce case first, where social need exists; secondly,
where there is a goodprimafacie case; and; third; where the client cannot afford to employ coun-
seL" Id. at B-3. See also E. Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States, 72 (1951). In 1957 the
standard was relaxed further.
Every legal aid organization should... undertake the defense of all divorce cases, pro-
vided the client cannot afford to employ counsel, and appears to have a meritorious
defense. It is the obligation of every member organization to defend these cases.
Every legal aid organization should. . . accept a divorce case for a plaintiff first,
where the client cannot afford to employ counsel; second; where there is a goodprima
facie case; and third, where social need exists.
NLAA, Summary of Conf. Proceedings 29 (1957). The restrictions on divorce representation as
well as other subject matter restrictions, were eliminated from NLADA standards in 1965. See 24
Legal Aid Briefcase, Dec. 1965, at 61, 62.
A perceptive critique of the 1947 standard, which provides a general critique of the "social
need" argument, can be found in the correspondence between Alan Wardwell and Emory Brown-
ell reprinted in 6 NALAO Briefcase, Apr. 1948, at 31-35.
87. NLAA, Proceedings of the 34th Annual Conference 118 (1956). See also 5 NALAO
Briefcase, June 1947, at 57, 62 (comments of Judge Hackney); Theophilus, Determining Social
Need, 22 Legal Aid Briefcase, Apr. 1964, at 211, 213 ("Obtaining a divorce is not a right but a
privilege. For most Legal Aid clients, a separation is just as useful and practical as a divorce").
88. 44 Legal Aid Rev., Jan. 1947, at 3, 11 (remarks of R. Gardiner).
89. Five Questions to the American Bar Association, 21 Legal Aid Rev., Oct. 1923, at 4, 5.
Some took this view for pragmatic reasons so as not to offend funding sources. See 5 NALAO
Briefcase, June 1947, at 62-63 (comments of Judge Goodrich). For others the requirement that a
client secure "a recommendation from the welfare agency. . . or ... a minister" derived from
the need to allocate scarce resources properly. See address by Ronald Gevurtz in NLADA, 40th
Annual Conference, reprinted in NLAA Proceedings 5 (1962). See also Advisory Committee,
NALAO Activity as to the Moral and Social Factors of Legal Aid Associations, 5 NALAO Brief-
case June 1947,at60 (comments of Judge Charles Wysanski).
90. Letter to the Editor from Arthur K. Young, 20 Legal Aid Briefcase, June 1947, at 200.
91. In the early twentieth century many people looked "upon the bankruptcy law as a disrep-.
utable business." Mariano, Discharge in Bankruptcy Through Legal Aid Societies, 33 Legal Aid
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and slander cases were rejected, 92 as were wage claims unless it was consid-
ered that the employer had treated the employee unfairly.93 Other restrictions
set by local legal aid offices included adoption, change of name cases, work-
men's compensation cases,9 4 and personal injury or tort cases, "which wil at-
tract competent attorneys on a contingent fee basis."
'95
The early history of legal aid reflects a tension between access principles
and a principle of moral desert that limits service eligibility to persons deemed
worthy in some moral sense. Access principles were never accepted widely;
instead allocation focused on the character of the client as well as the character
of his legal problem.
The federally-funded Legal Services program defined itself against the
structure and experience of the traditional legal aid programs, and at its incep-
tion resisted imposing a selective grid on a program's caseload.96 The new
Rev., Apr. 1935, at 1, 4, largely because of the notion that it fosters imprudence among reckless
debtors. Most legal aid societies restricted their representation of bankrupts in some manner.
The National Association of Legal Aid Organizations proposed a criterion that limited bank-
ruptcy representation to
those instances in which the client has a reputation for honesty and has made every
reasonable effort to pay his just debts but in which creditors have refused to cooperate in
any reasonable plan of payment and have persisted in harassing the client by attachment
of his wages or by other proceedings to such an extent that he is in danger of losing his
employment; to undertake bankruptcy proceedings, however, only as a last resort, and
after all other attempts in the way of conciliation or otherwise have failed to protect the
client from the unreasonable collection practices of his creditors.
NALAO, Conf. Proceedings 50 (1936). That was the NALAO Bankruptcy Ideal before 1947. In
1947 it was recommended that the Ideals be restated as "Recommended Practices" and the Bank-
ruptcy rule liberalized as follows:
Every legal aid organization should, as far as local conditions permit, endeavor to:...
11. Accept bankruptcy cases only in instances where everything possible has been done
to make an adjustment with a creditor and where it is obvious that a client will never be
able to pay his debts and will be harassed by creditors for a long period.
Committee on Policies, Standards, and Statistics, Report, reprinted in NLAA Proceedings A-20
(1947).
92. Cobb, Legal Aid Practice, 35 Legal Aid Rev., Apr. 1937, at 3. See also Silverstein, Eligi-
bility for Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. Urb. L. 549, 582 (1967).
93. Rule 4 of the Rules of the Legal Aid Society of New York provided.
in a case of a claim for wages due for domestic employment, if it appears that the appli-
cant abandoned the employment without reasonable notice to the employer, such fact
will be considered misconduct which, if not satisfactorily explained, shall cause the case
to be rejected by the Society's attorneys.
Cited in NALAO, Conf. Proceedings 141, 142 (1926). See also Scope of Work by "Poor Man's
Lawyers" Great Throughout New York City, 26 Legal Aid Rev., July 1928, at 1, 4 ("The only
cases not tolerated are those of employees who quit without notice."). Thus one early legal aid
leader, Arthur von Briesen, stated: "Whoever receives our attention must show that he has ren-
dered some service, that he has done some work, and that he is entitled to a corresponding consid-
eration, which, being denied, we enforce on his behalf." Quoted in J. Auerbach, Unequal Justice
56 (1976) (emphasis in original).
94. For a full listing of the various restrictions programs had laid down, see E. Brownell,
Legal Aid in the United States 74-76 (1951); Silverstein, Eligibility for Free Legal Services in Civil
Cases, 44 J. Urb. L. 549, 582-83 (1967).
95. E. Brownell, supra note 94, at 75.
96. Thus John Robb responded to congressional inquiry about the circumstances under
which legal services accepts a divorce case by arguing that
[t]he only rules that we have in most of the programs are that the person have a com-
plaint for which there is a legal remedy. We don't try to impose a social sanction and try
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guidelines for legal services programs made clear that programs which re-
ceived federal funds must accept all categories of civil cases from eligible cli-
ents.97 Acknowledging their broader function, legal services attorneys rejected
the notion that they had any personal or professional responsibility for the
views of their clients. As two progenitors of legal services, Edmund and Jean
Cahn, noted:
Other professionals such as social workers and educators are in-
stitutionally given the role of mediating between their employers and
their clients. A lawyer need not be apologetic for being partisan, for
identifying. That is his function. The "identifying" attorney is one
who will not judge his client or his motive.
98
Thus Legal Services lawyers saw their role as advocates in the traditional
sense, in zealous pursuit of their clients' interests. Unlike their predecessors,
they rarely focused on a client's deserts or the character of his problem.
This laissez-faire approach to client selection soon resulted in waiting
rooms filled to overflowing. This demand, when combined with the small
number of available attorneys, forced attorneys to deal with the constraints of
scarcity. A debate soon ensued between those who argued for the need to
limit eligibility in order to maintain high quality service and those who argued
that Learned Hand's maxim, "thou shalt not ration justice," 99 forbade formal
service restrictions. Moreover, many Legal Services lawyers perceived them-
selves as strategists in the War on Poverty and argued for caseload limita-
tions' 00 as a method of allowing attorneys to focus their energies on cases of
social significance. This concept of impact litigation, then called law reform,
soon became a stated public goal for the legal aid lawyer. 10' Programs were
to determine the social desirability of whether or not a person should or should not have
a divorce ....
Hearings on H.R. 8311 Before the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 2116
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 8311]. Robb suggests that "[o]ne of the basic pur-
poses of the Legal Services program of the OEO was to sweep away arbitrary limitations on
service." Id. at 2117.
97. OEO, Guidelines for Legal Services Prografis 22-24 (1967); E. Johnson, Justice and Re-
form 107 (1974). Thus Robb, in support of the program, suggested in 1967 that
there are certain areas. . . where some limitations of service have already been imposed
but frankly we resist them because we continue to go back to the fundamental principle
that equal representation before the law for all people ought to be available whether you
can afford it or not. [It] may be [that] ultimately the legal services program is going to be
driven to making priority allocations. We have resisted up to now.
Hearings on H.R. 8311, supra note 96, at 2135.
98. Cahn & Calm, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 Yale LJ. 1317, 1335
(1964).
99. Address by Judge Learned Hand, Legal Aid Society of New York, 75th Anniversary
Dinner (Feb. 16, 1951), reprinted in E. Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States xviii (1951).
100. See Silver, Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to Limit
Caseload, 46 J. Urb. L. 217 (1969); see also Clark, Legal Services Programs-The Caseload Prob-
lem, or How to Avoid Becoming the New Welfare Department, 47 J. Urb. L. 797 (1970). Similar
problems are discussed in the context of public defender caseloads in Note, Caseload Ceilings on
Indigent Defense Systems To Ensure Effective Assistance of Counsel, 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 185
(1974).
101. "By March 1967 we had already developed a fairly precise management goal for the
Legal Services Program-to focus substantial program resources on law reform." E. Johnson,
Justice and Reform 170 (1974).
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rated according to the size of their law reform docket.10 2 As burgeoning case
loads forced programs to consider allocation mechanisms, law reform activity,
at least rhetorically, eclipsed the individual service function of legal aid. 0 3
Even when no systematic allocation techniques were used, programs often
set priorities by rationing devices. Many programs set a limit on the accept-
ance of divorce cases to avoid becoming "divorce mills."'10 4 In some, only the
first one hundred divorce clients per month could be accepted. Other offices
used more subtle rationing techniques. For example, by informing clients of a
six month waiting period for a divorce case, offices limited services to the most
intense or hardy.10 5 Another technique was to move offices from a storefront
to an upstairs office building, thus discouraging casual queries or crank
repeaters.106
While law reform may have been the ideological lodestar of the OEO
Washington staff, many local programs failed to implement directives either
because of philosophical objections or due to local political considerations.1
0 7
Indeed, OEO program evaluations are replete with criticisms of programs for
failing to meet law reform standards.108 Nonetheless, law reform remained
the ideological focal point of legal services for many of its most committed and
articulate staff.
B. The Role of Congress in Resource Allocation
Congress' substantive goals for government-subsidized legal services were
102. Program evaluations were used to "engineer" changes in program priorities and to "ne-
gotiate" the firing of directors who were less enthusiastic about law reform. Id. at 175. See gener-
ally id. at 173-76. See also Monmouth Legal Servs. Org. v. Carlucci, 330 F. Supp. 985,987-88,990
(D.N.J. 1971).
103. The use of law reform terminology is fraught with symbolic connotations for both radical
and conservative critics of legal aid. The term is a condensation symbol in Edelman's terminol-
ogy, one which evokes emotions associated with situations rather than referential or economical
ways of referring to situations or concepts. M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (1970).
104. Thus, Earl Johnson decried the "millions in legal aid funds.. . being spent on divorces."
Johnson, Further Variations and the Prospect of Some Future Themes, in Toward Equal Justice
133, 219 (M. Cappeletti, J. Gordley & E. Johnson eds. 1975), suggesting that such expenditures
fail a minimum cost effectiveness test. See also E. Johnson, supra note 101, at 230-33. The cost-
budget approach is urged in a different context by James Lorenz, Jr. Lorenz, The Application of
Cost-Utility Analysis to the Practice of Law: A Special Case Study of the California
Farmworkers, 15 U. Kan. L. Rev. 409 (1967).
105. The Buffalo Neighborhood Legal Services currently requires a six-month waiting period
for appointments for matrimonials absent special circumstances. The waiting period for clients
who seek legal assistance in other subject-matter categories is far shorter. Letter from George L.
Cownie, Director, Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc., Buffalo, N.Y. to author (Feb. 3, 1981).
106. See the description of the Philadelphia Office for Juveniles' shift from a neighborhood to
a central office of Community Legal Services in L. Forer, No One Will Lissen 299-300 (1970).
107. See Finman, OEO Legal Service Programs and the Pursuit of Social Change: The Rela-
tionship Between Program Ideology and Program Performance, 1917 Wis. L. Rev. 1001. The best
analysis of law reform as an ideology can be found in C. McCarthy, The Consequences of Legal
Advocacy: OEO's Lawyers and the Poor (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley 1974).
108. See, e.g., GAO Rep. No. B-130515, The Legal Services Program-Accomplishments of
and Problems Faced by Its Grantees 25 (Mar. 21,1973); GAO Rep. No. B-130515, Effectiveness
and Administration of the Legal Services Program Under Title II of the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964 (Aug. 7, 1969). See also I John D. Kettelle Corporation, Final Report: Evaluation of
Office of Economic Opportunity Legal Services Program (1971).
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not clearly articulated in the legislative history of the enabling statutes for the
various programs. The stated purpose of the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act
was "to strengthen, supplement and coordinate efforts in the furtherance" of
the policy to "eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty."109 The
statutory purpose of the Community Action Programs, under whose rubric
Legal Services was initiated, was that of "enabling low-income families and
low-income individuals of all ages... to 'attain the skills, knowledge and
motivations and secure the opportunities needed for them to become fully self-
sufficient."' 10 The 1974 Act includes as a goal "a need to provide equal access
to the system ofjustice. . '. for individuals who seek redress of grievances."'I'
The 1977 amendments carried forward this access language and added that
the provision of legal assistance to those too poor to secure counsel will "assist
in improving opportunities for low-income persons."' 1
2
Numerous attempts were made during OEO's administration of legal
services to restrict the subjects for which service could be provided 1 3 and the
population groups who could receive legal assistance. For example, efforts
were made to amend the Economic Opportunity Act to prohibit legal repre-
sentation in divorce actions 14 and in actions "against any public agency of the
United States, any State, or any public agency thereof."' "15 One Senate com-
mittee recommended prohibiting the use of federal funds for litigation chal-
lenging federal welfare regulations." 6 Funds were in fact prohibited for most
109. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 2, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1976)).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2781(a) (1977).
111. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1976).
112. Legal Services Corporation Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-222, § 2, 91 Stat. 1619
(1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (Supp. 11 1979)). H.R. 3480, 97th ong., 1st Sess. (1981) and
S. 1533, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), the Legal Services Corporation reauthorization measures
presently before Congress, would add further restrictions to legal service activities. See notes 126-
27 infra.
113. The English scheme also contains subject matter limitations. The legal aid scheme as a
whole does not apply to certain types of actions such as defamation, contested election petitions,
and various civil proceedings in magistrates' courts. Although the Legal Aid Act of 1974 allows
access to administrative tribunals, regulations have not as yet implemented such access. Legal Aid
Act, 1974, ch. 4. In 1977 the Lord Chancellor withdrew the use of legal aid from uncontested
divorces arguing that attorneys were not necessary for such work, except in special cases. Legal
Aid (Matrimonial Proceedings) Regulations 1977 (S.L 1977, No. 447). This subject matter restric-
tion was based on financial considerations flowing from the increasing proportion of legal aid
expenditures expended for uncontested divorce. Gibson, Divorce and Recourse to Legal Aid, 43
Mod. L. Rev. 609, 610, 616 (1980). Of course the divorce limitation depended on the view that in
most cases an attorney was not necessary in an undefended divorce proceeding.
114. Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1966, H.R. 15111, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112
Cong. Rec. 24,409, 24,T29-30 (1966). An amendment offered by Rep. Dole provided that "federal
funds shall not be used, directly or indirectly, to prosecute or defend divorce, separate mainte-
nance or annulment actions." It was rejected 38-23. Id. at 24,430.
115. This was the famous Murphy Amendment. See Economic Opportunity Amendment of
1967, S. 2388, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., 113 Cong. Rec. 27,871-73 (1967) (defeated 52-36, id. at
27,873).
116. See Family Assistance Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 16311 Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 363-64 (1970) (attempted amendment to the Social Security Act
forbidding use of federal funds to challenge welfare policies); S. Rep. No. 1431, 91st Cong., 2d.
Sess. 488-90 (1972). A 1974 amendment proposed by Sen. Russell Long to curb welfare litigation
was also defeated. See 120 Cong. Rec. 1,685-89 (1974). Most of the antagonism to welfare itiga-
tion took other forms than a direct subject matter ban. See Bloch, Cooperative Federalism and
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criminal defense,1 17 as well as for members of the armed services and their
families.11 8 Unsuccessful attempts were made to insert similar restrictions in
the Legal Services Corporation Act.1 19 Even so, the 1974 Act significantly
limits the activities of legal services' attorneys. As the Corporation's mission is
representation in civil matters, criminal representation was forbidden.'
20
Representation of clients in school desegregation,12 1 selective service, 122 and
nontherapeutic abortion cases was disallowed, 123 as was representation of
juveniles. 124 The ban on juvenile representation was dropped in the 1977
amendments' 25 but the other restrictions were continued. In 1980, after ex-
the Role of Litigation in the Development of Federal AFDC Eligibility Policy, 1979 Wis. L. Rev.
1, 31-32.
117. See Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 222(a)(3), 81 Stat. 698 (1967) (repealed 1974). Criminal de-
fense work was only allowed "in extraordinary circumstances where.., the Director has deter-
mined that adequate legal assistance will not be available for an indigent defendant." Id.
118. Pub. L. No. 91-177, § 104(b), 83 Stat. 829 (1969) (repealed 1974). Members of the armed
services could receive service only in cases of extreme hardship.
119. Indeed the House even banned representation of Watergate defendants. See 119 Cong.
Rec. 20,754 (1973). This amendment may have been proposed in exasperation at the lengthy
debate over the 1974 Act.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(2) (Supp. I 1980). prohibits the provision of legal assistance in any
criminal proceedings, except to individuals charged with a misdemeanor or lesser offense or its
equivalent in an Indian Tribal Court. Exceptions to this restriction exist when the court appointsa legal services attorney to represent a defendant. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)O3) (Supp. I
1977) regarding prohibition of legal assistance for those civil actions arising out of malfeasance of
officers or official with regard to challenging the validity of the criminal conviction. See also 45
C.F.R. § 1613.1-.4, 1615.2 (1979).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(9) (Supp. 1m 1979). See also H.R. 3480, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 14(a)(3) (1981) (prohibiting litigation or legal advice relating to the desegregation of schools).
122. Id. § 2996f(b)(10) (Supp. 11 1979). The 1977 Amendments modified the prohibition to
allow legal assistance in those cases in which an eligible client alleges that he was improperly
classified prior to July 1, 1973. See 123 Cong. Rec. at 19,690-91; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 825, 95th
Cong. lst Sess. 16 (1977). See also 123 Cong. Rec. 17,025 (1977). Opponents of the current law
point out that legal services offices still cannot challenge military discharge classifications, and
hence the denial ofjob opportunities and veterans benefits to eligible clients. See Oversight of the
Legal Services Corporation 1980: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Poverty and
Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 139
(1980) (statement of N.O. Metzger).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8) (Supp. 11 1979) forbids the Corporation from making funds
available
to provide legal assistance with respect to any proceeding or litigation which seeks to
procure a non-therapeutic abortion or to compel any individual or institution to perform
an abortion, or to assist in the performance of an abortion, or to provide facilities for the
performance of an abortion, contrary to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of such
individual or institution ...
The Senate bill would have prohibited abortions except when "necessary to save the life of the
mother." In conference, the Senate receded. S. Conf. Rep. No. 845, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3897, 3908. That Senate position was substantially
reinstated in the 1981 House reauthorization bill. H.R. 3480, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 14(a)(2)
(1981).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(4) (1976). "Juvenile" referred to an unemancipated person less than
eighteen. The prohibition against representation of juveniles was not total. Exceptions were
made for those juveniles with parental or guardian consent, upon the request of a court, in child
abuse and neglect cases, or "for the protection of such person(s)... [or] for purpose of securing
... services under law in cases not involving the child's parent or guardian as a defendant or
respondent." Id.
125. Pub. L. No. 95-222, § 10, 91 Stat. 1619 (1977). The restrictions had "been demonstrated
to be inappropriate and because of their complexity [had] discouraged legal services attorneys
from representing juveniles in certain cases." 123 Cong. Rev. 33,354 (1977) (remarks of Sen.
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tended debate, a population exclusion restricting representation of illegal
aliens was added. 126 The fiscal 1981 congressional appropriation was condi-
tioned on the exclusion of cases involving homosexuality or gay rights.127
Besides restricting service in specific areas, Congress has also tried to
specify affirmative priorities for the use of Corporation funds. It attempted
either to allocate specific amounts to serve specified populations 28 or to order
the Corporation to develop programs that would serve discrete categories of
the poor.' 29 Congress believed that the failure to set national priorities re-
sulted in de facto discrimination at the local level against systematically un-
derserved groups, including the elderly, certain ethnic groups and native
Americans.
The treatment of the elderly in legal services' programs highlights this
problem. Although 16.2 percent of the poor are elderly, most programs do not
serve a corresponding proportion of elderly clients.130 It is unclear whether
this reflects a lack of interest on the part of legal aid offices or a lack of mobil-
ity on the part of the elderly. Either way, the insufficient attention paid to the
legal needs of the aged' 3 ' has spurred the development of federal and state
legal aid schemes aimed at the elderly client. Similar concerns have led to
Cranston). The restrictions were dropped in conference. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 825, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1977).
126. A rider appended to the Corporation's 1980 appropriation prohibits the use of Corpora-
tion funds "to carry out any activities for or on behalf of any individual who is known to be an
alien in the United States in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act." Departments of
State, Justice and Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-68, 93 Stat. 416, 433 (1979). The Corporation has interpreted the rider to apply only to
cases where the alien has been adjudicated to be in illegal status, thus considerably narrowing the
scope of the restriction. See LSC Gen. Counsel Op. (Dec. 5, 1979), reprinted in Departments of
State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1981, Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, R6th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, 161
(1980). "We don't ask a client when they walk in the office, 'Are you an illegal alien?'" Id. at 159
(remarks of Dan Bradley, Corporation President). In contrast, Immigration and Naturalization
Service regulations now require an indigent alien under exclusion or deportation procedures to be
informed of the availability of free legal assistance if the local program has evinced a willingness
to provide them. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.2(a), 292.2, 292a (1980).
Many Congressmen were not satisfied with this exclusion, and H.R. 3480, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 14(a)(6) (1981) prohibits legal assistance to aliens with specified exceptions. See discussion
of restrictions, supra note 1.
127. H.R. 3480, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) § 14(a)(6) prohibits the expenditure of funds on
litigation that will "adjudicate the legalization of homosexuality." The meaning of this statutory
language is unclear. See 127 Cong. Rec. H. 3,048 (daily ed. June 17, 1981); H. 3,074-86 (daily ed.
June 18, 1981).
128. See H.R. 6666, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 20,899 (1977) (Rep. Biaggi's amend-
ment to identify the elderly and handicapped and emphasize their need for accessibility in receiv-
ing legal services).
129. See Proposed Amendments to the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974: Hearings on
S. 1303 Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Poverty and Migratory Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Amendments] (statement of T. Ehrlich).
130. A Report to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Age Discrimination
Study (Part II) 104 (Jan. 1979). According to an April 1976 report to Congress cited by this study,
persons over 65 constitute 13.6% of the poverty population. Id.
131. See id. at 104-06. The elderly, it is argued, "must have someplace to turn for adequate
and effective legal assistance in dealing with a vast complex of crucial legal issues if they are to
take full advantage of the Governmental programs designed to benefit the elderly." S. Rep. No.
255, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (1975).
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claims for special funding formulas for native American and rural
populations.
The Corporation was able to escape any requirement that designated
funds be set aside for specific poverty groups. But congressional concern
about the special needs of certain disadvantaged groups led to compromise
language that required the Corporation to adopt procedures that would weigh
"the relative needs of eligible clients for. . . assistance. . including particu-
larly the needs for service on the part of significant segments of the population
of eligible clients with special difficulties of access to legal services or special
legal problems (including elderly and handicapped individuals)."'132 This
precatory language suggests congressional unhappiness with the Corporation's
"generalist" approach.133
Congressional restrictions on the representation of specified subject and
population categories reflect apparent congressional rejection of the access-
right justification for government subsidy. Congress may have justifiable
political or moral rationales for such legislated restrictions. 134 They cannot,
however, be justified by recourse to a theory of access rights. Under access
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C)(i) (Supp. 1111979). The listing of groups in the amendment
was not intended to be exhaustive. See 123 Cong. Rec. 19,689 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (remarks
of Sen. Nelson). While reinforcing the general, suggestive nature of the amendment, the House-
Senate Conference agreed that elderly and handicapped persons have special difficulties of access
to legal services or special legal problems which must be considered in the priority-setting process.
H.R. Rep. No. 825, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1977). Congress mandated a special needs assessment
study concerning elderly persons, handicapped persons, veterans, Native Americans, migrants,
and seasonal farmworkers, persons with limited English speaking abilities, those in sparsely popu-
lated areas with harsh climate and inadequate transportation. 42 U.S.C. 2996(0 (Supp. III 1977).
As Thomas Erlich pointed out, the Corporation sees its responsiblity as "the client commu-
nity," that is to say, the total "community of poor persons who are represented by the program."
Legal Services Corporation Oversight-Hearing Before a Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28
(1979). The Corporation opposed specifically earmarking funds for special groups, in that other
discrete groups of poor persons might be disserved. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 129,
at 16. Special funding would mean "special consideration" for some groups and would "seriously
fractionate the client community." Id. at 16-17. Rather than fuel such intrapoverty conflicts the
Corporation took a generalist approach, attempting to serve all persons eligible within a geo-
graphic area and not focusing on components or "subclasses" of the poor when implementing its
mandate.
133. The Corporation takes the view that "choices about legal problems associated with spe-
cific groups of poor people are better drawn at the local, rather than the national level." Hearing,
supra note 132, at 5-6.
134. Both subject matter and function restrictions have been condemned by liberals, and the
controversy reflects the lack of political consensus over those legal services deemed marginal to
the program's central mission. Senator Nelson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Employment,
Poverty, and Migratory Labor, noted in the 1977 hearins that "the limitations written into the
statute were written in there for purposes of getting the bill passed." Legal Services Corporation
Act Amendments: Hearings on S. 1303 Before Senate Subcomm. on Emplyment, Poverty, and
Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 94
(1977). Later in the hearing Senator Nelson again stressed the political consideration that
prompted the restrictions:
As a member of the committee from the time the Poverty Act was enacted and from the
time the legal services program was created, I can tell you that the rationale for the
F rohibitions was that without them there would be no legal services for the poor...
tihe fact is that limitations were imposed because we could not get-the votes without
them. It is as simple as that.
Id. at 172.
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right theory, the legitimacy of a citizen's claim to legal services does not de-
pend upon the purpose to which he intends to use the courts. Rather, his
claim to legal assistance is based on his right of access to the legal system. The
substantive goals for which he claims recourse to law are irrelevant to the
strength of his access claim.' 35 In contrast, the congressional use of popula-
tion and category restrictions bears analogy to social-utility-based allocation
criteria. Both flow from strategic decisions, moral or political, about the most
provident use of legal services funds. The former focuses on principles of de-
sert, the latter on the most efficient distribution of legal resources.
Congress has also restricted the functions .that federally-funded legal aid
lawyers can perform by limiting the types of legal work that can be under-
taken for a client. The restrictions on lobbying have been among the most
controversial. The 1974 Legal Services Corporation Act forbids Corporation-
funded attorneys from influencing "the passage or defeat" of any federal, state
or local legislation.136 Attorneys may not "influence the passage, amendment
135. The only subject-matter restriction that does not offend a client-oriented perspective is
the congressional ban on criminal representation. This ban may be seen as a decision to separate
defense functions in civil cases from state and local constitutional responsibilities for criminal
defense, thus continuing an historical trend to separate functions due to funding contingencies. R.
Smith, Justice and the Poor 103, 105-07 (3d ed. 1924).
In truth, the skills required for a criminal lawyer often differ from skills necessary for civil
work. Further, the constitutional mandate that state and local governments fund criminal legal
aid results in an independent funding source for public defender and assigned counsel programs,
The decision to create a federal presence in this overlapping area might result in a substitution of
federal for local funds in the criminal area. The total amount of monies available for legal aid
then would not increase.
Nonetheless, legal services and public defender programs have "shared concerns" that "can
serve as a basis for creative and efficient cooperation," Geier & Ginsberg, Cooperation between
Legal Services and Public Defender Programs, 32 NLADA Briefcase, Jan. 1975, at 125. This is
true even if one rejects the ideological underpinning of their position concerning "the inescapable
relation of poverty to crime." Id. at 126. However the funding responsibilities are allocated, the
separation of service at the delivery point is anachronistic and artificial. It is inefficient to tell a
client, "[W]e'll handle your false pretences [sic] charge but you'll have to go across town to find a
lawyer to handle the collection case involving the same facts." Brooks, President's Page, 33
NLADA Briefcase, May 1976, at 67.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 299e(c)(2) (1976). The congressional attitude towards lobbying by legal
services attorneys has tacked and veered and is suggestive of the lack of congressional consensus
over the program's purpose. In 1977 legislation was introduced to allow legislative representation
without a specific client, when "a government agency, legislative body, a committee or member
thereof. . . permits the general public to participate (by comment or otherwise) in the considera-
tion of a measure." H.R. 5528, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 2546 (1977). This language
was deleted in the House Judiciary Committee; the bill was reintroduced as H.R. 6666. 123 Cong.
Rec. 3,707 (1977).
The House later passed legislation to permit a legal services program to engage in legislative
or administrative representation on an issue directly affecting eligible clients if the board of the
local program had determined, in consultation with the client community, that the issue was a
priority for the program. Id. at 6,533 (voice vote). Several tacks were taken in attacking the
Corporation's lobbying activities. Congresswoman Holt argued that "the taxpayers' money
should not be used to fund special interest lobbies whose purpose is to change national policy."
Id. at 5,672. Rep. McClory feared that an all purpose client would be developed by legal service
offices to fulfill the requirement of a specific eligible client, and that agencies would "spend more
time in legislation than in helping some more pressing or more immediate problem of the person."
Id. at 6,532. The House language was rejected in conference and the 1977 amendments substan-
tially retained the lobbying restriction albeit in slightly relaxed form. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
825, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977) (Senate demanded that lobbying be limited to "measures
directly affecting the activities under [the Act] of the recipient or the Legal Services Corporation");
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or revocation" of any federal, state or local executive or administrative
agency.137 Further, Corporation funds may not be used "to support or con-
duct training programs for the purpose of advocating particular public policies
or encouraging political activities, labor or antilabor activities, boycotts, pick-
eting, strikes and demonstrations, as distinguished from the dissemination of
information about such policies or activities."' 3 8 Congressional concern about
the open textured character of these restrictions led to the passage of a rider in
the 1979 appropriations statute prohibiting the use of Corporation funds for
publicity or propaganda campaigns designed to influence federal or state
legislation.
139
see also 123 Cong. Rec. 12,762 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). The result of this controversy was
the 1977 restriction, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(5)(A)(B) (Supp. 111 1979), which reads as
follows:
mhe Corporation shall-
(5) insure that no funds made available to recipients by the Corporation shall be used
at any time, directly or indirectly, to influence the issuance, amendment, or revoca-
tion of any executive order or similar promulgation by any Federal, State or local
agency, or by any State or local legislative bodies, or State proposals by initiative
petition, except where-
(A) representation by an employee of a recipient of any eligible client is necessary
to the provision of legal advice and representation with respect to such client's
legal rights and responsibilities (which shall not be construed to permit an
attorney or a recipient employee to solicit a client, in violation of professional
responsibilities, for the purpose of making such representation possible); or
(B) a governmental agency, legislative body, a committee, or a member thereof
Ci) requests personnel of the recipient to testify, draft, or review measures or
to make representations to such agency, body, committee, or member, or
(ii) is considering a measure directly affecting the activities under this title of
the recipient or the Corporation.
See also 45 C.F.R. § 16124 (1979).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(5) (1976).
138. Id. § 2996f(b)(6). Attorneys were also forbidden to encourage any such demonstrations.
Id. § 2996e(b)(5)(a).139. Departments of State, Justice, and Commere, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-68, 93 Stat. 416 (1979), provides that "[no part of any
appropriation contained in this Act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes not author-
ized by the Congress." Id. at 435.
It is unclear whether this rider adds an g to existing statutory and regulatory restrictions.
The amendment's language is "precisely the same as provisions added to the Treasury, Postal
Service, and General Government Appropriation Acts, and it is not clear what, if any, further
restriction it places on lobbying activities of LSC funded programs." Departments of State, Jus-tice, Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, Appropriations for 1980: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 6, 477 (1979).
In the judgment of Dan Bradley, LSC president, the additional language is "unnecessary,
given the much clearer limitations placed on lobbying activities by the Legal Services Corporation
Act itself." Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, Appro-
priations for 1981: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1980) (testimony of Dan Bradley). However, he did not recommend deletion
since "if it would raise [congressional] concerns that the Committee was somehow opening doors
to activities that are otherwise impermissible." Id. Nevertheless, the Corporation promulgated in
March 1981 further restrictions on legislative advocacy to "ensure.. ". day-to-day observance" of
the existing congressional restrictions. 46 Fed. Reg. 16,267 (Mar. 12, 1981).
The extent to which the Corporation and its grantees have obeyed these restrictions has been
disputed. See Letter from Acting Comptroller General Milton J. Soclar to Representative F.
James Sensenbrenner (May 1, 1981), reprinted in 127 Cong. Rec. H. 1,843 (daily ed. May 5, 1981)
(charging LSC with violating relevant anti-lobbying-statutes and appropriation restrictions). H.R.
3480, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 5(a) (1981) would tighten the lobbying restrictions on the Corpora-
tion, and § 5(b) would increase restrictions on grantees.
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Legal services attorneys have also been prohibited from engaging in cer-
tain extralegal functions for their own purposes or on behalf of eligible cli-
ents.140 The 1974 Act forbade legal services' programs from using funds to
"organize, assist to organize, or to encourage to organize for the creation or
formation of. . . any organization, association, coalition, alliance, or federa-
tion."14' The 1977 amendments relaxed these restrictions, apparently al-
lowing assistance to such entities. 142 Presently the statute does not prevent
"the provision of legal assistance to eligible clients" for group organization or
incorporation. 143
These restrictions have been attacked as unconstitutional' 44 and unethi-
cal, but it is unlikely that they are either, although they may be debatable
social policy. 45 The proposed subject-matter restrictions are well within gov-
ernmental powers. Surely specific limited grants of service, such as legal aid to
disaster victims 146 or legal assistance to taxpayers, 147 are proper government
140. Thus, legal services attorneys may not engage in voter registration activity or provide
transportation for prospective voters to the polls. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(6)(A)-(C) (1976).
In the 1974 Act employees were prohibited from partisan and nonpartisan political activities.
Thus the restriction in the 1974 Act acted as a "super-Hatch Act" by forbidding Corporation
employees from engaging in nonpartisan political activity. Legal Services Corporation Act
Amendments: Hearings on S. 1303 Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Poverty and Migratory
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1977). The
Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976), permits nonpartisan political candidacies by government
employees.
The 1977 LSC Amendments Act did away with the ban on nonpartisan candidacies and
made the Hatch Act limitations equally applicable to Corporation employees. See Pub. L. No. 95-
222, § 7(a), 91 Stat. 1620 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(e)(2) (Supp. III 1979)).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(6) (1974). Critics of this view have argued that organizing poor
people using government funds is "a legitimate purpose just as organizing shareholders who might
consult a private attorney about a stockholders dividend statement." Legal Services Hearings
Before Subcomm. of House Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1977) (statement of L.
Pritchard).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(7) (Supp. III 1979). In conference, the provision was clarified so as
to prohibit the use of funds to initiate organizing activity "while making clear that a Legal Serv-
ices program may provide legal assistance to an eligible client who intends to form or organize
such an entity and seeks assistance from the recipient [of congressional funds]." 123 Cong. Rec.
19,690 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Nelson); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 825, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1977).
143. The current statutory language, although it continues to discourage organizing, is a
change from the original Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974. Gone is the prohibition against
a program's ability to "assist," "encourage" or "plan for" an association. See 123 Cong. Rec.
33,340 (1977). The change marks a move from specific descriptions (assist, encourage, plan for) to
more general words which have a different meaning.
H.R. 3480, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 14(a)(l) (1981) tightens these restrictions on the claimed
basis that the law as presently stated has been continually violated. The House Bill prohibits the
dissemination of information "advocating particular public policies or encouraging political activ-
ities, labor or antilabor activities, boycotts, picketing, strikes, and demonstrations' as part of a
training program. Id.
144. The constitutionality of various restrictions on service is discussed in Note, Depoliticizing
Legal Aid: A Constitutional Analysis of the Legal Services Corporation Act, 61 Cornell L. Rev.
734 (1976).
145. See Chemung Welfare Rights Org. v. Cramton, [1976-78 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 23,004 (restrictions on picketing and organizing). See 45 C.F.R. § 1612.2 (1980).
146. See Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 412, 88 Stat. 157 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 5182 (1976)).
147. See Proposed Federal Taxpayers Relief Act of 1975, H.R. 9599, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121
Cong. Rec. 28,821-24 (1975) (Rep. Vanik), which urged that the Legal Services Corporation set up
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determinations. Nor is such limited service unethical. Many attorneys limit
their practice to particular areas. No group of attorneys is required to provide
a full panoply of service-one's professional duty is to do competently
whatever job one chooses to take on. An attorney who secures a divorce for a
client is not obliged to handle his bankruptcy. Indeed, an attorney who takes
on the trial of a matter is not required to undertake the appeal. Of course,
when pursuing a discrete legal claim, restrictions on the manner or object of
discovery proceedings or the nature of the remedy pursued would be
improper.
Congress recognized the necessity for resource allocation mechanisms in
the 1974 Act, which required the Corporation to "establish priorities to insure
that persons least able to afford legal assistance are given preference in the
furnishing of such assistance."' 148 No definition of "least able" was provided.
There is no evidence whether Congress was focusing on the problem of the
"poorest of the poor," or merely referring to the need to set income eligibility
guidelines that exclude the middle class.
In 1977 Congress delegated to local programs, through the Legal Services
Corporation, the duty to make such allocation procedures. The Corporation's
duty was to "insure that... recipients, consistent with goals established by
the Corporation, adopt procedures for determining and implementing priori-
ties for the provision of such assistance, taking into account the relative needs
of eligible clients for such assistance." 149 The programs were further charged
with accommodating the needs of those "significant segments of the popula-
tion of eligible clients with special difficulties of access to legal services or
special legal problems (including elderly and handicapped individuals)."'150
The legislative history gives little guidance on this priority-setting process.
Substantively it suggests that programs take into account "relative needs" and
special access problems. It in no way resolves the debate over who should
allocate resources or what criteria they should use. In particular it neither
requires nor prohibits the use of social utility or impact criteria. The allocative
requirements made by the statute, however, suggest comparisons by individual
needs rather than considerations of impact on the poor generally.
Restrictions on legal aid functions are not inconsistent with the theory of
access rights. The congressional desire to limit the core meaning of the right to
legal services to litigation functions reflects the view that the government's re-
sponsibility to provide legal expertise is limited to the single function of ensur-
ing access to the legal system. According to this view, securing access to a
dispute-resolution forum is separated from claims concerning access to the leg-
a three year pilot project to aid taxpayers on a sliding scale basis. H.R. 9599 § 5(c). The proposal
was opposed by the IRS, see Proposals for Administrative Changes in Internal Revenue Service
Procedure: Hearings Before the Committee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 433 (1975) (statement of Comm'r Donald C. Alexander), and died in
committee and was not included in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C) (1976).
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islative forum "for individuals who seek redress of grievances."''5 While the
importance of that latter function is not denigrated, it is not, under the theory
presented here, an essential government responsibility.
While this claim has been hotly disputed, it is clear that the justification
for legislative advocacy is based on different theoretical principles than the
justification for litigative services developed in this Article. The justification
of government subsidy for litigation flows from a citizen's claim of access to
the legal system in the context of general principles of justice and theories of
citizenship. In contrast, the justification for legislative advocacy flows either
from a general equity argument-what the rich get the poor should have' 52 -
or from an argument for government subsidy for interest group representation
in the legislature based on a theory of "market failure,"'I53 by which substan-
tial groups in the population are unable to participate fully in legislative poli-
tics. Some interest groups may be too poor or demoralized to enter the
political process. In some instances, the group interests represented, such as
environmental or consumer concerns, may be too "diffuse"' 154 to allow for the
unaided development of political pressure groups. Technical access to the leg-
islative process may not, in itself, be sufficient for robust representation in the
political arena. This failure of the pluralist model, it is argued, can be reme-
died only by government creation or subsidy of "countervailing" interest
groups' 55 to correct this bias. This "market failure" argument has a far wider
reach than lobbying by legal aid groups. It is the underlying justification for a
host of government interventions in the legislative and administrative process
including intervenor financing proposals' 56 and statutory fee-shifting to en-
courage "private atto1eys-general. '' 57 Indeed the "market-failure" concept
151. Proposed Amendments to the Legal Services Corporation Act: Hearings on H.R. 3719
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1977) (statement of Thomas Ehrlich) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hearings on H.R. 3719].
152. "[N]o lawyer working in the legal services program should be restricted from doing any-
thing that a lawyer for DuPont or General Motors would be permitted to do." Id. at 74 (statement
of Representative Robert F. Drinan).
153. Trubek, Public Advocacy: Administrative Government and the Representation of Dif-
fuse Interests, in 3 Access to Justice 445, 453 (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds. 1979). See also
Trubek, Trubek & Becker, Legal Services and the Administrative State: From Public Interest
Law to Public Advocacy, in Innovations in the Legal Services 131 (E. Blankenberg ed. 1980);
Weisbrod, Problems of Enhancing the Public Interest: Toward a Model of Government Failures,
in Public Interest Law 30 (B. Weisbrod, J. Handler & N. Komesar eds. 1978).
154. Trubek, Trubek, & Becker, supra note 153, at 142; Trubek, supra note 153, at 457-66.
Trubek's analysis of "diffuse" groups, id. at 460, is directed at consumer and environmental
groups rather than the poor. The comparisons between these underrepresented groups have been
insufficiently explored.
155. This concept of countervailing power is drawn from John Kenneth Galbraith. See J.
Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power 110-14 (1956). See also
J. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1967). It is applied to the context of access to justice by
Mauro Cappelletti. Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in
Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 793, 800, 848 (1975).
156. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, sec-
tion 202(a), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1) (1976); Boyer, Funding Public Participation m Agency Proceed-
ings: The Federal Trade Commission Experience, 70 Geo. L.J. 51 (1981).
157. See, e.g., Attorneys' Fee Civil Rights Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). For a
listing of over 70 statutes allowing attorney's fee-shifting by prevailing parties in litigation, see
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can be understood to justify the organization and sustenance of all kinds of
pressure groups. While Congress undoubtedly has the power to create autono-
mous citizens' lobbying organizations, that enterprise falls outside the purview
of legal aid and must be justified on different grounds.
158
The claim that legal assistance "must not be narrowly construed"'5 9 has
been put forward as an ethical mandate for legal services attorneys on the view
that full representation encompasses a wide variety of nonlitigation tasks in-
cluding, when appropriate, legislative, advocacy. This view is surely miscon-
ceived. While many attorneys, particularly in the Washington area, fulfill a
variety of lawyering roles, legislative advocacy is not an inseparable part of a
lawyer's workload. Whether or not congressional limitations on lobbying are
wise or equitable they are unlikely to place the legal aid attorney in an ethical
vise. Such service limitations, whether mandated by Congress or proposed by
a local program's board of directors, do not raise questions of professional
ethics.
C. The Role of the Legal Services Corporation in Resource Allocation
The congressional decision to create an independent nonprofit corpora-
tion to manage the federal subsidy for legal services was based on the view
that an autonomous program would be free from political interference. This
freedom, it was felt, would allow programs the latitude to focus on their man-
date--the provision of legal services to the poor.
The Corporation, however, serves as more than the conduit for federal
funds; it is the chief funding source for legal services. As such the Corporation
has significant influence on the allocation of resources for and by legal services
programs. Its guidelines and regulations provide "policy guidance... to in-
sure that congressional intent is carried out," 160 thus shaping implementation
of the Act. Such management control has been exercised in at least three
ways: (1) control over the geographical placement of programs and their
funding levels; (2) control over the boundaries of client eligibility; (3) control
over the priority-setting process.
During the Corporation's early years decisions regarding the geographical
distribution of expansion funds were governed by two themes. First, a com-
mitment to the minimum access plan1 61 which resulted in the placement of
thinly funded programs throughout the country. Second, an attempt to cen-
Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 270 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 677, 707-19, 726-27 (1977).
158. Note, however, Cappeiletti, supra note 155, who argues that the state can no longer fulfill
its traditional role as protector of the public interest and that autonomous private public interest
groups are necessary for that purpose.
159. Hearings on H.R. 3719, supra note 151, at 102 (statement of Llewelyn Pritchard).
160. R. Schmidt and J. Waller, Program Management and Evaluation, in The Legal Services
Corporation: A Recommended Approach 2 (Dec. 7, 1977, Urban Institute).
161. The minimum access plan would provide the equivalent of two attorneys per 10,000 peo-
ple. It has been identified as the short-term goal of the Corporation. See, e.g., Legal Services
Corporation, Annual Report 1977, at 10.
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tralize existing programs for purposes of efficiency. Existing programs were
enlarged, and contiguously located small programs amalgamated.' 62 By its
control over "special needs" grants 163 and other discretionary nonformula
finding the Corporation exercised further influence over the direction of pro-
gram growth and development. This influence was limited, however, by Con-
gress' grant-in-aid approach to federal subsidy that maximized program
autonomy. 16 Further, the complex defunding procedures in the 1977 amend-
ments created a presumption of funding continuity which inhibited effective
control of local program activity.
165
Control over client eligibility was mandated originally by the 1974 Act,
which required that the Corporation establish priorities that would give a serv-
ice preference to "those who would be otherwise unable to afford adequate
legal counsel." 166 The House Report for an early draft of this legislation
makes clear: "Regulations promulgated by the corporation will assure that the
poorest of the poor receive a priority in the provision of legal serv-
ices .... ",167 This standard was omitted in the 1977 Amendments because
preferences based on income might "upset priorities of the client community
by requiring a less urgent legal problem to be given greater consideration,
merely because the client had a lower income."168 The present Act does not
contain specific income eligibility criteria. Instead, the Corporation has dele-
gated the choice of income limits to local programs which set their own stan-
dards for client eligibility within maximum income levels set by the
Corporation. 169 These guidelines limit legal assistance to persons whose in-
come does not exceed 125 percent of the Office of Management and Budget's
162. The Corporation made special efforts to order the amalgamation of small programs. See,
e.g., Spokane County Legal Servs. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 614 F.2d 662, (9th Cir. 1980); Neighbor-
hood Legal Servs. Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Conn. 1979).
163. Legal Services Corporation, Annual Report 1978, at 9.
164. The problems in ensuring "local commitment to federal performance objectives" in
grant-in-aid programs are reviewed in W. Williams, Government by Agency: Lessons from the
Social Program Grants-in-Aid Experience xi passim (1980). The problem of ensuring grantee
accountability is a generic one. See Hood, Government by Other Means: The Grants Economy
and the Contract State, in W.J.M.M. Political Questions 146 (B. Chapman & A. Potter eds. 1974);
Porter & Warner, How Effective Are Grantor Controls? The Case of Federal Aid to Education, in
Transfers in an Urbanized Economy 276 (D. Boulding, M. Pfaff & A. Pfaff eds. 1973).
165. See Pub. L. No. 222, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 91 Stat. 1619 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996j (Supp. HI 1979)). These provisions expanded the hearing procedures in the 1974 Act by
requiring the appointment of an independent hearing examiner, when requested, before any final
decision by the Corporation. See § 1011(2), as amended by § 10 of Pub. Law 95-222; Conference
Rert No. 825, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (accompanying H.R. 6666). See 45 C.F.R. § 1623
g198).
H.R. 3480, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(b) (1981), would repeal section 1011 of the Legal Serv-
ices Corp. Act as amended and would no longer require that the Corporation hold a hearing prior
to denying a refunding application. Notice and a hearing would still be required for suspensions
and terminations of more than thirty days, however. See id. § 4(a). The propriety of such pre-
sumptive funding was discussed at 127 Cong. Rec. H. 2,990-93 (daily ed. June 16, 1981).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(2) (1976) (amended 1977).
167. H.R. Rep. No. 247, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
3872, 3880.
168. H.R. Rep. No. 310, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4503, 4512.
169. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1611.3, .5 (1980).
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(OMB) poverty threshold. 170 In most states, this is approximately $5,388 for
an individual and $10,563 for a family of four. 171 Otherwise ineligible persons
may be eligible for legal services if a staff attorney takes into account "[tihe
cost of obtaining private legal representation with respect to the particular
matter in which assistance is sought."' 172 Attorneys may also consider "[tihe
consequences for the individual if legal assistance is denied."'
173
The Corporation also influences the priority setting decisions made by
local programs. Under OEO, an overt effort was made to enforce law reform
as a programmatic priority "irrespective of the attitudes held by board or staff
leaders of grantees."'174 National goals and guidelines were laid down for pro-
grams to follow. 175 Evaluations were used to accomplish "major surgery on
clearly deficient grantees."'176 This effort reflected a continuous tension be-
tween national policy and local control. 177 OEO, however, showed "its deter-
mination to enforce its demands by cutting back the funds of those offices
which it [did] not regard as properly oriented."'
178
The Legal Services Corporation took a different tack, delegating in large
measure its responsibility to establish service priorities for resource allocation
to local programs. The Corporation concluded that "[t]he specific mix of serv-
ices and case types undertaken will be a matter for local judgment,"'179 not
national policy. The abandonment of strong efforts to influence policy meant
that legal services staffs became "increasingly autonomous. .. [and] free to
set their own priorities."'180 Thus significant evaluation or monitoring of local
program activity' 8 ' became difficult.
170. Id. § 1611.3(b).
171. 46 Fed. Reg. 19,936 (1981) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 1611 app. A) (excepts Alaska
and Hawaii). Authorized exceptions are found in 45 C.F.R. § 1611.4 (1980).
172. 45 C.F.R. § 1611.5(b)(6) (1980). This must be read in conjunction with 45 C.F.R.
§ 1611.4(a) (1980) if the individual's income exceeds the maximum level
173. Id. § 1611.5(b)(7) (1980). This must be read in conjunction with 45 C.F.R. § 1611.4(a)
(1980) if the individual's income exceeds the maximum leveL
174. E. Johnson, supra note 101, at 176. In contrast, Gary Bellow suggests that "there was,
particularly in the early years, relatively little federal control or regulation of individual pro-
grams." Bellow, supra note 21, at 338.
175. Office of Economic Opportunity, Guidelines for Legal Services Programs (1967). The
development of the guidelines is traced in E. Johnson, supra note 101, at 106-16.
176. E. Johnson, supra note 101, at 173.
177. Hannon, National Policy versus Local Control: The Legal Services Dilemma, 5 Cal. W.
L. Rev. 223 (1969). This is the core of the Reagan Administration's proposals to situate legal
services in the states-although the administration has a different notion of who should exercise
such local control.
178. Id. at 230. Katz concurs with this view of national OEO pressure on local programs in his
study of the Chicago program. J. Katz, Poor People's Lawyers in Transition 252 (prepublication
draft 1981). See generally E. Johnson, supra note 101, at 163-84.
179. Olmstead & O'Donnell, Commentary on Singsen, Management of Scarce Resources (or
How to Be a Better Ant), 13 Clearinghouse Rev. 564 (1979). It is unclear why that should be the
case. This view is posited on two assumptions: (1) that there are different local or regional needs
in every part of the country and that centralized decisionmaking could best reflect these local
idiosyncracies; (2) that each local community should have the choice to decide how it wishes to set
its own priorities consonant with its own ideological perspective.
180. J. Katz, supra note 178, at 254.
181. Bellow, supra note 21, at 343. The General Accounting Office concluded that it is essen-
tial that information about resource allocation be centrally collected and evaluated for local
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The Corporation's requirement that local programs adopt procedures for
establishing priorities in allocating its resources182 mandates that the proce-
dures include "an appraisal of the needs of eligible clients. . . and their rela-
tive importance." 18 3 The priority setting procedure must ensure that "all
signgicant segments of the client community and the [program 's employees"
have an opportunity to participate. 8 4 This arrangement reflects the Corpora-
tion's view that varying local needs require differing program emphases.
Local programs, however, do not have complete autonomy in setting their
litigation agenda. The Corporation monitors the actions of the local pro-
grams. Were a program to refuse all service work and limit its efforts to "im-
pact litigation," the Corporation would probably step in.185 By means of
informal communication and monitoring by regional offices, the Corporation
sensitizes local programs to the outer limits of their autonomy in the priority
setting area.186 While the Corporation has attempted to impose a variety of
management controls over local programs, this has been met with tremendous
field resistance and has been attacked by field attorneys as "bureaucratic" and
stifling. 187 For the most part, however, the Corporation has failed to exercise
projects management and oversight. See GAO Rep. No. HRD-78-100, Expanding Budget Re-
quests for Civil Legal Needs of the Poor-Is More Control for Effective Services Required? 17-19,
22 (Apr. 26, 1978).
The GAO accused the Corporation of operating too loose a bureaucratic rein on local grant-
ees. The GAO commented unfavorably on the 1977 struggle between the Corporation and local
operation and demonstration projects to obtain national data for a management study. Local
offices refused to cooperate, expressing concern over confidentiality and fears that the information
would be used to gauge attorney performance and quality of service.
182. 45 C.F.R. § 1620.2(a) (1980). As of January 1979, barely half of the programs surveyed
by the Legal Services Corporation Office of Field Services even claimed to have established pro-
gram priorities. Memorandum from W. Callahan, Draft of Proposed Content for Program Plan-
ning Primer (Jan. 12, 1979). Little evaluation has been done as to whether the compliance which
has occurred has been meaningful or perfunctory.
183. 45 C.F.R. § 1620.2(a)(1) (1980).
184. Id. § 1620.2(a)(2) (1980) (emphasis in original). The original regulations published on
November 23, 1976, required recipients to "insure participation by clients and employees of the
recipient" whether or not they evinced a desire to participate. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,609 (1976) (codified
at 45 C.F.R. § 1620.2(a) (1977)).
185. Thomas Ehrlich suggested that "if we found a program excluded a significant portion of
the population in setting its priorities-in New York City, for example, if it excluded the elderly
or excluded veterans, excluded Spanish speaking people-we would not allow that to continue
without stopping it." Proposed Amendments, supra note 129, at 26 (statement of T. Ehrlich, Presi-
dent, LSC). Program staff apparently take a different position, however, suggesting that
Local priority determinations can, in theory, totally exclude an identified group within
the eligible population unless some other violation of law is involved. For example, if a
program will only see clients at one of its regular offices, all institutionalized persons are
excluded from its services. A local judgement to that effect is presently permissable [sic].
LSC Research Institute, Section 1007(h) Issues Paper 13-14 (Sept. 13, 1978).
186. Lieberman, Management Failures in Legal Services Programs: A Structural Dilemma,
14 Clearinghouse Rev. 143 (1980).
187. Thus one legal services attorney has complained, "There is no longer a sense of commu-
nity within legal services" blaming in part "a bureaucratic civil service mentality" presumably
fostered by the Corporation. Rosenthal, Legal Services ... Revisited, 35 NLADA Briefcase,
Sept. 1978, at 128. This malaise in Corporation-staff attorney relations may be responsible, in
part, for the growing trend towards unionization of legal services attorneys. Through December
1980, over 50 programs have been unionized. Schorr, Unionization in Legal Services, 14
Clearinghouse Rev. 836, 848 (1980). For a discussion of political issues involved in such unioniza-
tion see id. at 844-50. See also Stavitsky, Lawyer Unionization in Quasi-Governmental Public
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its regulatory powers.
The Corporation has used its abdication of central authority to develop a
myth of local autonomy: the Corporation merely provides administrative con-
trols and technical assistance to local programs, but does not control the ways
in which local programs choose to spend their money and disclaims responsi-
bility for the choices made.188 This claim of neutrality depends on an implicit
acceptance of the social utility justification for government subsidy and a con-
comitant rejection, rhetoric notwithstanding, of the theory of access rights.
Even so, the requirement of priority setting has been approved by both
courts and ethics committees. The constitutionality of priority setting was up-
held in a West Virginia case in which a local program limited its divorce
caseload to situations "where the defendant could be personally served and
where there were minor children of the marriage whose custody or support
was in issue." 189 Further, the American Bar Association Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics has approved the use of such priority setting as a vehicle for
caseload limitation, at least "to the extent necessary to allocate [resources]
fairly and reasonably.., to establish proper priorities in the interest of mak-
ing maximum legal services available." 19,0 Another opinion has suggested that
"the refusal of the directors of a legal services office to institute a system of
priorities or waiting lists" causes staff attorneys to violate the canons of ethics
when unmanageable caseloads cause "inadequate preparation by a staff law-
yer or 'neglect' of cases already in hand."'191 Thus, it is argued that Corpora-
tion-mandated priority setting possesses an ethical imprimatur as well as
pragmatic popularity.
The Corporation's eligibility threshold of 125 percent of the OMB pov-
erty line means that eligibility is largely restricted to welfare recipients.192
and Private Sectors, 17 Cal. W.L. Rev. 55, 66-70 (1980), for a discussion of the collective bargain-
ing issues.
188. Indeed, one corporation study document urged that the Legal Services Corporation "was
not established to regulate the field but to serve the needs of the legal services field offices, staff
and clients.' Legal Services Corp., Next Steps for the Legal Services Corporation 148 (1978).
189. Calvert v. West Virginia Legal Servs. Plan, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 789, 790 (S.D.W. Va.,
1979). Barring the use of invidious criteria, it is likely that the adoption of efficiency of utility
criteria for priority-setting is constitutionally valid.
190. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 334, at 6 (1974).
It is possible that, in order to achieve the goal of maximizing legal services, services to
individuals may be limited in order to use the program's resources to accomplish law
reform in connection with particular legal subject matter. The subject matter priorities
must be based on a consideration of the needs of the client community and the resources
available to the program. They may not be based on considerations such as the identity
of the prospective adverse parties or the nature of the remedy ("class action") to be
employed.
Id.
191. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. No. 1359 (1976).
192. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3 (1979) (125% of official OMB poverty threshold); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(A), (B) (Supp. 11980).
The General Accounting Office has criticized Congress and the Corporation for permitting
grantees to serve individuals above the OMB poverty level, especially in light of the Corporation's
funding goal: to provide the poor with minimal, rather than adequate, access to services. The
GAO believed that allowing such a threshold "could result in those least able to afford not receiv-
ing preference in obtaining free legal services." See Comptroller General of the United States,
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This does not extend legal services to all people unable to afford lawyers for
basic legal tasks.193 Even the middle class may not be able to afford adequate
counsel in complex litigation. The contingent fee system may mitigate this
problem for personal injury cases and the growth of legal clinics and prepaid
schemes may reduce fees in standard cases. Nonetheless, a legal aid scheme
that attempted to serve all who could not afford legal assistance would expand
its eligibility criteria substantially.
194
Eligibility criteria could be expanded in one of three ways. The first
would be by abolishing the income requirement and making legal services
available to all. This accepts the implicit logic of the theory of access rights.
Indeed, the Older American Act takes this position in principle, 195 although
the Act requires that "pending the availability of such programs for all older
citizens, [programs] give priority to the elderly with the greatest economic and
social need." 196 The second way would be by further developing the concept
Expanding Budget Requests for Civil Legal Needs of the Poor-Is More Control for Effective
Services Required? 7 (1978).
193. It is clearly simplistic to imagine that the population divides up neatly into the "poor"
who cannot afford legal services and the "nonpoor" who can.
194. The English rule on eligibility is more generous than the American limitations. In the
mid-70s the scheme funded almost 40% of civil litigation. The Law Society & the Lord Chancel-
lor's Advisory Committee, 27th Legal Aid Annual Reports 61 (1976-77). A recent revision of the
eligibility requirements for part one of the scheme makes legal aid available to those with disposa-
ble incomes of not more than £ 4,075 and available without contribution to those with disposable
incomes of not more than £ 1,700. However, the capital sum available to the applicant must not
be in excess of£ 2,500. The applicant must make a contribution if his capital sum exceeds £ 1,200.
Legal Aid (Financial Conditions) No. 2 Regulations 1979, S.I. 1979 No. 351; Legal Aid (Financial
Conditions) Regulations 1979, S.I. 1979 No. 1394. See also Legal Advice and Assistance (Finan-
cial Conditions) (No. 2) Regulations 1979, S.I. 1979 No. 350; Legal Advice and Assistance (Finan-
cial Conditions) (No. 4) Regulations 1979, S.I. 1979 No. 1164. These schemes are well described
(with somewhat dated figures) in 1 Royal Commission on Legal Services, Final Report, Cmnd.
7648, at 11.8-.9, 12.1-13.72 (1979).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1976 & Supp. II 1979). The regulations governing legal services pro-
vided under the Act contain the means-test prohibition, 45 Fed. Reg. 21,161 (1980), as do those
concerning the general content of state and area plans. See id. at 21,150 (1980). In 1978, legal
services became a required part of every aid package under the Act. The Department of Human
Resource Development expressed concern that dispensing legal services to the elderly without a
means-test (as opposed to other social services) "might be too restrictive for legal services. Legal
representation can at times be very expensive, and a single client, who may well need extensive
legal services may also be able to pay, at least in part, for those services." The agency invited
comment on "whether it would be feasible or appropriate to allow legal service providers to con-
sider an older person's income and resources in deciding the extent of legal representation to
rovide that person." 44 Fed. Reg. 45,040-41 (1979). After receiving many comments speaking to
th sides of the issue, the agency decided to retain the means-test prohibition, but allowed area
agencies to "set priorities for the categories of cases for which it will provide legal representation"
and to "consider the availability of staff resources" so as to "concentrate on older persons with the
greatest economic or social need." 45 Fed. Reg. 21,161 (1980); a legal service provider under the
Act cannot require an older person to disclose financial information, except as part of the process
of giving legal advice or while providing that person with additional resources and benefits under
the Act. 45 Fed. Reg. 21,161 (1980).
196. See the congressional declaration of additional objectives, 42 U.S.C. § 3003(2) (1976).
States are to take into account the particular needs of low income persons in choosing which
services are to be funded and in locating service offices. See S. Rep. No. 255, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
18, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1252, 1259.
A 1976 study gives the impression that Title III area agencies funded by the Act should have
been defining and screening for low income groups as part of the congressional mandate and were
failing to do so. R. Steinberg, A Study of Funding Agreements and Program Agreements and
Monitoring Procedures Affecting the Implementation of Title III of the Older Americans Act,
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of "legally needy." Such a criterion of eligibility might be based on the
number and intensity of a person's legal problems in relation to that person's
income rather than using his income level alone. This criterion would con-
sider: (1) total family needs in the particular case; (2) the seriousness and com-
plexity of the problem; and (3) the private costs of required legal assistance.
This concept of "legally needy" would cover individuals whose income and
resources are insufficient to cover the cost of necessary services. This approach
is already used in Criminal Justice Act determinations to provide government
subsidy to criminal defendants. The third way would be for the Corporation
to raise the income eligibility level above 125 percent of the OMB poverty line.
However, without an increase in congressional funding, such an increase
would only compound the existing resource allocation problem.
197
A central argument made by the legal services community against re-
laxing existing eligibility criteria is that enlarging the eligible group will dilute
the purported homogeneity of the program's clientele and the uniformity of its
Rep. No. 3, A Longitudinal Analysis of 97 Area Agencies on Aging 65 (U.S. Cal. Andrus Geron-
tology Center 1976). Only 22% of the agencies surveyed used any income criteria for individual
screening or group targeting and then as areas of emphasis only. Id.
The 1978 Conference report made it clear, however, that inclusion of a preference for those
with the greatest economic need should not be interpreted as the first step towards institutional-
izing a means-test for programs under the Act. See H.R. Rep. 1618, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 69,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3429, 3445.
Under the 1978 amendments, states and area agencies are required to "provide assurances
that preference will be given to. . . older individuals with the greatest economic or social needs."
42 U.S.C. §§ 3025(a)(2)(E), 3026(a)(5)(A) (1980); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 21,157 (1980). Agencies
administering the Act must focus their resources and personnel on needy older persons to satisfy
the interstate funding formula, 45 Fed. Reg. 21,152 (1980), when designating service areas, 45 Fed.
Reg. 21,153 (1980), when designating community focal points, 45 Fed. Reg. 21,156 (1980), in
specific area plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 21,155, and in the delivery of services, 45 Fed. Reg. 21,156. See
also H.R. Rep. No. 1150, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
3388, 3404. See W. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice 222-26 (1966) for an anal-
ysis of the effect of means-tests on applicants and the reasons for the unpopularity of such tests.
The universalist arguments against selectivism in the provision of social services are first, that they
stigmatize the recipient; second, that the stigma and the lack of information of how to obtain a
selective service will lead many in need not to request service; third, that systems of selective
service isolate those in need from the rest of society and thus tend to result in service of inferior
quality. See Redding, Universalism and Selectivity, 40 Pol Q. 12-22 (Jan.-March 1969). But see
R. Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare (1968), in which the author points out that "[t]here is. . . no
escaping the conclusion that if we are effectively to reach the poor, we must differentiate and
discriminate," id. at 159, and that "[t]he challenge that faces us is not the choice between univer-
salist and selective social services. The real challenge resides in the question: what particular
infrastructure of universalist services is needed in order to provide a framework of values and
opportunity bases within and around which can be developed socially acceptable selective services
aiming to discriminate positively, with the minimum risk of stigma in favour of those whose needs
are greatest?" Id. at 135. In the last decade, there has been a movement away from universalism
among social welfare theorists in Europe.
197. An increase in funding of legal services proportional to the increase in eligible clients
would require a restructuring of the program, if not the profession. The requisite increase in
funding would result in increased pressure for participation by the private bar in the available
funding pool Alternatively, the necessary increase in staff attorneys would result in the partial
nationalization of the profession. See the scheme proposed by Marvin Frankel in Justice: Com-
modity or Public Service (1978); see generally Frankel, An Immodest Proposal, N.Y. Times, Dec.
4, 1977, § 6 (Magazine) at 93-104. See also M. Frankel, Partisan Justice 123-29 (1980). For a
skeptical discussion of the effects of nationalization, see Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession:
Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services Achieve Social Justice?, I Law & Pol'y Q. 5(Jan. 1979); 1
Royal Commission on Legal Services, Final Report, Cnnd. 7648, at 5.7-.8 (1979).
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purpose. If the purpose of legal services is to advance the position of the pov-
erty community in society, enlarging the contours of the program to include
the lower middle class would expand the variety of interests and concerns that
the program must face. 198 For example, a program serving the "near poor"
elderly might have to provide service in will drafting and simple real estate
transactions. Such service, while important to the individuals involved, does
not attack the roots of poverty or the structural concerns of the poor. With a
larger eligible client pool, a program would have to set priorities' that might
ignore, or even conflict with, the needs of a significant portion of its
constituency.199
While suggestions that Legal Services use a concept of legal need tailored
to individual circumstances may recognize considerations of fairness or equity,
the approach is fraught with practical difficulties. An eligibility determination
tied to legal need will vest the legal aid attorney with extraordinary discretion.
Such discretion may defeat efforts to ensure client-oriented allocation of the
use of legal aid.
D. The Role of the Attorney in Resource Allocation
Congressional, Corporation, and local board prohibitions and mandates
are mediated through the managing attorney and his legal staff. Managing
attorneys can influence a program's style and may well shape a program in
their own image. While formally constrained by priority guidelines developed
by the program's board of directors, managing attorneys and their staff have
considerable discretion in the manner and intensity with which they approach
the problems their clients present them. Similarly, they still control the deci-
sion whether or not to take on a client.
2°°
Thus, within the parameters of decisions on resource allocation by Con-
198. See Fretz, Decent Legal Care for Moderate Income Americans: Hope for the Eighties, 36
NLADA Briefcase, Mar. 1979, at 2, 4, acknowledging the argument that "expanded eligibility
would bring a greater variety of legal problems to an office. It could replace public assistance
issues with unemployment compensation; it could eclipse Social Security advocacy with pension
litigation."
199. Thus, one former legal services attorney has admitted that he formerly opposed expan-
sion of eligibility limits because such an approach "would create conflicts for the poverty orienta-
tion of legal services, would cause class conflict to some extent among clients and between staff
members and clients, and, most significantly, would create an irresistable temptation to expand
services to middle income clients in pursuit of the money carrot." Letter of Paul J. Kelly, 36
NLADA Briefcase, Summer 1979, at 49. See also Fretz, supra note 198, at 3 ("Expansion could
drain off to middle class whites those scarce funds intended to benefit poor blacks and other
minorities."). Indeed, in a number of issues, such as welfare reform, the lower middle class may
perceive its interests to be directly opposed to those of the hardcore poor. However, some com-
mentators, including Fretz, have suggested that expansion "can help repair divisiveness between
those who are legaly served and those who remain unserved." Id. at 4. The importance of mod-
erating such divisiveness, thus seeking out "links between the very poor and the others who are
regularly put into conflict with each other by the kind of social legislation we have," has been
urged by Edward Sparer. Sparer, Legal Services and Social Change: The Uneasy Question and
the Missing Perspective, 34 NLADA Briefcase, Dec. 1976, at 58, 61. Sparer suggests that such
linkage can be developed by legal aid lawyers looking "to new types of issues," other than ex-
panding income eligibility. Id. at 62.
200. The tremendous influence of project directors was underscored as early as 1970 in two
studies sponsored by OEO. Project directors in OEO Legal Services emerged as the "most impor-
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gress, the Legal Services Corporation, and local boards, it is in large measure
the staff in consultation and individual attorneys who set program priorities by
the cases they choose to handle. In this respect the line attorney is the "gate-
keeper" of the legal services system.20 1 Either he, or a paralegal under his
control, will make the initial decision whether a client is eligible for services
202
and whether the client will be served. Historically, the individual legal aid
attorney had considerable discretion in deciding who should and who should
not be served. In part, this was due to the open-textured character of the serv-
ice regulations. In part it was a result of the lack of any effective review of
attorney decisions.
The argument that the attorney should be given discretion to allocate pro-
gram resources springs from a conviction that a professional should control
and determine whom he will serve. The autonomous professional will resist
the rules and regulations laid down by a regulatory authority like the Corpora-
tion. In the name of professional autonomy he will reject client control as
bureaucratic interference with effective service for the poor.
Many commentators have stressed the importance of protecting attorney
autonomy. Charles Fried, in an essay entitled "The Lawyer as Friend,"
20 3
argues that just as we have the right in society to choose our friends, so should
we have the right to choose attorneys and attorneys should have a similar right
to select clients on the basis of either personal or moral considerations. Some
writers have argued that unless attorneys choose their clients on the basis of
such feelings, they will violate their duty of fidelity to self.2°4 Program direc-
tors have argued that no one, not even a program director, can set limits on an
attorney's decision about whom he will serve. One program director has
stated that whatever the program's priorities, if the "staff attorney whom you
hired ... makes the attorney decision 'this is my client, I will serve him,'...
[I] cannot interfere with that decision."20 5 The view that "[b]oards can impose
tant individuals in establishing the policy orientation of the projects." Champagne, The Internal
Operation of OEO Legal Services Projects, 51 J. Urb. L. 649, 651-52 (1974).
201. In fact, Champagne speculated that the "inadequate" emphasis on law reform in OEO
Legal Services was directly due to the fact that "many attorneys are simply not interested in law
reform." Id. at 653. Only 14% of the offices sampled in one study were involved in substantial law
reform. He attributed this to "lack of both aggressiveness and interest in law reform." Id.
To Champagne, a supporter of a proactive posture by attorneys, the data suggested the OEO
attorneys need to be motivated "to pursue goals other than individual case handling," id. at 654,
even to the extent of "hiring and retaining only those [attorneys] supporting national program
goals." Id. at 663.
202. There is controversy as to whether the screening process should be undertaken by an
attorney or whether a paralegal should undertake intake interviews and make eligibility decisions.
This is not a recent controversy. See NLAA, Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference 86-88,
88-89 (1953), for conflicting views on whether "every client that came into an office had a right to
see an attorney." Id. at 91.
203. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85
Yale LJ. 1060 (1976). See also Dauer & Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 Yale
LJ. 573 (1977); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. L. Rev. 30, 106-13.
204. Flynn, Professional Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty to Self, 1976 Wash. U.L.Q. 429, 443.
205. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Ethical Aspects of Re-
strictions on (Non-Profit) Legal Assistance Offices 127-28 (1973).
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upon the Legal Aid Director or his staff attorneys [orders about] which cases
they can get into and which cases they cannot get into. .. 206 has been vigor-
ously rejected.
Professional ethics do not require an attorney, public or private, to take
all comers on a first-come, first-served basis. While the Code of Professional
Responsibility suggests attorneys should not lightly decline employment, the
Code specifically protects the autonomy of an attorney to choose his own cli-
ents. Lawyers who fail to derive personal satisfaction from representing a cer-
tain client may terminate the relationship. The attorney has no need to live
with frustration.20 7 If a case or client offends his feelings, he may refuse.208 In
this respect, the American position differs from the British taxi-rank rule,
which requires a barrister to accept a client if his workload permits and the
client can pay the fee.
209
There are numerous problems with the American position in the legal aid
context. It minimizes the role of the client as a participant in determining how
program funds should be spent. We cannot assume that the program staff,
even with good intentions, would in fact set priorities according to the commu-
nity's best interest. There is, in fact, little reason to vest the legal aid lawyer
with expert status in determining a community's legal agenda. The legal aid
lawyer is not likely to be a resident of the community where he works. Often
he comes from a different cultural milieu. Thus, even if we accept the lawyer's
good faith, we may question his method for assessing community need and the
accuracy of his perceptions.
As an example, the legal aid attorney's desire to pursue impact litigation
may reflect the intellectual satisfaction and intrinsic legal interest of that
206. Id. at 183 (testimony of Mr. Benavides, Director of the Laredo, Texas Legal Aid Society).
207. Pincus, The Clinical Component in University Professional Education, 32 Oldo St. L.J.
283, 286 (1971).
208. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-30 (1978). See also id. at EC 2-26. On
the other hand, there is a duty to ensure that persons can get some legal representation. The
Canons suggest that "a lawyer should not lightly decline proferred employment." They further
note that a lawyer must accept "his share of tendered employment which may be unattractive both
to him and to the bar generally." Id. Further, when requested by a bar association or appointed
by a court, a lawyer "should not seek to be excused from undertaking the representation except for
compelling reasons." Id. at EC 2-29. The old Canons were less specific. Regarding representa-
tion of indigent prisoners, they required that an attorney not "seek to be excused for any trivial
reason." ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 4 (1967). There is a contradiction in the ethical
literature on this point. On the one hand, the lawyer is free to accept employment from whomever
he wishes. On the other hand, someone must agree to take on the indigent and controversial
client. Often that attorney is viewed as a vaguely shady member of the profession. See G.
Warvelle, Essays in Legal Ethics 132-33 (2d ed. 1920). Perhaps the rule should be reformulated as
follows: A lawyer is free to decline employment for whatever reasons he chooses (although not for
trivial reasons) unless there is no one available who will volunteer to take the case in which case
he needs a compelling reason to decline to accept employment if asked.
209. "Counsel is bound to accept any brief in the Courts in which he professes to practice at a
proper professional fee dependent on the length and difficulty of the case." W. Boulton, A Guide
to Conduct and Etiquette at the Bar of England and Wales 48 (6th ed. 1975). Exceptions are made
for conflict of interest cases. Id. at 32-41. The rule does not apply to solicitors, T. Lund, A Guide
to the Professional Conduct and Etiquette of Solicitors 28 (1969), although some have suggested
that it should. For a different view of solicitors' case-selection methods, see Can a Solicitor Pick
and Choose, 34 L. Guardian, Feb. 1968, at 1.
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work.210 Some may view the repetition involved in general practice as bor-
ing,211 so it is not surprising that legal services attorneys shrink from routine
domestic relations work. Attorneys may be affected by a variety of concerns in
deciding whether to take on a case and how intensely to press it. Some of
those factors are personal rather than professional.212 Thus, the attorney may
consider a variety of extra-legal criteria in determining case selection, such as
advancement within his administrative organization,213 enhancement of pro-
fessional reputation,2 14 easing of workload,215 emotional and intellectual
needs,216 and the desire for peer approval.
210. T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Pure and Applied 185-99 (1949). See gener-
ally Ladinsky, The Traffic in Legal Services: Lawyer-Seeking Behavior and the Channeling of
Clients, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev. 207, 209-211 (1976).
It must be understood that there is no analytic reason why law-reform litigation must contain
more "intrinsic" interest. Indeed, a small problem if attacked intelligently can require creative
thinking and often result in important impact on the lives of the poor. I am indebted to Jonathan
Weiss for underscoring this point.
211. However, "the discovery of a unique issue is likely to be a function of the amount of time
that lawyers devote to a case, and thus of the amount of money that the client spends on lawyers.
If the stakes are high, the problems can become very complex; if the client lacks money, his
problems are likely to be routine." Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests,
Professional Roles and Social Hierarchies, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1111, 1117 (1978). A useful sketch of
the implications to the legal profession of this "deep pocket" for legal research may be found in
M. Galanter, Larger than Life: Mega-Law and Mea-Lawyering in the Contemporary United
States (draft, Apr. 1980); see also G. Hazard, Ethics m the Practice of Law 152-53(1978).
212. This phenomenon is not specific to attorneys. Research into the sociology of medicine
suggests that doctors and medical researchers often make decisions for patients on grounds of self-
interest rather than subject or patient interest. B. Gray, Human Subjects in Medical Experimenta-
tion 70-71 (1975). See also Blumgart, The Medical Framework for Viewing the Problem of
Human Experimentation, in Experimentation with Human Subjects 39 (P. Freund ed. 1969).
213. "In the Los Angeles defender organization, the trial attorneys orient their behavior to suit
the expectations of middle-level administrators .... Trial attorneys are generally rewarded for
meeting their supervisors' expectations and penalized for rejecting them." Bohine, The Public
Defender as Advocate: A Study in Administration, Politics and Criminal Justice 24, 25 (Institute
for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 414-77, Apr. 1977).
214. The choice of cases might not be unlike that of a private, public interest law firm.
The development of the firm's program, the need to litigate and to obtain publicity and
legitimation, cannot be left to walk-in trade. The firm has to select clients that will fur-
ther these goals. The ideal client, from the point of view of a public interest law firm, is a
roup that is newsworthy and either a hierarchical or a paper organization, so that the
awyers only have to deal with the leadership rather than a restless membership.
J. Handler, E. Hollingsworth & H. Erlanger, Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal Rights, 81-82
(1978).
215. Studies of prosecutional priority-setting have suggested that prosecutors choose to go to
trial against defendants when they believe the weight of the evidence is in their favor rather than
when the defendants have prior arrest records and are labelled as "bad" men. This decision is
motivated in part by work pressures. Forst & Brosi, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the
Prosecutor, 6 J. Legal Stud. 177 (1977). In discussing the decision of public defenders to stress a
plea bargain, Jonathan Casper has pointed out: "He knows that his caseload is tremendous and
that it is in the interest of the courts as a whole for most guilty men to plead guilty. He knows that
he cannot spend as much time as he might like on any particular case." J. Casper, American
Criminal Justice: The Defendant's Perspective 108 (1972); see also Church, In Defense of "Bar-
gain" Justice, 13 Law & Soe'y Rev. 509, 522 (1979) ("Public defenders often labor under the same
intense caseload pressures experienced by their counterparts in the prosecutor's office.. . . [They
may urge their clients to settle for a less advantageous bargain than the facts warrant."). The
symbiotic relationship between defender and prosecutor is detailed in A. Blumberg, Criminal Jus-
tice (1967); Skolnick Social Control in the Adversary System, 3 J. Conflict Resolution 52 (1967).
216. In the medical context one study of medical students found that the students would prefer
to work on nonroutine cases than on routine ones. See H. Becker, B. Geer, E. Hughes & A.
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Lawyers may also bring their personal political beliefs to bear on case
selection and case handling criteria; those beliefs will often affect not only
their approach to clients217 but also the very clients they choose. 218 Legal
services lawyers who believe their job is to serve the poverty community will
allow their docket to be organized by the leaders of community groups with
which they are working.219 Attorneys who are committed to radical social
change may try to work on cases that will help forward their political goals.
Such lawyers will act as "moral and political 'entrepreneurs' who can take
advantage of the pressures of ideals and the legitimation needs of the [polit-
ical] system"'220 to affect desired changes in the social order.
To the extent that the choice of clients depends on the political and social
views of the legal aid lawyer, explicit review of a lawyer's political and social
characteristics would suggest the nature of his bias in case selection. Efforts to
compose a collective biography of legal aid lawyers have produced mixed re-
sults. Some suggest legal services attorneys possess many of the culture-spe-
Strauss, Boys in White (1961). While it is often suggested that attorneys prefer the interesting as
opposed to the routinized case, there is evidence among public defenders that they choose to
"type" clients for routinized processing. Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the
Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 Soc. Probs. 255 (1965).
217. Radical politics and a commitment to impact litigation do not necessarily result in a
commitment to client control. Thus one commentator suggests that "[w]e have gotten idealistic
young people to join us in the struggle by optimistically holding out the possibility that they could
to some degree exercise their power for social justice, not merely act as servants of the poor."
Kaimowitz, Legal Services: Marching to a Different Drummer, 35 NLADA Briefcase 66, 67 (June
1978). "This accountability to a mythical client populace can only be compared to trustees or
capos in a prison system watching the actions not only of other inmates, but of their lawyers as
well." Id. at 68. The ideal of the lawyer's role in guiding the supposedly powerless and helpless
coexists with notions of professional autonomy. Thus one legal services attorney has recognized
that "[i]t is often far too easy for well meaning legal services staff to take over from clients the
power to make essential decisions on the course of legal representation." Dooley, The ABA
Model Rules-Why Legal Services Staff and Clients Should Become Involved, 37 NLADA Brief-
case, Sept. 1980, at 44, 45.
218. Thus in one student legal aid clinic, students debated at length over whether they should
develop legal theories that would aid indigent landlords. Lawyers, Clients and Ethics 66-71 (M.
Bloom ed. 1974). Further, the Parkdale Legal Clinic at York University, Toronto, refused repre-
sentation of indigent landlords in eviction actions claiming that such representation is "destruc-
tive" of the effort of "establishing and maintaining an image of a place that represents the interests
of low-income people." Representing landlords against tenants would "seriously diminish [the]
clinic's potential for acceptability in the low income community." Letter from S. Ellis to Toronto
City Executive Committee (Aug. 11, "1975). The Legal Aid Foundation of Chicago takes a similar
position. J. Katz, supra note 178, at 258. The staff of the Toronto clinic later urged the proposi-
tion "that access to PCLS legal services be denied to clients seeking to oppose union organization"
and that the board and staff "prepare a list of the people or causes for whom we will not act." S.
Ellis, Position Paper Number Two on the Subject of Access to Legal Services (Apr. 12, 1977). By
this view, the clinic would provide access to legal services only for those purposes approved by the
staff.
While the impact of ideology on programmatic choice has been studied, see Finman, OEO
Legal Service Programs and the Pursuit of Social Change: The Relationship Between Program
Ideology and Program Performance, 1971 Wis. L. Rev. 1001, there has been no exact study of how
ideology affects case selection in individual cases and how ideological views affect the extent to
which clients, in fact, share in allocation decisions.
219. See generally Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 Yale L.J. 1049 (1970). The
correlative also occurs. The attorney.may use his skills to help develop poor people's
organizations.
220. Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order- Balbus and the Challenge of
Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev. 529, 561 (1977).
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cific generational attitudes221 of "new professionals ''t engaged in social
activism223 on behalf of the poor,224 which grew out of the student movement
of the 1960s.
225
One explanation for the uniform biases of these new professionals has
been the view that their attitudes derive from an ideology encouraged by ho-
mogeneous social backgrounds. This view has been rejected in a recent study,
which suggests "that both the Legal Services program as a whole and its more
reformist components have been staffed by lawyers of heterogeneous back-
grounds." 226 That study found there was a "lack of prior political commit-
ment among many Legal Services lawyers,"'' 2 7 and that "Legal Services
lawyers have idiosyncratic and divergent political motivations"228 for joining
legal services. Legal services lawyers do hold different views from those cham-
pioned by legal professionals generally. This is explained by the claim that
"the program acts as a structural mechanism ' 229 that in part redirects "the
careers of professionals who pass through them".-30 Thus, experiences inher-
ent in legal services, not political and social background, mold attitudes to-
ward work.231 Katz's socio-biography of legal aid attorneys suggests that the
moral character of the legal aid enterprise requires attorneys to maintain a
self-image as social activists 3 2 who take an expansive and aggressive notion
of their clients' interests. Thus, legal aid attorneys are interested in aggregate
problems of the poor rather than the "little disturbances of man." 3 The for-
mer provide them the freedom for creative application of their legal skills and
221. See generally Mannheim, The Problem of Generations, in Essays on the Sociology of
Knowledge 276 (P. Kecskemeti ed. 1952).
222. See R. Gross & P. Osterman, The New Professionals 117-31 (1972).
223. See R. Flacks, Youth & Social Change 104-39 (1971).
224. See N. Demerath, G. Marwell & M. Aiken, Dynamics of Idealism 186-211 (1971).
225. See, e.g., J. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, 105-09 (1969); M. Teodori, The New Left: A
Documentary History (1969); Flacks, Social & Cultural Meanings of Student Revolt, 17 Soc.
Probs. 340 (1970).
226. Erlanger, Lawyers and Neighborhood Legal Services: Social Background & The Impetus
for Reform, 12 Law & Soc'y Rev. 253, 271 (1978).
227. Id. at 269.
228. Id.
229. See Erlanger, Social Reform Organization and Subsequent Careers of Participants: A
Follow-up Study of Early Participants in the OEO Legal Services Program, 42 Am. Soc. Rev. 233,
246 (1977).
230. See id. at 234.
231. Erlanger suggests that data supports "the conclusion that the 'radical' character of the
program did not derive so much from the political predispositions of its lawyers as from the op-
portunity Legal Services offered lawyers to pursue client interests with the same vigor as they
would in private practice." Erlanger, supra note 226, at 272. This statement is ambiguous in a
number of respects. For one, it suffers from the defect of imputing homogeneity to the private
sector. More important, it is unclear that opportunity or freedom has anything to do with ability
or capacity. Most important, there is no evidence that legal services lawyers have such an oppor-
tunity. Erlanger relies on the rhetoric of legal services in developing his descriptive reality of the
workings of a legal aid program.
232. J. Katz, Routine and Reform: Personal and Collective Careers in Legal Aid 11 (unpub-
lished Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern Univ., July 1976). See also Bellow, The Legal Aid Puz7Ie:
Turning Solutions into Problems, in 5 Working Papers for a New Society 52, 58 (1977).
233. The phrase is Grace Paley's. See G. Paley, The Little Disturbances of Man (1973). One
sympathetic student of legal aid, however, has concluded that notwithstanding "the value of test-
case litigation... I believe that more attention and effort should be made to secure individual
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the opportunity for professional development.234 Further, "in order to main-
tain involvement,. . . [the legal services] lawyers must impose a sense of sig-
nificance on their clients' problems. '235 Both career concerns and personal
self-esteem thus channel the legal aid lawyer into reform activity.
The concept of attorney autonomy does not justify client selection by the
legal services lawyer. First, the government attorney is a salaried employee;
he has agreed to work for a particular employer, thus relinquishing his free-
dom to select his own clients. Like corporate house counsel, he operates
within a bureaucratic matrix that limits his professional autonomy. Congress
has already limited the subject matter categories in which attorneys may prac-
tice. The Corporation itself argues that local programs can limit service ac-
cording to community priority schedules, thus preventing attorneys from
taking on cases or clients that they might, left to their own initiative, choose.
Indeed, proponents of legal services have recognized the power of a Board of
Directors to control a program's resource allocation by setting general service
priorities.2
36
Although it is not unnatural for legal services attorneys to desire the same
autonomy in case selection enjoyed by privately funded public interest attor-
neys, this is not possible. Legal services lawyers and public interest lawyers do
not have equivalent roles. The public interest lawyer, whether he is a member
of the Sierra Club or an attorney for a public interest law firm, has no con-
straints on his activity other than the Canons, his individual conscience, and
his foundation grant.237 He may clearly make broad policy decisions that
justice in the day-to-day, low-visibility decisions that confront ordinary people." J. Handler, Pro-
tecting the Social Services Client 28 (1979).
234. See generally Katz, Lawyers for the Poor in Transition: Involvement, Reform and the
Turnover Problem in the Legal Services Program, 12 Law & Soe'y Rev. 275, 284 (1978).
235. Id.
236. Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public
Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. Rev. 337, 347 (1978). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 334 (1974).
237. "Public interest lawyers can choose between many possible clients and causes" and thus
face case selection problems as well. Halpern & Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public
Interest Law: Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 Geo. L.J. 1095,
1108 (1971). For many public interest law firms specific case selection is made by a litigation
committee that approves specific cases. The litigation committee of the Citizens Communications
Center, as example, operates as follows:
The Litigation Committee is composed of at least five members, although the Board
may elect to increase the number of the persons on the Committee. There are presently
six members. Each member of the Litigation Committee is a Board member, an attor-
ney, and possesses expertise in the competence relevant areas of law.
Once CITIZENS' attorneys have conducted a study of a particular problem
presented to them and believe that it is an appropriate case for CITIZENS to represent a
party, the Litigation Committee reviews their judgement to assure that the matter is
within the scope of CITIZENS' purpose, ability and programs.
Prior to initiation of any proceedings, the matter under review is presented to a
majority of the Litigation Committee. If the majority unanimously approves the litiga-
tion, the attoineys may then institute proceedings. But if any one of the members of the
Committee to whom the materials are initially presented opposes the proceeding, the
matter is then presented to the entire Committee for approval prior to initiation of the
proceeding.
For Responsive Media: Citizens Communications Center, The Ten Year Report of the Public
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"limit the kinds of litigation ... [in] which he will assist."2 8 A privately
funded public interest attorney need have no qualms about partiality. He may
allocate his time and skills in whatever manner he chooses within the limits of
his grant,2 39 and has no greater responsibility to adverse parties than any other
Interest Law Firm 100 (1979). See also Public Counsel, 1977-78 Annual Report of Public Counsel
7 (1978) ("No new litigation will be undertaken without thorough consideration by Public Coun-
sel's Board of Directors and its litigation Committee."); Education Law Center, 1979 Annual Re-
port 5 (1979) ("Overall program priorities are developed by the board of trustees on the
recommendation of its program committee. Specific cases are chosen by the litigation review
committee consisting of six lawyers appointed by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees on the
advice of the staff."). The composition and procedures of the litigation committee are described in
Memorandum from Marilyn J. Morheuser, Director, Educational Law Center to Friends of Public
Interest Law 7-8 (July 18, 1980). In some instances public interest law firms may rely on their
membership base to generate case selection criteria and provide some measure of accountability
and discipline over intake. J. Fleischman, The Criticisms of Public Interest Law: Some Rebuttals
44-45 (unpublished manuscript, 1980).
A useful analysis of decision-making and case selection processes in public interest organiza-
tions can be found in J. Berry, Lobbying for the People 199-211 (1977). Berry suggests the two
main variables affecting issue selection are "the expertise and personal interest of the professional
staff." Id. at 200. New Jersey's unauthorized practice committee criticized the Education Law
Center, and by implication other public interest law firms, charging that "it is ELC's Board of
Directors not its legal staff that decides whether to represent a particular client." New Jersey,
UPLC Opinion 471-79 (1981). The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, re-
versed the Committee, finding that "although ELC has a board of directors that includes non-
lawyers as well as lawyers, the board is responsible only for policy-making. Decisions as to which
cases to accept are made by a subcommittee of the board comprised solely of lawyers." In re
Educ. Law Center, Inc., 86 N.J. 124, 139, - A.2d -, - (1981).
238. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420 (1963). For example, since 1950 the NAACP has
undertaken only lawsuits that promoted school integration. Even prior to Brown v. Board of
Education it would not accept cases that asserted a separate but equal position, even if such a suit
might improve the position of blacks. Wilkerson, The Negro School Movement in Virginia: From
"Equalization" to "Integration," in 1 The Making of Black America 259, 269 (A. Meier & E.
Rudneck eds. 1969). Examples of this policy abound. When Mrs. Sarah Bulah, a black housewife
in rural Delaware, complained that "a bus passed right by her front door to take the white chil-
dren... to their pretty little school up on the hill while she had to drive her daughter, Shirley,
two miles to the old one-room schoolhouse for colored youngsters down in the village," civil rights
lawyer Louis Redding told her that "he. . .wouldn't help me get a Jim Crow bus to take my girl
to any Jim Crow school, ... but if I was interested in sendin' her to an integrated school, why,
then maybe he'd help." R. Kluger, Simple Justice 434-35 (1976). In 1951 a similar response was
given to students in Prince Edward County, Virginia, who went on strike against the black high
school because of its inadequacies and desired equalization. "The lawyer told the striking stu-
dents that the only way the NAACP could get involved in their cause was to sue for the end of
segregation itself-a giant step beyond the goal of the young strikers." One student noted, "It
seemed like reaching for the moon." Id. at 476. The resulting lawsuit was the first attack on
segregation per se in Virginia. Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952). A
similar incident occurred after the landmarl decision in Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483
(1954). Parents in Mississippi wanted their "separate but equal"*elementary schools in their black
neighborhood reopened but, after talking to Derrick Bell, agreed to sue for integration. Bell,
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests, in School Desegregation Litigation,
85 Yale LU. 470, 476-77 n.21 (1976).
The 1950 NAACP policy decision that segregation per se was unconstitutional is discussed in
R. Kluger, Simple Justice 290-94 (1976). See Kelly, The Desegregation Case, in J. Garraty, Quar-
rels That Have Shaped the Constitution 242, 257 (1962); The Margold Report, in J. Greenberg,
Judicial Process and Social Change 50-57 (1977).
239. Some foundations, however, perceive that their tax-exempt status makes them quasi-pub-
lic organizations affected with a public interest who should therefore refrain from obviously parti-
san political activity. W. Nielsen, The Big Foundations 395-98 (1972). See also Hart,
Foundations and Social Activities: A Critical View, in The Future of Foundations 43-57 (F. Hei-
mann ed. 1973). On this view foundations should be "even-handed in the political consequences
of those activities, seeking neither to advance nor impede any cause save that of understanding
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private attorney.24° The legal aid attorney, however, fulils the state's respon-
sibility to provide legal services in civil cases to those who cannot afford it.241
In this respect he differs from the public interest lawyer, who can serve partic-
ular causes without regard to the need of the individuals involved.
E. The Role of the Community in Resource Allocation
The Corporation has recognized that resource allocation in the context of
scarcity will result in decisions to prefer certain substantive areas and program
functions over others. It is concerned that these decisions be made consciously
rather than by default. As a result, it has developed the concept of formal
priority setting by local programs as a mechanism for allocating local re-
sources efficiently and in accordance with client needs. The 1974 Act required
the Corporation to establish priorities which ensured that those least able to
and competence." Moynihan, Social Welfare: Government v. Private Efforts, 13 Found. News 5,
8 (No. 2, 1972).
In contrast, the Ford Foundation has advanced a far different conception of its role, showing
"a willingness to enter zones of activity directly adjacent to politics and lobbying." W. Nielsen,
supra, at 356. See Simon, Foundations and Public Controversy: An Affirmative View, in The
Future of Foundations 58-100 (F. Heimann ed. 1973); Commission on Private Philanthropy and
Public Needs, Giving in America 43-44 (1975). See also R. McKay, Nine for Equality Under
Law: Civil Rights Litigation 21-22 (1977). The Ford Foundation has justified its grants to public
interest law firms on process grounds of redressing imbalances within the adversary system, Ford
Foundation, The Public Interest Law Firm: New Voices for New Constituencies 9, 31 (1973),
rather than articulating a substantive bias for the litigation goals of its grantees. This focus on the
creation of equity in adversary representation has not led the Foundation to recognize that "there
may be several underrepresented interests" in a single litigation and that it might "be in the public
interest to ensure equal relative representation." Weisbrod, Conceptual Perspective on the Public
Interest: An Economic Analysis, in Public Interest Law 4, 22 (B. Weisbrod, J. Handler, & N.
Komesar eds. 1978).
240. In one recent controversy, the Wampanoag Indian tribe, represented by the Native
American Rights Fund, a public interest law firm supported in part by the Ford Foundation, see
R. McKay, Nine for Equality Under Law: Civil Rights Litigation 21-22 (1977), sued the Town of
Gay Head in Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, claiming that the town's common lands belonged
to the tribe. Wampanoag Tribal Council v. Town of Gay Head (D. Mass., filed Nov. 1974) re-
ported in 1978 Native American Rights Fund, 1978 Annual Report 63. Property owners in the
Gay Head Taxpayers Association requested that Ford grant them $15,000 to pay for their legal
defense asserting that Ford had a responsibility to provide money for an adequate defense. In the
opinion of the property owners, "[t]he problem was created by unlimited financing of the Indian
cause and inadequate resources of the non-Indian members of our community to defend them-
selves against this litigative attack." Memorandum from Michael J. Sovern to National Affairs
Division, Ford Foundation 6 (July 18, 1977) (quoting letter from Alvin Lane to Ford Foundation
(Jan. 31, 1977)). See also N.Y. Times, July 8, 1977, at 21, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1977, at 40,
col. 4.
Nonetheless, it is clear that Ford is not responsible for the property owners' predicament. In
this respect its responsibilities as a private organization differ from those of a government funded
legal aid organization. As a private organization, neither Ford nor any of its agents has a respon-
sibility to persons injured by litigation. As the Foundation has suggested, "[a] claimant defending
values the Foundation opposes is, of course, entitled to his day in court, but the Foundation is
under no obligation to finance that day and should not do so." Memorandum from Michael J.
Sovern to National Affairs Division, Ford Foundation, supra, at 8.
241. S. Jan Brakel has criticized the view that the publicly funded lawyer has the freedom to
allocate resources as a private attorney might as "a paternalistic assessment of priorities made for,
not by, the poor." S. Brakel, Judicare 126, 127 n.3 (1974). He argued that "[t]he fact that poor
legal services clients are recipients of government largesse does not justify a unilateral dictation of
service policy and priorities on the part of government officials or their hired consultants." Brakel,
Styles of Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor, 1977 Am. B. Found. Research J. 219, 250.
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afford legal assistance were given preference.242 In 1977 the Act was amended
to require that local recipients adopt procedures for determining and imple-
menting priorities taking into account "the relative needs of eligible clients for
such assistance," including the special needs of eligible clients "with special
difficulties of access to legal services or special legal problems." 243 In an effort
to develop community participation in allocation decisions, the 1977 amend-
ments also required that "eligible clients" be appointed to the Corporation
board.244 While sixty percent of the directors of local programs must be attor-
neys,245 at least one-third of the directors must be eligible clients or represent-
atives of associations or organizations of eligible clients.2"6 Indeed,
Corporation regulations require that the Board be representative of the pov-
erty community247 and state that it is essential to structure the governing body
in such a way that ensures that legal services lawyers will be "accountable to
the communities they serve."
248
The requirement that clients be placed on boards of directors is not the
only mechanism by which the Corporation attempts to ensure broad represen-
tation of client interests. The Corporation has encouraged the creation of a
clients' lobby, the National Clients Council, as official representatives of the
poverty community.249 The Council, a "trade association" of clients, is
242. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 2, 88 Stat. 383 (1974)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C) (1976) (amended 1977)).
243. Legal Services Corporation Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-222, § 9(b)(1), 88
Stat. 383 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1979)).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2996c(a) (Supp. I1 1979). The clients must be eligible when appointed.
There is no requirement of continuing eligibility. LSC Opinion Letter (Feb. 8, 1979),[1978-1980
Transfer Binder] Pov. L. Rep. (CCH) 27,615.
245. 42 U.S.C. 2996f(c) (Supp. 11 1979). See 45 C.F.R. § 1607.3(b) (1980). The attorneys
"shall be selected from, or designated by, appropriate Bar Associations and other groups, includ-
ing, but not limited to, law schools, civil rights or antipoverty organizations, and organizations of
eligible clients." 45 C.F.R. § 1607.3(c) (1980).
246. 45 C.F.R. § 1607.3(d) (1980). Note that the group representative need not be himself an
eligible client but, should that be the case, only eligible clients may participate in the selection
process. LSC Opinion Letter (Aug. 14, 1978) [1978-1980 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
27,360.
247. Corporation regulations require that eligible client board members be selected from "a
variety of appropriate groups" 45 C.F.R. § 1607.3(e) (1980). See also LSC Opinion Letter (June 8,
1979) [1978-1980 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 28496 recognized the representation
problem by noting that "in certain circumstances, the limitation of groups receiving representation
on a governing body to only a few similar organizations could violate this section:' Such opinion
letters represent Corporation policy until modified or withdrawn.
In fact, it is considered proper to select all eligible client board members and some attorney
board members through a number of different local advisory committees that themselves repre-
sent different distinct segments of the community. LSC Opinion Letter (May 22, 1979) [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] Pov. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 28,500.
248. See 43 Fed. Reg. 32,772 (1978). For that reason staff members may not serve on local
boards. LSC Opinion Letter (June 8, 1979) [1978-1980 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. Rep. (CCH)
% 28,496. The importance of accountability is also illustrated by the existence of the client griev-
ance committee. See 45 C.F.R. § 1621 (1979).
249. The Council, "a nationwide organization of persons eligible for legal services," see LSC
Annual Rep. 23 (1979), was set up during the OEO era. National Clients Council, Proceedings of
1979 Annual Meeting 32-35. Its goal is to foster ongoing accountability of the Corporation to the
client community. Oversight of the Legal Services Corporation, 1980: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Employment, Poverty and Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1980) (statement of Kathy Cain).
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funded by the Corporation to provide technical assistance to client board
members. It serves as a pressure group for client interests before the Corpora-
tion and local programs. The Council's staff monitor Corporation activity and
ensure a sensitivity to client concerns at both the local and the national level.
Consistent with the principle of local control, the original Legal Services
regulations required the board of directors of each local program to set priori-
ties, using suggestions from staff and the client community. Each program
must make a focused inquiry into the community's legal needs. 250 The revised
regulations implement the amended Act's requirement that "the needs of all
significant segments of the client community are considered in the priority-
setting process" and that priority setting should be approached "in a system-
atic way."251 While the 1974 Act requires that the Corporation ensure that
programs have procedures for implementing priorities,252 the regulations only
require provision of a "brief written report" on the implications of their priori-
ties for resource allocation. 253 The priority setting process was seen as a vehi-
cle for ensuring client involvement in the policy decisions of local programs.
In structuring priority-setting the Corporation required that local programs
"involve clients at every step of the process.' '254 Reliance on client input into
the Board of Directors was apparently considered insufficient.
The Corporation does not, however, tell programs how their priority set-
ting process must be structured. Some programs rely on client representatives
on their board to sound out and articulate client sentiment.25 5 Other pro-
grams allow participation by formal poverty groups such as the National Cli-
ents Council or ad hoc groups of poor people.256 In some instances the legal
staff determines what priorities should be, drawing on its understanding of
community needs. 257 A number of programs have developed community
surveys and have mailed questionnaires or conducted door-to-door or tele-
phone surveys to identify the legal problems of clients. 258 More often, pro-
grams hold public meetings to ascertain client sentiment. 25 9 At these
250. 45 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1978) (prefatory material).
251. 45 Fed. Reg. 51,789 (1978).
252. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 97-355, § 1007, 88 Stat. 378, 383
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 2996f(a)(2)(C) (1976) (amended 1977)).
253. 45 C.F.R. § 1620.2(c) (1980).
254. 43 Fed. Reg. 51,789 (1978).
255. Case Service Reports: Analysis of Narrative Submission, January 1-June 30, 1979, at 3-5
(March 25, 1980) (unpublished discussion draft prepared by Westat, Inc. for LSC) [hereinafter
cited as Case Service Reports].
256. See id. at 3-3; C. Lyons & J. Epstein, Priority Setting/Planning 8 (Jan. 23, 1979) (unpub-
lished memorandum to LSC).
257. Case Service Reports, supra note 255, at 3-2; see C. Lyons & J. Epstein, supra note 256, at
13.
258. Case Service Reports, supra note 255, at 3-2 & 3-3; C. Lyons & J. Epstein, supra note 256,
at 10-11. See, for example, the Legal Services of North Carolina, Inc., Client Needs Survey (un-
published manuscript) (undated).
259. Indeed one statewide legal services program met its priority-setting duties by fostering an
"Iowa Poor People's Platform Congress" based on the political party caucus system. See Barrett
& Youells, The Statewide Poor People's Platform Congress: Building Coalitions for Social Jus-
tice, 14 Clearinghouse Rev. 1168 (1981). This statewide political convention allegedly provided "a
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meetings, staff, board and clients discuss the legal problems faced by the com-
munity and vote a priority schedule for both substantive priorities and pro-
gram functions. For example, the Contra Costa Legal Services program
conducted a public conference to determine priorities, and agreed to follow its
results. 260 Four categories of participants were invited: staff, board members,
clients and representatives of special interest groups within the poverty com-
munity. A random cross-section of clients and ex-clients was invited so that
eligible clients "would constitute no less than half of all participants. ' 261 As
another example, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association has devel-
oped a "model" priority setting process to assist programs in isolating needs
and articulating ways to meet those needs.262 A number of programs have set
up weekend retreats to encourage a discussion of these problems.2 63 Programs
have also used task forces to set priorities, assigning clients, staff and board
members to a committee charged with developing a schedule for the board of
directors.264 Over the last few years the number of programs that have allo-
cated resources through some type of formal process has increased. Over sev-
enty-four percent of programs presently engage in some form of priority
setting.265 The larger the program, the more likely it is to set priorities.
266
Programs have set priorities in a variety of substantive areas. Most iden-
tified seven or eight speeific issues on which they wish to focus. Almost ninety
percent of the programs identifying priorities focused on income maintenance,
health and housing concerns. 267 Almost two-thirds of programs established
consumer and domestic relations problems as key goals.268 The actual rank-
ing of the priorities is unclear. The emphasis in priority setting has been on
ensuring that programs use some formal process to identify their goals; there
has been less concern about the substantive priorities that programs choose.
Corporation ideology suggests that local decision making regarding resource
allocation is preferable. In the few cases in which the Corporation has taken
exception to the results of local priority setting it has criticized the efficacy of
the process rather than the actual results.
Resource allocation through priority setting is the Corporation's theoreti-
cal contribution to the problem of effective distribution of service. It reflects
truly informed and representative document describing the priorities of the state's poor people."
Id. at 1173.
260. Report on the 1979 Priority Setting Conference of the Contra Costa Legal Services Foun-
dation 2 (Mar. 8, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Contra Costa Report]. For another example, see
Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., Management Planning Conference (Oct 22-23, 1976).
261. Contra Costa Report, supra note 260, at 1.
262. N. Metzner, Too Many Clients, Too Little Time: A Guide to Management/Planning for
Legal Services Programs, NLADA 3-1 & 3-12 (Mar. 1974).
263. See Arango, Planning for Legal Services Projects: Concepts, Experiences and Issues, 12
Clearinghouse Rev. 163, 164 (1978). See generally N. Metzner, supra note 262, at 4-13
(Appendix).
264. See W. Callahan, Priority Setting By Legal Services Programs 9 (Apr. 1978) (study pre-
pared for LSC Office of Program Support).
265. C. Lyons & . Epstein, supra note 256, at 6.
266. Case Service Reports, supra note 255, at 3-6.
267. See id. at Table E-5 & Table 2-1.
268. See id.
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an attempt by the Corporation to delegate responsibility while assuring a
structured allocative process. Viewing priority setting as a neutral mode of
allocation, the Corporation has ignored politics 269 and has failed to take into
account the extent to which priority setting has become a vehicle of competi-
tion between groups for service. Thus, the Corporation has focused on the
integrity of the process without reference to its structural inadequacies. The
entire effort has its own political dynamic that gives disproportionate signifi-
cance to the views of the particular clients chosen to join the process and al-
most dispositive weight to the views of staff charged with translating that
process into practice.
The statutory requirement of client representatives on a local board of
directors reflects the ideological drive for community control intrinsic to fed-
eral poverty programs. The OEO War on Poverty nurtured the belief that
participation by the poor in antipoverty decision making would reduce their
alienation270 and strengthen indigenous community organizations. 271 The
OEO Community Action Program guide urged the involvement of area resi-
dents and members of the groups to be served in planning, policy making and
the operation of the poverty program.272 While many social theorists hoped
that community participation would help integrate a poverty community into
the larger society, others believed that community participation would create
institutions that would battle the establishment. The community action move-
ment generated intense hostility from urban administrators. 273 As interest in
community control ebbed, Congress increasingly questioned the accomplish-
ments of the Community Action Programs (CAP), which were the focal points
for local participation.274
The principle of local control upon which priority setting rests flows from
the view that the claim for legal assistance belongs to the client community
269. The term is borrowed from an essay by Stanley Herr. See S. Herr, From Rights to Reali-
ties: Advocacy By and For Retarded People in the 1980s 3 (DHEW Pub. No. [OHDS] 21026,
1979). See also J. Dooley, My Perspective on Priorities From Elderly/Handicapped Visits This
Summer 13, 14 (Jan. 7, 1980) (unpublished memorandum to LSC).
270. This view is derived from the "opportunity theory" of juvenile delinquency developed in
R. Cloward and L. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity 175-78 (1960), which became the intel-
lectual precursor for much of the antipoverty program. See B. Frieden & R. Morris, Urban Plan-
ning and Social Policy 178 (1968).
271. See Moynihan's comment that "The essential problem with community action was that
the one term concealed at least four quite distinct meanings: organizing the power structure...
expanding the power structure.. . confronting the power structure.. . and finally, assisting the
power structure." D. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in
the War on Poverty 168 (1969).
272. See 42 U.S.C. § 2782 (1964). The general history of the maximum feasible participation
concept of community participation is traced in Rubin, Maximum Feasible Participation, The
Origins, Implication, and Present Status, 2 Poverty & Hum. Resources Abstracts 5-18 (No. 6 1967)
and is critically reviewed in D. Moynihan, supra note 271, at 88-101. See also Kravitz & Kalod-
ner, Community Action: Where Has It Been? Where Will It Go?, 385 Annals 31 (1969); Note,
Participation of the Poor Section 202(a)(3) Organizations Under the Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964, 75 Yale L.J. 599, 608 (1966).
273. This hostility is described in R. Kramer, Participation of the Poor (1969).
274. D. Moynihan, supra note 271, at 138. See generally id. at 128-66. For a similar analysis
from a more sympathetic perspective, see D. O'Brien, Neighborhood Organization and Interest-
Group Processes 130-74 (1975).
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rather than the individual. On this view, legal assistance should be distributed
to community groups, which redistribute it according to their own criteria.
Individual claims would be analyzed according to whether they advance com-
munity interests. This approach was used in the early years of OEO funding
in the form of Community Action Program control of legal services funds.
275
It was abandoned because of a concern over unbridled discretion and political
determinations by community groups.
A number of theoretical problems are endemic to the concept of commu-
nity participation. Most important is that of ascertaining the purpose of client
representation or participation. Is it meant to suggest client control?
276 Is it
designed to foster attentiveness to client concerns? If the latter, what status
should client concerns have vis-&-vis staff or Corporation concerns?277 A sec-
ond problem is the representative status of the client board members.278 Few
programs select their community representatives through client elections. 279
In many instances, board members are "appointed by a community organiza-
tion." 280 In some cases, the local board members themselves elect eligible cli-
ents to be members of the board.281 The client representative need not, in fact,
be a poor person. In a case in which he is a representative of a poverty group,
he need not be elected by the group, but may be selected by any method of
appointment. Community representatives for the priority setting process are
chosen in an even less systematic manner. In some instances any client who
wishes to attend may do so and may vote. In others, groups are invited to send
representatives, or board members may recommend clients whom they con-
sider to represent community views.
282
The requirement of client involvement without an adequate conception of
275. The battle over whether OEO Legal Services would be governed by the local lay CAP
boards or by a lawyer-controlled board is documented in E. Johnson, Justice and Reform 64-66,
135-62 (1978). See also Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1967, Hearings Before the
House Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 8311, Part 3, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2124-28
(1967) (remarks of Rep. Goodell criticizing bar control of the program).
276. This might be difficult given the requirement of 60% attorney participation. See 42
U.S.C. § 2996f(c) (Supp. III 1979).
277. These issues in the political theory of representation cannot be resolved here. See H.
Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (1967); see also C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic
Theory (1970).
278. LSC Opinion Letter (Dec. 9, 1977) [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. Rep. (CCH)
25,404. The group representative must be appointed by the group, however. LSC Opinion Letter
(Dec. 19, 1977) [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,406. The Board may not
select the group representative, id., nor may an independent screening committee. LSC Opinion
Letter (Mar. 7, 1978) [1976-1978 Transfer binder] Pov. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,725.
279. A survey of client local board members conducted in 1978-79 found that "only one out of
five respondents. . . were elected to board membership by clients." M. McCalL Client Board
Member Training Needs: A Report of Survey Results 16 (1979) (unpublished memorandum to
LSC).
280. Id. This was true for over one-third of respondents. In Buffalo all board members of the
local Legal Services program are appointed by a variety of community groups including the
SUNY Law School, the NAACP, andthe Niagara Frontier Chapter of the New York Civil Liber-
ties Union. Letter from George L. Cownie, supra note 105.
281. Id.
282. See C. Lyons & J. Epstein, supra note 256, at 8-12; Case Service Reports, supra note 255,
at 3-2 through 3-4.
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the nature and quality of that involvement leads to the disproportionate influ-
ence of participating clients. As a result, certain unrepresented minorities,
such as the elderly or handicapped, with legal problems not endemic to the
poor may be slighted.283 For example, on a local level, the severely handi-
capped have difficulty in speaking for themselves and often lack an organized
constituency to press their claims. Without an interested person on staff or
some outside pressure, the mentally disabled may be excluded from legal at-
tention.284 Thus, such "discrete and insular minorities" 28 5 of poor people will
remain invisible. The Corporation has recognized this and is considering
promulgating priority guidelines that will urge inclusion of groups with special
needs.286 Its 1981 budget includes funds targeted for legal care for the institu-
tionalized.28 7 This is a retreat from both the concept of local control and from
the principle of the homogeneity of the poor.
The present process of priority setting generates skepticism that the results
indicate the desires of the client community. Programs that use a community
meeting to set priorities are vulnerable to the charge that the results may be
dictated by the interests represented at the meeting.288 Programs with formal
introspection processes that generate varieties of goals may find they are un-
dergoing a "paper" process manipulated by the staff.28 9 Programs that engage
in some form of consultation between the board and staff may be defining
goals that reflect the subjective interests of staff members. Thus, the require-
ment of client representation on a local board of directors does not mean nec-
essarily that the client community will effectively control the actions of a local
program. Client representatives may reflect the interests of only one portion
of a community's eligible poor. Such client participation also allows a social
service staff to co-opt the poor by accepting the trappings of community con-
283. A. Houseman, The Elderly and Handicapped Chapters of the 1007(h) Report 19, 20 (Apr.
16, 1980) (unpublished memorandum to LSC); J. Dooley, supra note 269, at 13-14; A Report of
the United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Age Discrimination Study, Part 11114 (Jan.
1979); see C. Lyons & J. Epstein, supra note 256, at 6-7. But see S. Herr, supra note 269, at 3
(arguing that the elderly are a vocal, well represented group but that the retarded are not). In his
Memorandum, however, Houseman states:
For none of the programs observed did the presence of priorities and the process that
created them mean that the elderly got either more or less service than they did prior to
priorities. It is unlikely there is any program where priority setting has intentionally
affected the relative quantity of work done for the elderly.
A. Houseman, supra, at 20. In other words even where "the elderly" are given high priority status
as a separate group, actual implementation usually does not occur. Id.
284. See S. Herr, supra note 269, at 3.
285. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
286. See C. Lyons & J. Epstein, supra note 256, at 41. C. Lyons & J. Epstein, Priority Setting 4
(Mar. 15, 1979) (unpublished memorandum to LSC) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of March
15, 1979].
287. Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropri-
ations for Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropria-
tions, Part 2, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 110, 122-24 (1980) (statement of Dan J. Bradley) [hereinafter
cited as 1980 Hearings].
288. C. Lyons & J. Epstein, supra note 256, at 16; S. Herr, The New Clients: Legal Services for
Mentally Retarded Persons 149-50 (1979).
289. C. Lyons & J. Epstein, supra note 256, at 15-16.
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trol.290 Only programs that attempt to assess community needs empirically
through survey techniques succeed substantially in creating a community pro-
file that can serve as a basis for objective priority setting.291 In the main,
therefore, the priority setting process fails to fulfill the promise of the Corpora-
tion's goal of impartial resource allocation.
There is further conceptual inconsistency in the Corporation's ideal of
community participation, which conflicts with the statutory insistence on attor-
ney control of the program's board. Indeed, this tension between community
and professional interests is a recurrent theme. During the OEO period legal
services advocates vociferously opposed the introduction of lay control. They
feared that placing programs under the control of the OEO Community Ac-
tion Programs would result in lay interference with attorney autonomy, and
with the aggressive impact advocacy that OEO Legal Services saw as its pri-
mary purpose. They demanded boards controlled by attorneys, although the
CAP's could be said to represent, in theory, the very community that legal
services was pledged to serve.
Staff control is highlighted by the lack of serious implementation require-
ments in the goal setting process. 292 The fact that a program chooses a half-
dozen priorities says nothing about how the priorities themselves should be
ranked or what specific program areas or functions should be ignored to sat-
isfy that priority schedule. The fact is that if housing is a priority, welfare
cases, for example, cannot be undertaken. As long as the priority setting pro-
cess ignores the harsh reality of implementation the power to translate priori-
ties into reality will remain with the program staff.
In fairness it must be recognized that the intent of the community partici-
pation ideal has been to make legal services more responsive to the needs of
clients. The rationale is that the members of a local client community best
understand the needs of individual clients within that community. Unfortu-
nately, the process all too often legitimates the view that legal aid runs to the
community and that it is the responsibility of community representatives (to-
gether with other board members) to decide the value that should be assigned
to individual claims for service. The effort to ensure that legal services attor-
neys serve community needs is an approximation of the client oriented per-
spective. This effort recognizes, though not fully, the primacy of "client"
290. See instances cited in Rubin, Maximum Feasible Participation: The Origin, Implications
and Present Status, in Poverty & Hum. Resources Abstracts, Nov.-Dec. 1967, at 5-18.
291. See discussion of survey methodology infra note 301. Nonetheless, the questionable
methodological validity of some surveys lends credence to the argument that their underlying
purpose is less to elicit community sentiment than to ratify staff views. See the description of the
Food Research and Action Center priority setting process: "FRAC, an LSC-funded support
center, for example, sent out a major questionnaire this summer to everyone on our mailing list.
We have about 4500 people on our mailing list. And we ask people to rate the different activities
that we work on.. .. " Statement of B. Schwartz, quoted in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Oppos-
tion to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, at 16, Grassley v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 81-277-B (S.D.
Iowa 1981). No effort was made to limit responses to eligible clients.
292. C. Lyons & J. Epstein, supra note 256, at 15. See Memorandum of April 16, 1980, supra
note 283, at 20-21. Some excellent examples illustrating the interrelationship of staff control and
serious implementation are presented in J. Dooley, supra note 269.
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concerns. However, by ignoring the divergence between community priorities
and individual needs, it misdeflnes "client."
IV. CLIENT KINOWLEDGE AND CAPACITY FOR RESOURCE
ALLOCATION DECISIONS
One can only speculate how the priority schedule of individual clients
would compare to those drawn up for them by attorneys or by community
representatives. 293 The existing studies on the legal problems of the poor have
not adequately surveyed that question. Nonetheless, some evidence may be
drawn from the corpus of literature on legal needs.294 The recent American
Bar Foundation study on the legal needs of the public found that the most
common problems for which citizens generally required attorneys were torts,
real estate, consumer matters, estate planning, and governmental matters. The
areas for which they actually went to lawyers for help were, in order of use,
real property, estate planning, marital problems, torts, consumer matters, and
governmental matters, broadly defined.295 Although attorneys in the private
sector influence their clients' decision making, individual clients themselves
determine how to allocate personal resources when securing legal assistance.
They set their priorities and their attorneys serve them, or else the attorneys
are released from employment. Indeed, the aggregation of individual client
choices organizes the structure of the legal profession. This freedom of choice
should be extended to the poor.
The argument against permitting client demand to shape the allocation of
legal services assumes that client demand does not reflect client need. It goes
as follows: It is misleading to rely on individual choice because poor people
are ignorant of the numerous ways in which they can use an attorney. This
ignorance prevents indigents from seeking aid in areas that would be of signif-
icant benefit for them. Further, the poor lack the confidence needed to take
293. Hannah Pitkin points to the paradox that to represent truly the constituency would re-
quke the presence of the represented at the decision-making stage. H. Pitkin, The Concept of
Representation (1967). To do otherwise would result in the paternalistic model of representation
envisaged by Edmund Burke who wrote that: "It]he representative's duty toward his constituents
is 'a devotion to their interests, rather than to their opinions."' Id. at 176, quoting E. Burke,
Speech to the Electors, in Burke's Politics 115 (1949).
294. "There exists no well-developed theory of lawyer use." Project, An Assessment of Alter-
native Strategies For Increasing Access To Legal Services, 90 Yale L.. 122, 131 (1980). The
problem of defining unmet legal needs is discussed id. at 123-28, 131-38. Bryant Garth reviews
the existing studies in Neighborhood Law Firms for the Poor 3-13 (1980). This issue must be
contrasted with descriptions by the demographers of lawyer use. Lawyer use is a function of client
problem-solving behavior, problem incidence, and level of satisfaction with results obtained. B.
Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National Survey 261-63 (1977).
295. See B. Curran, supra note 294, at 99-159. The most recent survey of lawyer utilization in
the general population, the Curran study was intended "to inform judgments about the nature and
scope of the public's legal needs and to provide an empirical base for assessing the extent to which
those needs are met within existing legal service delivery mechanisms." Id. at 9.
A limited but useful British survey of lawyer utilization among the London poor is B. Abel-
Smith, M. Zander & R. Brooke, Legal Problems and the Citizen 80-82 (1973). The British survey
considers the use of alternate advisory services as well. Id. at 67-80; see also id. at 39-63.
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advantage of the legal system and manipulate it for their own benefit. 296 They
are commonly apprehensive about lawyers and the legal system and lack, in
Carlin's phrase, "legal competence. ' 297 Therefore, the legal services attorneys
or community representatives must set priorities for a local office.
In considering this view it is necessary to analyze the concept of legal
need. The proposition that we cannot rely on individual consumer demand to
determine the legal needs of a community begins with the argument that the
concept of legal need is a social construct and that the extent to which people
go to attorneys will depend on cultural definitions of when and why one re-
sorts to law.298 Such a "subjective" definition of legal need may be summa-
rized by the notion that "[iln the final analysis, an individual has a 'legal
problem' only if, and when, he sees that he has one." 299 This model suggests
that need is a reflection of consciousness. The goal is to meet the individual's
"set of felt needs."3°° Research indicates that perceptions of legal need differ
according to income level and exposure to the legal system,301 and that poor
people have a conventional, but limited, view of when a lawyer is needed.
They recognize a need for attorneys in criminal, domestic relations, and real
estate matters, but for little else. Their competence in directing attorneys also
depends on their economic class.302 Complementary studies further argue
296. Matthews & Weiss, What Can Be Done: A Neighborhood Lawyer's Credo, 47 B.U.L.
Rev. 231, 233-235 (1967).
297. J. Carlin, J. Howard & S. Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor 61-63 (1967).
298. Similarly in medicine, academic critics have suggested that "illness is a socially assigned
category given meaning from society to society by social interpretation and evaluation of the bio-
logically abnormal characteristics." Veatch, The Medical Model: Its Nature and Problems, 1 Has-
tings Center Stud. 59, 60 (No. 3, 1973). The patient is not vested with the "sick role" without a
social judgment labelling him as such. T. Parsons, The Social System 428-79 (1951). Whether the
social judgment is the physician's as Parsons suggests, or is part of an autonomous process of
psychological organization by which individuals give meaning to their reality is unclear. See C.
Herzllch, Health and Illness: A Social Psychological Analysis 28-40 (1973). See also S. Sontag,Illness As Metaphor 45-46 (1978).
299. F. Marks, The Legal Needs of the Poor. A Critical Analysis 4 (1971). Marks takes a
somewhat different position in Marks, A Lawyer's Duty To Take All Comers and Many Who Do
Not Come, 30 U. Miami L. Rev. 915 (1976).
300. Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev.
401, 405 (1975). The poor have always been viewed as "traditionalists" in their conception of the
legal system. F. Marks, supra note 299, at 8.
301. See, e.g., Boston Bar Association, Action Plan for Legal Services, Part I, at 23-82 (1977);
Sykes, Legal Needs of the Poor in the City of Denver, 4 Law & Socy Rev. 255 (1969); Levine &
Preston, Community Resource Orientation Among Low Income Groups, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 80.
A study of the accessibility of legal services to low income groups in London, Ontario, Ca-
nada, finds that the poor are not aware of the availability of lawyers' services and do not perceive
lawyers as a source of help in resolving social problems. D. Cruikshank, Legal Services in
London: An Empirical Study 18, 20, 22-26 (1971). On the relationship between client ignorance
about or hostility toward lawyers and the delivery of legal services, see Phillips, Social Work and
Legal Services, 42 Mod. L. Rev. 29-41 (1979).
The methodology of existing studies of legal needs has been questioned on the ground that
"the incidence of legal problems may be in part a function of the number of questions addressed
to the members of the sample." L. Goodman, Memorandum on Legal Needs Assessment Meth-
ods 5 (National Social Science and Law Project, Inc., Mar. 15, 1979). Surveys using more sophis-
ticated techniques have been conducted by North Carolina Legal Services. See Legal Servs. of
North Carolina, Inc., Client Needs Survey (unpublished manuscript) (undated).
302. J. Carlin, J. Howard & S. Messinger, supra note 297, at 61-76.
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that knowledge about legal rights, 30 3 as well as enforcement of these rights, 304
bears a direct relation to income. Following this view, if a legal services pro-
gram were to set priorities on a first-come, first-served basis, that program
would necessarily be using a culture-specific and relative conception of
need.
30 5
Legal need is a variable that can also be manipulated by the attorney.
Thus, the failure of the poor to use the legal system is not simply a result of
their lack of "opportunity (principally price) and sophistication to use the legal
system," 306 or their lack of legal competence. Instead, the attorney and his
legal culture define certain problems as amenable to legal resolution.30 7 Law-
yers that are "reactive," 308 waiting for clients to bring problems to them, will
receive a docket different from that of attorneys who take an aggressive role
and suggest possible ways in which clients can use the legal system, especially
at its frontiers.309 This view suggests that client perception of a "felt need"
303. Leon Mayhew argues that if the poor do not have knowledge about certain legal rights, it
is either because no social organization exists to provide routine and established support for that
particular right, or because the rihts involved are not perceived by the poor as relevant to their
concerns. Often, such misperceptions exist because rights are not specified in such a way as to be
palpable to those who possess them, experience their violation, and advocate or protect them. See
generally Mayhew, supra note 300, at 409-10.
304. "It is not uncommon to find people who think that it is the well-to-do, especially the rich,
who most have occasion to deal with law and lawyers." Cobb, The Law and the Poor, Legal
Aid Rev., July 1929, at 9. This view reflects the belief that legal problems are tied up with the
ownership of property, traditionally conceived. Jonathan Weiss has convincingly discredited that
view in The Law and the Poor, 26 J. Soc. Issues 59 (1970). See generally Ehrlich, A Progress
Report from the Legal Services Corporation, A.B.A.J. 1139(1976) ("Inability to utilize the legal
system can be and often is disastrous for the poor in ways that are inapplicable to others.").
On a macro-economic level, however, Pashigan contends that "[t]he most important determi-
nant of the demand for legal services and for lawyers is real gross national product" and that
"[s]hifts in the demand for lawyers are due for the most part to changes in real income." Pashi-
gan, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand for and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J.
L. & Econ. 53, 72 (1977). This view stands on the premise that the number of transactions for
which one needs an attorney is directly proportional to income. Id. Whichever view one takes
about the poor's need for lawyers, however, the evidence is clear that lower economic and social
groups use lawyers less than higher economic groups. See M. Cass & R. Sackville, Legal Needs of
the Poor 77 (1975) (Australia); B. Curran, supra note 294, at 186-90 (a greater variable was level of
education, however); Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 381, 383 (1965).
305. See Marks, A Lawyer's Duty to Take All Comers and Many Who Do Not Come, 30 U.
Miami L. Rev. 915, 916-18 (1976). In a similar vein, Michael Zander has urged that the legal
competence theory is "unsatisfactory" as "an explanation of unmet need for legal services." He
points out that "in some fields many poor persons do get the help of lawyers, whilst in others,
many who are not poor lack such help." Further, the "use of lawyers vanes enormously as be-
tween different kinds of problems. In other words, the kind of problem seems to cause much
greater differences in lawyer use than the kind of potential client." M. Zander, Legal Services for
the Community 289 (1978).
306. Marks, supra note 305, at 917.
307. Joel Handler, a poverty law theorist, has pointed out from a social work context that "as
every practicing professional knows, when options are laid out for a client, he invariably asks what
the professional thinks he ought to do." J. Handler, Protecting The Social Service Client 52
(1979). Handler concludes that the goal of client self-determination is rarely achieved. Id.
308. Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. Legal Stud. 125, 128 (1973). One might also classify
the process by which a legal system acquires its cases as passive or active. See P. Selznick, Law,
Society and Industrial Justice 225-28 (1969).
309. Marks, supra note 305, at 922.
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depends in large part on the attorney's "promotion of that need. '310
None of these theories justifies ignoring individual choice in legal services
allocation. 31' If it is feared that the indigent cannot make effective choices
because of a lack of knowledge, the proper response is extensive client educa-
tion.312 But even educated clients can be manipulated by their attorney's defi-
nitions of legal need. Therefore, any system must demand self-restraint by
attorneys and develop a structure that will redefine the power relationships
between professional and client. Recognition that the definition of a situation
as a "legal" problem "is a consequence of the social organization of the legal
system" 313 means that changes can be made to allow clients to decide whether
certain problems, given the limited resources available, should be pursued
through a legal strategy or through other forms of conflict resolution.
314
For these reasons, client education is the key to the development of client
responsibility for resource allocation. Client education would inform poor
people of their legal rights in a variety of contexts and would apprise them of
the availability of legal services lawyers. Clients could then define the nature
and character of the legal services they require.315 The Corporation has long
fostered such forms of community outreach,316 but efforts toward client educa-
310. Id. at 919-20.
311. The problem inherent in the claim that clients have needs which they do not recognize is
amenable to different solutions. One may dismiss the concept of needs as inescapably subjective
and speak instead of rights. This conceptual shift would allow one to argue that individuals
choose not to exercisd their rights. Further, a focus on rights suggests that one ought "to re-
formulate the objectives of legal services research so as to include not only an analysis of the
processes whereby existing rights are or are not enforced but also... attempt to identify those
social problems and conditions in relation to which it might be thought desirable to create new
structures of rights." These new legal rights could then be vindicated by legal services attorneys.
L. Bridges, S. Sufrin, J. Whetton & R. White, Legal Services in Birmingham 3 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Legal Services in Birmingham]. See also White, Lawyers and the Enforcement of Rights,
in Social Needs and Legal Action 37 (P. Morris, R. White, & P. Lewis eds. 1973).
312. F. Marks, supra note 299, at 13; Landinsky, The Traffic in Legal Services: Lawyer-Seek-
ing Behavior and the Channeling of Clients, 11 Law & Soe'y Rev. 207, 212-13 (1976).
313. Mayhew, supra note 300, at 408. See also Legal Services in Birmingham, supra note 311,
at 2. One may resolve the apparent tension between Bridges and Mayhew by reading Mayhew as
suggesting that social reality is malleable. It is unlikely, however, that as a sociologist Mayhew
takes this view. For this important epistemological distinction see P. Berger & T. Luckmann, The
Social Construction of Reality 1-18, 134-47 (1966).
314. One could argue that the way to build a poverty community's confidence in lawyers is to
bring test cases which galvanize that community. Under this view a case might be worth bringing
for its publicity value even if it is not considered technically meritorious. Whether this notion is
encompassed in Marks' view of "legal competence" is unclear.
315. Whether or not a need is defined as a legal need may be a function of the character of the
helping organization to which a poor person is referred initially. See White, supra note 311, at 5 1.
316. The need for community education is clear. Of 1,260 eligible poor persons interviewed in
a 1978 GAO study about 60% were not aware that free legal services were available to them and
only half of those who were aware knew the types of available services. See GAO Rep. No. HRD-
78-164 Free Legal Services for the Poor-Increased Coordination, Community Legal Education,
and Outreach Needed 19-23 (Nov. 6, 1978). That study showed that seven of the nine programs
studied engaged in limited or no education programs. An LSC survey of its programs reachedsimilar conclusions. Oversight of the Legal Services Corporation, 1980: Hearing Before the Sub-comm. on Employment, Poverty and Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980).
Of course, to the extent to which resources are severely limited increased community educa-
tion may prove frustrating if not self-defeating. As one legal services attorney noted, "[wihen an
office can take only 12% of the cases, there is no reason to publicize the services. Telling people to
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tion must avoid duplicating the problem it hopes to solve, conceptualizing le-
gal need through an attorney's point of view. Traditionally outreach programs
have been an organizing tool with legal services lawyers directing programs,
efforts, and resources to identify particular audiences and topics. 317 To the
extent that the content of community education programs are tailored to pro-
mote particular service requests318 community education serves to formulate a
community's perception of legal need.
Such activity is improper for legal services attorneys for at least two rea-
sons: their status as publicly-funded lawyers and their positions as lawyers of
first and last resort for most poor people. First, because Legal Services is pub-
licly funded, its institutional structure demands certain public accountabil-
ity. Government funding carries with it responsibilities of fairness, if not
neutrality. If the government attempts to develop "a system of awareness
shaping, administered directly in response to a political determination of the
proper awareness agenda,"3 19 it should recognize its responsibility for "bal-
anced communication, '320 thus ensuring that a variety of perspectives are ad-
dressed.321 Of course, Congress could expressly authorize the use of federal
funds to advocate particular uses for legal services. Lacking such authoriza-
tion, legal services attorneys ought not to mold the poor's concept of legal need
to meet their personal vision of the good society. Whatever criticisms one may
make against the neutrality model of government intervention in the political
process are not relevant to the case of government subsidy for legal services.
Legal services is a claim that individuals may make on the community and as
such, each person may make an equal claim. The state lacks the prerogative to
use non-neutral criteria in resource allocation. Furthermore, the rationale of
the legal aid principle is to ensure each citizen the legal rights he may possess
under existing laws and not, in and of itself, to redistribute wealth and power
by exercising legislative and political functions. As such, neutrality in alloca-
tion procedures assures that the program remains true to its articulated pur-
pose: the vindication of rights embedded in law rather than the political
mobilization of the poor. Any complaint that neutrality biases allocation to-
come in just to turn most of them away, seems to us a fraud on our client community." Id. at 261
(statement of Charles Dorsey).
317. Indeed, legal services partisans have approvingly pointed out that by strategic case selec-
tion one could "socialize" clients into having confidence in the use of lawyers and thus direct and
stimulate client demand in selected areas of law. F. Marks, supra note 299, at 11.
318. Id. at 15. A fine line exists between "intervention" in a client's problems and "interfer-
ence." "The principle of client self-determination can be easily perverted if the realities of person-
ality dynamics are ignored." Cihlar, Client Self-Determination: Intervention or Interference, 14
St. Louis L.J. 604, 622 (1970). A lawyer's status, bearing and very presence can influence other-
wise sincere attempts to let the client make an unfettered decision on a course of action. Id. at 616,
623.
319. J. Tussman, Government and the Mind 27 (1977).
320. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and
the First Amendment, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 863, 908 (1979). See also Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 565 (1980), for a different analysis of the general problem of government inter-
vention into the realm of ideas.
321. See Bonner-Lyons v. School Comm., 480 F.2d 442 (Ist Cir. 1973); Alaska Gay Coalition
v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 -(Alaska 1978); Anderson v. City of Boston, 376 Mass. 178, 200, 380
N.E.2d 628, 641 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979).
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wards the status quo is relevant only insofar as the status quo fails to enable
persons to seek legal redress of their grievances.
322
A second, more important basis for self-restraint by legal services at-
torneys flows from our conception of the attorney as a professional. The
agency aspect of the attorney-client relationship imposes special duties on the
attorney different from those imposed on other professionals. The attorney's
role as counsel is inconsistent with attempts to program a client's legal agenda.
In spite of this, the lawyer-client relationship has historically been one of "pro-
fessional dominance 323 in which the lawyer dominated and controlled the
structure of the relationship.324 The client who seeks counsel from an attorney
is predisposed to accept the attorney's definition of his problem. However, the
fact that attorneys representing privately funded clients may aggressively de-
fine the legal agenda is no justification for allowing legal services lawyers to
organize the client's schedule of legal needs. Corporate clients may be sophis-
ticated enough in legal relations to counterbalance an attorney's influence. It
is less clear that poor people have the same sophistication. If a private client is
unhappy with his attorney he may discharge him and hire another. For the
poor, the legal services attorney is likely to be the only lawyer available. The
dangers of paternalism and professional dominance are thus much greater for
the legal aid lawyer than for lawyers in the private sector.
The bureaucratic nature of the legal services program takes on many fea-
tures of traditional street-level bureaucracy.325 In particular the interaction
between poverty lawyer and poverty client reflects bureaucratic norms for the
"routinized, mass processing of cases," reinforcing conceptions of professional
dominance.326 Thus, one sympathetic observer concluded that legal services
322. Neutrality models are explored and criticized on a variety of grounds in Baker, Neutral-
ity Process and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 1029,
1042-70 (1980).
323. See generally E. Freidson, Professional Dominance (1970); see also W. Moore, The Pro-
fessions: Roles and Rules (1970).
324. The available studies of lawyer-client interaction generally support the claim of lawyer
domination of clients. See D. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge (1974). The closest
analogue is the doctor-patient relationship in which the patient defers to the physician as an ex-
pert. He is a supplicant and not a consumer of medical services. See Bloom & Wilson, Patient-
Practitioner Relationships, in H. Freeman, S. Levine & L. Reeder, Handbook of Medical Sociol-
ogy 275 (3d ed. 1979). Five models of the doctor-patient relationship are described in Szasz &
Hollander, The Basic Models of The Doctor-Patient Relationship, 97 A.M.A. Archives of Internal
Med. 585 (1956). The literature on physician dominance is reviewed in Note, Restructuring In-
formed Consent; Legal Therapy of the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 Yale L. J. 1533, 1533-55
(1970). For the concept of patient as consumer, see Reeder, The Patient Client As A Consumer:
Some Observations on the Changing Professional-Client Relationship, 13 J. Health & Soc. Behav-
ior 406 (1972).
325. Such bureaucracies are defined as publicly funded organizations that deliver routine
services to clients using low-level intermediaries. See Lipsky, Toward a Theory of Street-Level
Bureaucracy, in Theoretical Perspectives in Urban Politics 196-213 (W. Hawley & M. Lipsky eds.
1976). For case studies analyzing the activities of public housing managers and Veterans Admin-
istration out-patient department and emergency room clerks according to this construct, see J.
Purttas, People-Processing: The Street Level Bureaucrat in Public Service Bureaucracies (1979).
326. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What is Going
To Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. Probs. 599 (1979) (detailing lawyer
domination of lawyer-client interview process in which lawyers confined "communication to pre-
scribed subjects," id. at 610).
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to the poor has "become shallow, cautious and incomplete. '327
This problem is exacerbated by the differences in private and public attor-
ney-client relationships. Research on the attorney-client relationship 328 sug-
gests that legal aid lawyers respond to a generalized view of clients and cases
prior to encounters with specific clients thus ensuring "that what he expects
will happen does indeed happen." 329 Such lawyer-client interactions create a
"closed environment" 330 that denies autonomy to clients.33t If the publicly
funded client ought to have "control over the 'subject matter' of the action,"
332
at least "when client values or lawyer conflicts of interest are involved, '333 is
the allocation of decision-making authority affected prior to the creation of a
formal attorney-client relationship?
334
In the private sector this question would raise few difficulties. An attor-
327. Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA
Briefcase, Aug. 1977, at 110. It should be noted that these evaluations flow from a focus on
the character of individual attorney-client interactions judged against the highest standards of
attorney quality. Earlier evaluations of legal services performance focused on "the impact of the
OEO projects" in terms of broad social goals. Champagne, An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of
the OEO Legal Services Program, 9 Urb. Af. Q. 466 (1974). Sec also Berk, Champagne's Assess-
ment of Legal Services Programs: An Evaluation of An Evaluation, 9 Urb. Aff. Q. 490 (1974);
Champagne, A Reply to Berk, 9 Urb. Aff. Q. 510 (1974).
328. The character of the attorney-client relationship depends considerably on administrative
organization and client type. See J. Carlin, Lawyers Ethics 66-83 (1966) (solo practitioner); J.
Handler, The Lawyer and His Community (1967) (small town practitioner); E. Silgel, The Wall
Street Lawyer 261-66, 297-98 (1969) (Wall Street lawyer); R. Wells, The Legal Profession and
Political Ideology-The Case of the Carr Law Firm of Manchester, Iowa (1963) (Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Univ. of Iowa) (small town practitioner).
329. C. Hosticka, Legal Services Lawyers Encounter Clients: A Study in Street Level Bureau-
cracy 200 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Brown Univ. 1976). See also id. at 201, 202 n.8, 207-8; Bel-
low, The Legal Aid Puzzle: Turning Solutions into Problems, in 5 Working Papers for a New
Society 52, 55 (Spring 1977); Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experi-
ence, 34 NLADA Briefcase, Aug. 1977, at 106, 108, 117.
330. Bellow, Legal Aid in the United States, 14 Clearinghouse Rev. 337, 343 (1980). Bellow
argues that in many legal services offices "[t]he definition of the client's problems and the 'best'
available solutions are not mutually explored and elaborated; they are imposed by the lawyer's
view of the situation." Bellow, supra note 329, at 108.
331. The response to this problem developed by Gary Bellow has been to propose that legal
aid lawyers limit client intake to allow them to provide each client with a detailed preventive law
"check-up" reviewing his social and economic problems to determine those which are amenable to
legal resolution. See Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34
NLADA Briefcase, Aug. 1977, at 106, 108, 120; Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics:
Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. Rev. 337, 355, 358 (1978)
(ethical implications of more complete, less attorney-autonomous service to the poor).
Bellow proposes to select clients for this service according to whether they have a particular
problem which his reference group, the "client community," is interested in. If the client possesses
that "lucky" problem, legal services will address his other difficulties as well. See 1980 Annual
Report of Legal Services Institute; Grant Proposal of Legal Services Institute (Dec. 14, 1978).
332. Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profes-
sion, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1979).
333. Id. at 73.
334. The rules surrounding the creation of an attorney-client relationship are unclear. See
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (7th Cir. 1978), in which
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that explicit consent to an attorney-client
relationship is not necessary for its formation. Indeed, "[t]he attorney-client relationship is not
dependent on the payment of a fee nor upon execution of a formal contract." United States v.
Constanzo, 625 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1980). See also L. Ray Patterson & E. Cheatham, The
Profession of Law 245-46 (1971).
[Vol. 60
LEGAL AID AND A4 CCESS RIGHTS
ney's responsibilities start with his acceptance of the client. The client controls
the selection of the attorney and the purposes for which he is hired. At the
same time, the attorney has no obligation to accept employment on any but his
own terms. Without the formal constraint of the attorney-client relationship it
is easy for a private attorney to argue that he has no obligation to take a case,
or inform a client about his legal rights. In the public sector the problem
arises because the legal services lawyer has obligations to a particular pool of
clients. "An indigent person who seeks assistance from a legal service office
has a lawyer-client relationship with its staff of lawyers which is the same as
any other client who retains a firm to represent him. ' 335 However, prior to the
creation of the relationship the issue is less clear. The raison d'etre of the legal
services lawyer is service to poor persons for whom he is the attorney of last
resort. Having a designated clientele to serve, as well as an individual client,
he is also concerned that the largest possible number of that clientele receive
legal services. This concern for the unrepresented eligible client is in one sense
psychological, a reflection of the concern for social justice that motivates the
career choices of many legal aid lawyers. It reflects the harsh fact that the
scarcity of resources prevents legal services from meeting the needs of all who
request service. Since the poverty lawyer is committed to serve poor persons
only, he has a concern for eligible clients in the preclient phase: those to
whom he may have to deny services,336 those who have not yet requested serv-
335. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 334 (1974). Note that section two of the
Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996(b) (1976)), requires that "attorneys providing legal assistance must have full freedom to
protect the best interests of their clients in keeping with the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Canons of Ethics and the high standards of the legal profession." The Corporation is ex-
pressly forbidden from interfering with the Code's mandates to an attorney. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996e(b)3. See S. Rep. No. 495, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973), where the Committee places
particular emphasis on those provisions governing the inviolability of the attorney-client relation-
ship. The issue was further discussed in 119 Cong. Rec. 20,738 & 40,460 (June 21 & Dec. 10,
1973); 120 Cong. Rec. 15,004-05 (May 16, 1974).
336. Meltsner & Schrag, Report From a CLEPR Colony, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 581 (1976), relate
the following incident which raises this issue acutely:
Ms. Prince had sued our client, Ms. Ward, and we concluded that since Ms. Prince's
story kept shifting, it would be desirable to take her deposition. During the deposition
itself, the plaintiff (who was still not represented by counsel) told Mary that she was not
certain that the defendant hadn't repaid the money to her husband, and that she had
actually received $800 of the $1500 from the defendant during the course of one week,
and had spent it on food and liquor. Of course, one of the conventional purposes of
depositions is to obtain admissions, but the students were quite uncomfortable obtaining
from the plaintiff concessions that would never have been made had the witness been
represented by counsel.
Id. at 618. If the legal aid lawyer follows the traditional rule, he does nothing for his pro se
adversary.
Does the attorney's dedication to truth and to making the adversary system work require him
to steer a middle course in his adversary relations with apro se litigant? Judges properly treat
such litigants with indulgence and make certain that their interests are protected. Should the same
duty attach to private counsel generally or to legal aid counsel specifically?
If the legal aid attorney does aid thepro se adversary in any productive way he might be
charged with a lack of loyalty to his client Would making strenuous efforts to find his adversary a
volunteer counsel present similar problems?
A discussion of the rules concerning the giving of legal advice to a potentially adverse unrep-
resented person may be found in ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(2). For-
mer Canon 9 is also relevant: "It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid
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ice, and those who will not request services because of their perception of legal
need.
But the concern for the unrepresented client is also pragmatic. Many le-
gal services attorneys fear that allocating resources by client choice will reduce
the opportunities to handle nontraditional and often complex litigation.
While one cannot prove this point, a consumer preference for service over law
reform cases is not unlikely. The use of rationing schemes for divorce and
landlord-tenant litigation in some urban areas supports this view. At the same
time, a client-oriented approach to legal assistance allocation by no means
necessitates the end of law reform or impact litigation for legal services attor-
neys. Individual poor persons may request service in a particular area in order
to further a "collective choice" 337 of the poverty community. The aggressive
pursuit of client interests in areas in which the client desires service may well
lead to impact litigation. Major test cases such as Boddie v. Connecticut338 and
Shapiro v. Thompson339 started out as individual service cases and resulted in
major constitutional challenges because that was the only way to obtain legal
redress for clients who could not afford to pay court filing fees or were denied
welfare benefits because they had recently moved.
V. SOCIAL UTILITY ARGUMENTS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The preceding sections have indicated that the prevailing approach to re-
source allocation in legal services is based on some form of utilitarian theory,
reflecting the view that resources should be allocated to yield the greatest good
for the greatest number. The strongest argument for utilitarian resource allo-
cation is that with demand exceeding available resources, it better accommo-
dates the general welfare of those eligible for service by bringing cases that
mean relief for the largest number of people.34° In a situation of scarcity there
are two ways the general welfare of people eligible for service can be increased
by a utilitarian allocation; legal services lawyers may bring lawsuits that affect
the largest number of poor persons, or they may choose litigation that is
designed to change the condition of the poor as a class. Since all individuals
cannot be served, individual representation is rejected as a realistic goal and
cases involving certain programs such as welfare, public housing, and Medi-
caid, which by definition create categories of beneficiaries, are given priority
everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not under-
take to advise him as to the law." ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 9 (1908). See also ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Ops. No. 5 (1924); id. No. 9 (1926); id. No. 58 (1931); id.
No. 101 (1933); id. No. 160 (1936).
337. Such choices might otherwise remain latent because the poor are unlikely to organize as
an interest group. See M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Choice 165-67 (1965).
338. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
339. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
340. This characterization of the argument as one based on social utility is correct only if one
accepts the argument's operative assumption-that the maximization of happiness or the interests
of the poor will necessarily result in the maximization of happiness for society generally. To do so
one must either view social relations as a nonzero sum game or consider the satisfaction of the
desires of the poor as productive of more happiness than those desires which the rich are required
to give up to provide the stated benefits to the poor.
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because these programs affect large numbers of people. The utilitarian vidw
justifies a legal services program limiting cases to such areas because the effort
improves the legal status of the largest number of people and is, therefore, the
most socially efficient use of legal aid funds.
Under this version of utilitarian theory, the rights of the individual to
service are subordinate to the interests of a larger number of the poor. A case
may be chosen because the aggregate effect of successfully pursuing it may
negate the necessity for litigating similar individual cases. The individual
whose case is rejected, however, does not necessarily benefit from the case
taken on. In rejecting a specific client's request for service, the latter's rights of
access to a lawyer are offended. The only way we can say that even the re-
jected client benefits from the lawyer's case selection is if we assert that the
aim of legal services is to serve the poor as a class. In practice, the utilitarian
rationale for grounding decisions of resource allocation and client selection on
serving the greatest number of individuals reduces to an argument that views
the poor as a class who share a community of interests.
The utilitarian argument, however, is often put differently. It is argued
that equal justice for the poor cannot be attained without redistributing wealth
and power in society. Based on this view, the most socially efficient use of
legal aid funds requires priority-setting criteria for choosing cases that bring
the most monetary benefit to the poor, Earl Johnson, former director of the
OEO Legal Services Program, articulates this explicit utilitarian rationale:
[W]hen issues affecting hundreds of thousands of poor people
and involving millions of dollars in potential benefits go unappealed
because each individual case is merely a small claim, while millions
of dollars are being spent on divorces, there seems reason enough to
pose the question of cost-effectiveness in the expenditure of govern-
ment funds.34
1
In another study, Johnson calculated the dollar benefit of legal aid "law re-
form" activity.34 2 In his view, the large sums that putatively accrue to the
341. Toward Equal Justice: A Comparative Study of Legal Aid in Modem Societies 219 (M.
Cappelletti, J. Gordley & E. Johnson eds. 1975). This view is argued well in S. Nagel, Improving
the Legal Process 271-310 (1975).
342. Toward Equal Justice, supra note 341, at 167-184. One may wonder whether this "simple
economic loss-gain argument" only "equates forced transfer of funds [from poor defendants to
equally poor plaintiffs] with social gain." Brakel, Styles of Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor,
1977 Am. B. Found. Reseaich J. 219, 238.
By engaging in "simplistic multiplications" of law reform victories and settlement amounts to
compute the benefit of law reform efforts, Johnson neglects to consider whether "the so-called
economic losses of one side may be passed right back--more or less directly--to the economic
'beneficiaries' of the other side." Id. at 239 (criticizing E. Johnson, supra note 173, at 178 & nn.90-
92). Thus, significant evidence suggests that landlord-tenant litigation in some legal aid contexts
may not, in fact, improve the housing situation of the poor. See Note, Legal Services and Land-
lord-Tenant Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 82 Yale L.J. 1495, 1499-1503 (1973). Habitability
laws may provide tenants with a weapon against housing code violations and a defense against
nonpayment of rent, but they also can force rents upward with no comparable increase in housing
quality benefits. See Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of Effects of Habitability
Law Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 Cal. L. Rev.
1098, 1130, 1133-36 (1975) (receivership laws result in increased rents) (testing the hypotheses of
Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Hous-
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poverty community from the use of social utility selection criteria make obvi-
ous the virtue of conscious priority-setting. Thus, legal services programs
should pick cases that serve the largest number of the poor because that is
cost-effective. The utilitarian theory also serves the original goals of the legal
services program. As one spokesman for the Corporation stated, equal justice
requires that:
the burdens on the poor and the rights accorded them. . . [be] equal
to those of other segments of the population. . . . Thus legal serv-
ices work and achieving equal justice for the poor requires con-
fronting poverty and the conditions that produce poverty and
challenging the individuals and institutions which perpetuate it.3
43
This perspective is the legacy of President Johnson's War on Poverty.344 Un-
like the British welfare state approach, which aimed at providing certain goods
to its citizens, the War on Poverty focused primarily on the redistribution of
wealth in society and allowed for personal service or individual welfare grants
only to the extent resources permitted.345 Most followers of the social utility
ing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 Yale L.J. 1093 (1971), and Komesar, Return
to Slumville-A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor,
82 Yale LJ. 1175 (1973). See also Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy:
A Reply to Professor Komesar, 82 Yale LJ. 1194 (1973).
The issue has arisen in the welfare context as well. As a result of the huge increase of re-
quests in the 1960's by militant welfare recipients for fair hearings on special grant requests, see L.
Jackson & W. Johnson, Protest By the Poor 114 (1974); Rabaglial & Birnbaum, Organizations of
Welfare Clients, in Community Development in the Mobilization for Youth Experience 102-36
(H. Weissman ed. 1969), local and state governments abolished the discretionary special grant
system and instituted a universal flat grant system at amounts lower than those possible under an
individualized need-based allocation. See F. Piven & R. Cloward, Poor People's Movements:
Why They Succeed, How They Fail 303-07 (1977). The victory in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (notice and evidentiary hearing required prior to termination of government benefits) may
have prompted more rigorous initial eligibility determinations. J. Hander, Protecting the Social
Service Client 70 (1979); Brill, The Uses and Abuses of Legal Assistance, 31 The Public Interest
38, 43-44 (1973). But see Denvir, Towards a Political Theory of Public Interest Litigation, 54
N.C.L. Rev. 1133, 1139, 1151-52 (1976).
343. Houseman, Legal Services and Equal Justice for the Poor. Some Thoughts on our Fu-
ture, 35 NLADA Briefcase 44, 45 (1978).
344. Rejecting the Biblical view that "the poor shall never cease out of the land," Deut. 15:11
(King James), the proponents of the War on Poverty sought to provide not only cash and in-kind
payments to the poor but also to change their social and economic condition. As one writer
pointed out:
The Great Society's antipoverty strategy was three-fold. First, placing emphasis upon
the presumed desirability of changing the poor, the Great Society improved the provi-
sion of diverse services, focusing on educational opportunities and training. Second, the
Great Society legislation aimed at changing American institutions to allow the poor a
greater voice in determining their own destiny, including the planning and implementa-
tion of programs in aid of the poor. Third, the Great Society expanded direct assistance
to the poor through the provision of in-kind services including health care, shelter, and
nutrition.
S. Levitan, Programs in Aid of the Poor 131 (3d ed. 1976). See also J. Donovan, The Politics of
Poverty (1967); R. Elman, The Poorhouse State (1966); S. Levitan, The Great Society's Poor Law:
A New Approach to Poverty (1969).
345. The announcement by the Community Service Association of New York that it was dis-
continuing casework is an interesting instance of this attitude. The Executive Director of the
agency pointed out:
If you don't deal with the pathology of the ghetto, all the individual counseling you
do with a person is not going to help. The situation is not just a matter of persons with
problems but rather of whole areas afflicted with social ills. If the individual is to be
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model accept the view that a conscious strategy of "law reform" involving a
concerted effort to change substantive rules of law in favor of-the poor is the
best way to maximize benefits for the poor. Others, however, followed the
social utility model but felt that law reform strategy was ultimately futile.
3
46
In their view, only the development of economic self-sufficiency breaks the
poverty cycle. Thus, Legal Services resources should be used in the drive for
community economic development.
Because they are concerned with social change, adherents to the social
utility perspective see the stated mission of Legal Services as far different from
that of ensuring "equal access to the system ofjustice. . . for individuals who
seek redress of grievances" and "who would be otherwise unable to afford
adequate legal counsel." 347 In their view, equal access to justice is impossible
in an unequal society. They wish to be conscious agents.of social change using
the law as a means to organize the poor and redistribute wealth. Thus, the
clients of Legal Services are not only individual litigants, but the client com-
munity or the poor as a class. Litigation decisions are made to forward the
best interests of the greatest number of eligible clients, and priorities are set
with the needs or desires of the client community, rather than individual cli-
ents, in mind.
Many consider case selection on utilitarian grounds the only sensible re-
sponse to a situation of budgetary crisis and overwhelming demand in which
all individuals cannot be served. For example, emotive analogy with the "bat-
tlefield" concept of triage is the basis for recommendations by the OMB to the
Corporation:
As in the case of medical treatment, the concept of triage must
be applied--the relative need must be further defined in terms of
resources available and the worth (both social and economic) of the
rights at issue .... Only when resources are sufficient to meet all
"needs" is the luxury of a policy which need not make such distinc-
tions reasonable.
348
If the goal is equal justice, one could still say that the principal aim of
legal services is to respond to the needs of individuals and to pave the way for
effective access to the justice system for as many poor people as possible. The
rhetoric of effective access to the legal system is continually on the lips of
Corporation spokesmen, who suggest that lack of resources, not lack of will,
helped, someone has to deal with the complex of social ills that bears on the individual,
not just on the individual himself. We are convinced that an approach that focuses pri-
marily on individuals may help some people, but will not really alleviate the basic prob-
lem of a sick community. Instead of starting out by saying that the individual is the
client, we're going to say that the community is the client.
W. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America 263-64
(1974).
346. See, e.g., Hazard, Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 242, 244
(1970); Hazard, Social Justice through Civil Justice, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 699 (1969).
347. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(1), (2) (1976) (amended 1977).
348. Letter from OMB to LSC, quoted in Amicus Curiae Brief, at 10, Calvert v. West Va.
Legal Servs. Plan, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.W. Va. 1979).
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fosters priority-setting. Josephine Worthy, a client representative on the Cor-
poration Board, has both urged that legal services should be "a resource avail-
able to all low income people" and that legal services should pursue priorities
"which benefit low income people to the greatest extent possible."349 But the
writing of many in the legal services arena makes it clear that even if there
were adequate resources, they would not consider it incumbent on them to
serve individual clients regardless of the social worth of their claims. The ba-
sis of this view is that equal justice cannot be achieved by dealing with the
problems of individual clients. Rather, individual problems that take time
away from major litigation, and advocacy of legislative and administrative
policy, are marginal to the goals of the program.
350
Gary Bellow discusses the implications of the view that, in times of scar-
city, the needs of the individual must be eclipsed by the needs of the commu-
nity for the sake of greater impact.35' He presents the case of a public interest
law firm that decides "to focus the program's activities on reform of the city's
public housing program." Specifically, it would focus "on cases involving ten-
ant selection and assignment practices" that have resulted in racial and ethnic
disparities in the city's housing developments. Bellow considers the possibility
that the program would accept clients "only if they were referred by, or were
members of, the city-wide public housing Tenants' Council." He correctly cat-
egorizes this as a delegation of the program's decision-making authority and
says that the code of ethics permits this. Lawyers would retain the freedom to
refuse clients from within this group, but not the freedom to serve clients
outside the group. Under these circumstances, Bellow suggests, the tenants
council "would have... control over which and in what ways individual
clients were represented, because the lawyers would be bound by the conflict-
of-interest provisions" of the code of ethics to turn away individual tenants
whose personal goals did not track the group goals of the tenants associa-
tion.352 This approach would provide legal assistance only to those groups
and for those cases that a community group considers important.
353
This technical defense of community-based selectivity avoids the harder
political and ethical problems. The community-based model suggests that
government grants for legal assistance are the same kind of political tools as
349. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
67 (Feb. 7, 1978) (nomination hearing for LSC Board of Directors) (testimony of Josephine
Worthy).
350. See, e.g., Sabot v. Lavine, 42 N.Y.2d 1068, 369 N.E.2d 1173, 399 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1977), is
an example of the tension between the spectrum of individual desires for legal assistance and the
most socially useful distribution of legal resources. The issue in the case was whether the plaintiff,
a welfare mother, had to deplete her children's bank accounts before she was eligible to receive
welfare. She was refused legal aid on the ounds that "even if she won, not too many indigent
defendants would benefit from her case." The legal aid attorney apparently did explain to her the
mechanics of legal research and directed her to two law libraries. Molotsky, Welfare Mother v.
State of New York, N. Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1977, at 25, col. 3.
351. Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public
Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. Rev. 337 (1978).
352. Id. at 349.
353. Id. at 348-53.
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other government welfare grants. It ignores all claims for legal assistance
based on access rights principles. While this Article does not reject the power
of government to provide in-kind grants to community groups to use as they
see fit, such a subsidy does not satisfy the individual claim for legal assistance
under access rights principles. Whether or not one provides funds for commu-
nity-based programs, one would still have a responsibility to provide funding
for programs focused on individual access rights.
Bellow, in his comments on this hypothetical, confines himself to discuss-
ing whether its policies are in conflict with provisions of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. While the subordination of the claims of eligible clients
to the needs of the community or interest group served by legal aid may not
conflict with the language of the Code, such an approach minimizes the value
of an individual's claim for legal services.354 Bellow's view, which derogates
attorney autonomy in resource allocation, tracks the implied logic of the Cor-
poration's priority-setting process. That process is premised on a reformula-
tion of the attorney's focus from client to community.
355
William Simon justifies this reformulation in his studies of attorney roles
in the adversary system. He charges that the focus on "the ideal of lawyer-
and-client as a self-contained relation between individuals" 356 deflects atten-
tion from the political effect of legal representation on "the distribution of
power in society' 357 towards "issues of personal relations. '358 He extends this
critique to the argument for client control of the resource allocation process.
Such "sensitivity to the personal needs of individual clients" 359 is a reflection
of a "[p]sychological [vlision" 360 of man that "has no principles by which any
want or desire can be ranked in terms of any other. '361 In Simon's view, a
client-centered model of advocacy lacks any conception of authentic human
nature.362 "The attempt to coordinate and focus the scarce legal resources
available to the poor so as to achieve the broadest possible benefit to the com-
munity as a whole" is "the only rational approach to providing the poor with
... access to the legal system." 363 This effort requires that attorneys or pro-
gram boards choose a resource allocation schedule that is most beneficial to
the poverty community, regardless of the wishes of eligible clients.
Some critics of the client-oriented perspective have suggested that this ap-
354. Id.
355. See Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 487
(1980).
356. Id. at 504. Simon calls this interaction a "community-of-two." Id. at 496-505.
357. Id. at 505. Perhaps the classic exposition of this theme may be found in Galanter, Why
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev.
95 (1974).
358. Simon, supra note 355, at 505.
359. Id. at 511.
360. Id. at 517.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 531.
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proach can be faulted for "artificially individualizing all conflicts." 364 This
approach, it is argued, is based on "a bourgeois conception of individual
rights. '365 While such a view is consonant with an avowedly political concep-
tion of the role of the legal services attorney, it does violence to the access
principles by which legal services derives its claim to government subsidy.
366
The central issue, as Simon recognizes, is the "validity of alternative...
conceptions of lawyering."367 While it may well be the case that the social and
economic problems of the poor can best be solved by "group organization,"
368
that is a different enterprise. The contemporary attempt to merge community
organization with client-oriented advocacy is a result of an expanded under-
standing of the legal enterprise that is inappropriate in the public sector under
principles of access rights. The individual's claim against the state for the pro-
vision of counsel does not extend to the expanded, avowedly political, concep-
tion of the legal enterprise. The client-oriented perspective underscores this
understanding of the public lawyer's purpose and role.
The problem of deciding what is the legal aid lawyer's purpose and role is
complicated by the problem of defining who is the client. Until recently, very
few people questioned the idea that the client of the legal aid lawyer, like the
client of any lawyer, was an individual or a concrete group of individuals.
The lawyer's role was that of zealous advocate for his client.369 As has been
eloquently suggested, "an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but
one person in all the world, and that person is his client."1370 At present, how-
ever, many legal aid lawyers are uncertain about the focus of their loyalty.
Some favor the traditional model. Others accept, either implicitly or explic-
itly, the notion that their role is to serve the poverty community and that the
interests of the poor as a class complement the interests of poor individuals.
They want to serve as 'general counsel' to the poor.371 This is a complex con-
364. Alcock, Legal Aid: Whose Problem?, 3 Brit. J. L. & Soc'y 151, 156 (1976).
365. Lewis, Unmet Legal Needs, in Social Needs and Legal Action 73, 94 (P. Morris, R.
White, & P. Lewis eds. 1973).
366. Simon attempts to force the attorney-client relationship into a psychological model to
bring to bear the recent critiques of self-actualization as an ethical theory. The attorney-client
relationship, however, will not fit so easily into this procrustean analysis. In claiming that the
"community of two," as he puts it, obscured "the political character of lawyering" he ignores the
moral character of the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client. By postulating for attor-
neys a Hobson's choice between political strategist or psychologist, Simon neglects the traditional
ro e of the lawyer as translator, an agent who translates his client's desires and goals into legal
language. The lawyer who accepts the client-oriented perspective sees his role as enabling hs
client to effectuate through law those choices which the client himself makes. By so doing, the
attorney recognizes the legitimacy of client autonomy over substantive policy ends. Simon, supra
note 355, at 492, 558.
367. Id. at 531.
368. Alcock, supra note 364, at 156.
369. M. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System (1975); Curtis, The Ethics of
Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1951); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L. 1060, 1065-76, 1080-87 (1976). See also Martin, The Lawyer
as Friend, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 695 (1979).
370. D. Mellinkoff, Lawyers and the System of Justice 510-11 (1976), quoting Broughan's
speech in the House of Lords (Oct. 3, 1820), as reported in 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821).
371. A Director of LSC, Howard Sacks, explains that "[i]n a sense, legal services acts as a
'general counsel' to the poor and significant segments of the poor who share common problems to
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cept. Individual clients are identifiable. A poverty community-at least in a
specific geographical area-can also be identified, although problems of defi-
nition abound. What it means to represent the interests of the poor as a class
is less clear and, although widely used, represents a claim that is more meta-
physical than empirical.
Although many issues are raised by the characterization of the poor as a
"social object," the relevant point for our purposes is the view that "the inter-
ests and well-being of the group are more valuable than those of the individual
and ought to override them."372 Essentially, this view ignores an individual
poor person's interests that are not synonymous, or at least compatible, with
the interests of the poor taken generally. It also discounts the view that his
interests are entitled to equal weight in the distribution of services.3 73 Even if
an individual shares the same interests as the group and recognizes class soli-
darity, he might not be motivated to sacrifice personal preferences for commu-
nal goals. Indeed, "every human being is at any moment a member of a great
number of distinct groups. '374 An individual poor person might see his pri-
mary group as one of nation, race, religion or geographical place although
others might ascribe primacy to his income level or class. It might be more
appropriate to contrast the poor as a class with the group of poor persons
presently eligible for legal services. That group might better be described as
"a conceptual assemblage." 375
Thus, representing the poor as a class ignores "the simple and obvious
fact that humanity is divided into separate persons"376 and indeed, as separate
persons, have a "moral title to equal concern and respect."377 There is as little
homogeneity among the poor as there is among the rich.378 Poor persons may
insure that their voice is heard in societal decision-making. Legal services must be judged on the
extent to which they address the needs of significant segments of the poor and not only on actions
with respect to specific clients." H. Sacks, Legal Services Corporation: A Plan for the Future 5
(Mar. 6, 1981) (unpublished report).
372. Quinton, Social Objects, 76 Proc. Aristotelian Soc'y 1, 12 (1975-76).
373. In other words, the fact that the individual poor person holds a position contrary to those
attributed to the group does not make "the moral convictions of the group ... more worthy of
acceptance than the deliverances [sic] of the individual conscience where the two conflict" Id. at
13.
374. B. Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy 36 (1978).
375. See Quinton, supra note 372, at 21.
376. Hart, Utilitarianism and Natural Rights, 53 Tulane L. Rev. 663, 676 (1979). Hart
suggests:
Individual persofts, for maximising Utilitarianism, are therefore merely the locations
where what is of value is to be found. It is for this reason that as long as the totals are
thereby increased, one individual's happiness or pleasure, however innocent he may be,
may be sacrificed to procure a greater happiness or pleasure located in other persons.
Such replacements of one person by another are not only allowed but required by Utili-
tarianism when unrestrained by distinct distributive principles.
Id. See also J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 187 (1971). Hart has argued that this criticism of
utilitarianism may go too far. See Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 828, 831
(1979).
377. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 273 (1977), discussed in Hart, Between Utility and
Rights, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 828, 831 (1979).
378. Marxist and neo-Marxist theory is wedded to the view that the poor (at least the working
poor) have class interests that transcend their individual desires and that once they become con-
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have radically opposing interests in an array of legal problems, and may even
be litigating against each other. Some commentators suggest that when the
interests of the poor require litigation against other poor persons, representa-
tion ought not be provided.379 They argue that participation in such intra-
poverty disputes goes against the very grain of the legal aid enterprise. A
weaker variant of that position requires the legal services attorney to prepare a
"poverty impact statement ' 380 before commencing litigation to ensure that no
conflict exists. Even at this level, the poverty lawyer is still a lawyer for the
poor as a class. He can only accept representation in a matter where the cli-
ent's interests do not conflict with other segments of the poverty community.
He is thus expected to make allocation decisions in ways which will not pit
poor against poor.
It may well be the client's responsibility to consider the effect of his action
on others and on the community. Often positions pressed by clients, while
legally correct, may have deleterious effects on others. The attorney, by ap-
propriately directing the client's attention to these effects, should point out the
possible social consequences of insisting on a legal solution. Good counseling
practice demands that the attorney do so, even suggesting that if it were up to
him he would refrain from litigation. Nonetheless, the ultimate decision must
be left in the hands of his client. Nor should specific groups be refused legal
service on grounds that they are being served through "impact litigation." It is
not thejob of Legal Services to choose among groups. The Corporation recog-
nized this principle when it opposed congressional efforts to mandate service
to specific groups.
381
VI. APPLYING THE CLIENT-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE
Can one develop a method of case selection that will not violate an indi-
scions of the bonds that unite them they will coalesce into a unified group. The possibility of such
class consciousness is a major predicate of Marxist thought. See generally G. Lichtheim, George
Lukacs 50-73 (1970); G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (1971).
379. Marvin Schick, the chairman of the Board of Legal Assistance of the Jewish Poor in
Brooklyn, New York, presented a statement to the October, 1977 meeting of the Legal Services
Corporation Board of Directors, in which he charged that "legal service funds are being used
against the poor. Congress did not intend this result and I am confident that the use of federal
funds to hurt the poor was not the intention of OEO Legal Services and is not the aim of the
National Legal Services Corporation." Minutes of LSC Bd. of Directors Meeting app. B 5-6 (Oct.
7-8, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Minutes]. Schick cited various New York City neighborhoods
where Black and Puerto Rican poor coexist and where the latter frequently have been denied
adequate participation in poverty programs. Id. at 3. "[ElIderly and poor whites. . . bear the
brunt of some of the activism of legal service lawyers who use the vulnerable as easy targets...
[notably] elderly Jews on the Lower East Side and Chassidic Jews of Williamsburg." Id. at 4-5.
See also 123 Cong. Rec. 33,761 (1977) (statement of Rabbi Joseph Langer of the United Jewish
Council of the East Side relating experience of elderly New Cork ity Jews).
At the Directors' meeting, Nathan Lewin argued that "prompt referral to another legal serv-
ices office to represent the defendants or the targets" of an inter-poverty dispute was imperative to
assure adequate and fair representation. See Minutes, supra, at 48-49. See also id. at 4.
380. At the October LSC Directors' meeting, the possibility of promulgating a "regulation
which requires local agencies to examine the possible adverse impact on the poor resulting from
class action or other litigation" was discussed. See Minutes, supra note 379, app. B, at 6.
381. See text accompanying notes 132-33 supra.
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vidual's right of access to legal assistance? One way of distributing the limited
resource of legal services would be to divide it equally among all who have a
claim to it, as through a voucher program.38 2 In the same way that ration
coupons allocate food during a shortage, a voucher scheme for legal aid would
allocate to each indigent a specific number of hours of an attorney's time.
Each individual would be free to choose the purposes for which he used his
allocation of legal services. There are two problems with such a voucher
scheme. First, equal distribution of the existing budget for legal aid is not
likely to allow each person adequate lawyer time for even the most minor
problem. Second, one needs an attorney for a specific purpose-to solve a
legal problem or to pursue a legal claim-not for a specific amount of time.
Some indigents will not have any legal problems while the vouchers are valid:
Others may have numerous or complicated problems needing many more
hours of lawyer time than those allotted to them. One cannot easily say to a
man who is about to be evicted that he has used up his number of lawyer
hours. For both reasons a voucher program is an inadequate way of providing
equal justice for all indigents.
Another possible allocation mechanism is a lottery or random scheme.
This method recognizes each individual's right of access to the legal system.
With modifications this method has been used in a number of government
programs, including the draft and the allotment of public housing authority
apartment slots. Randomness has a special virtue when it is applied to the
allocation of scarce "rights" in that it eliminates the claim of injustice in the
distribution of a good that is not available to all. 38 3 While randomness does
not stop persons from being denied their right to legal assistance, it does re-
move any injustice in its distribution of that good.
38 4
There are many problems in applying a random distribution model. For
example, how would one deal with the problem of "backlog"? Would the
lottery be held daily or yearly? Who would participate in the lottery, those
eligible clients requesting service or the entire pool of eligible clients? A prac-
tical variation on randomness might be temporal priority.38 5 This method was
382. Available sources indicate that the one voucher study begun, see LSC, Delivery Systems
Study 147-48 (1977), was never completed but was transformed into a judicare project during the
course of the delivery system study. R. Schwartz, Research Methods in the Delivery Systems
Study of the Legal Services Corporation: An Interim Report 11 (Mar. 18, 1980) (critically review-
ing the entire delivery systems study). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(g) (1976). For a discussion of
voucher schemes in education see Cohen & Farrar, Power to the Parents?-The Story of Educa-
tion Vouchers, 48 Pub. Interest 72 (1977); Coons & Sugarman, Vouchers for Public Schools, 15
Inequality in Educ. 60 (1973).
383. Note, The Equality of Allocation by Lot, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 113, 120 (1977).
The virtue of randomness as an allocation mechanism is discussed in Barzel, A Theory of Ration-
ing by Waiting, 17 J.L. & Econ. 73 (1974). See United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383) (when the ship is in no danger of sinking, but all sustenance is
exhausted, and a sacrifice of one person is necessary to appease the hunger of others, the selection
is by lot).
384. See Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 Philosophy & Pub. Aff. 293 (1977); see also
Parfit, Innumerate Ethics, 7 Philosophy & Pub. Aff. 285 (1978).
385. James Childress considers temporal priority as a "natural" form of randomness or chance
and views lottery selection as "artificial" randomness. Childress, Who Shall Live When Not All
Can Live?, in Ethics and Health Policy 199, 205 (R. Veatch & R. Barnson eds. 1976).
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ostensibly used by legal aid offices before attorneys arrogated the distribution
decision to themselves or to local communities. Temporal priority excludes
considerations of the social worth of a claim. It is assumed that all members
of the local community have access to the office. Luck and intensity of desire
determine who receives an attorney's services. Intensity of desire is indicated
by an indigent's willingness to queue and the amount of time he is willing to
devote to this process, just as in the private sector a person shows his intensity
of desire by the amount he is willing to pay for legal services.
But to ensure effective access to a lawyer for every eligible client, total
reliance on temporal priority is not possible. As Posner points out, "[A] major
cost associated with queuing as a method of rationing goods is the opportunity
cost of the time people spend in the queue. '38 6 It is much more costly for the
working poor than for the non-working poor to spend time waiting. Neither
the elderly nor the infirm are physically able to stand in line for long periods
of time.387 The institutionalized would be excluded from access completely,
so that special efforts and funds would have to be allotted to place lawyers in
mental hospitals, nursing homes or prisons.388 Because legal aid has a monop-
oly on legal services, allocation systems must treat indigents equally.389 Yet
consideration must also be given to emergency situations. A totally random
allocation system would not make these adjustments.390
A legal services office has to give emergency cases priority just as a doctor
ought to treat an individual with a heart attack before one with a headache.
When time is of the essence in a legal or a practical sense there must be a way
to fine tune the random distribution system. An example of the first case is
when an eviction notice is filed against an indigent tenant. If he does not
receive legal aid, he will default and be evicted. This emergency is created by
386. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
Legal Stud. 399, 445 (1973).
387. Temporal priority is a very rough approximation of a lottery system. It is not only those
with the physical capacity to get to an office early and wait who have an advantage under such a
scheme. Tlhose with the best access to information about the availability of legal aid, those who
live close to neighborhood offices and those without jobs also have an advantage.
388. The argument for targeting service to groups with special needs was recognized implicitly
by the Corporation when it pointed out that "the very fact of institutionalization means no access
to legal assistance, unless a legal services provider has an office in the institution or sends its
workers there." 1980 Hearings, supra note 287, at 122.
389. The problem of monopoly and equitable access is not confined to public legal services
and the poor. The private market may also fail to accommodate clients with unpopular views. In
such cases the organized profession or the courts may have to step in to ensure available represen-
tation. Thus, civil rights cases in the 1960s were "not an object of general competition among
Virginia lawyers." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415. 443 (1963). In Mississippi the largely white
private legal sector provided an "inadequate reservoir" of attorneys prepared to take on civil
rights cases. Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Lefton v. City of
Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280(5th Cir. 1964). As the organized bar was not prepared to fulfill its duty
to ensure access to the legal market, the court allowed a new market definition by striking down
restrictivepro hac vice rules. See A. Katz, Admission of Non-Resident Attorneys Pro Hac Vice,
Am. B. Found. Research Contributions No. 5 (1968). I am indebted to Professor Katz for this
insight.
390. There are obvious difficulties in bringing exceptions into a randomization or temporal
priority framework. Childress is against it but concedes its occasional necessity in the allocation
of scarce medical resources. "If we recognize exceptions would we not open Pandora's box again
just after we had succeeded in getting it closed?" Childress, supra note 385, at 209.
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legal process. A different problem arises after a tenant is actually evicted. Al-
though he has found other living arrangements, he wants to return to his
home. While time is no longer of the essence in a legal sense, as a practical
matter the tenant may be severely injured if he cannot receive legal aid imme-
diately. When individual A wants legal aid to effect a name change and indi-
vidual B wants legal aid because he has been evicted, one could argue that a
lawyer who can serve only one should accept B's case. As a practical matter,
however, the emergency exceptions, given existing resources, may well exhaust
available attorney time. Scarce resources may even require one to choose
among emergencies. It may be easy to choose the eviction case over the name
change. It is harder to choose when both cases are emergencies, for example,
if A is a battered spouse and B an elderly person whose utilities are about to be
disconnected.
The emergency exception reflects a theoretical limit on randomness and
on temporal priority. Recognizing that some uses for legal aid are more urgent
than others, many circumstances lead us to conclude that some uses are more
important than others. The relative importance of claims is twofold: the im-
portance to the individual and the aggregate social utility of the claim. The
problem is how to orgapize an objective preference schedule. While all may
agree on employing a ranking, there are clearly difficulties in developing gen-
eral principles of ranking. We reach the same problems of substituting the
poverty lawyer's or the community leader's judgment about a claim's impor-
tance. Third-party assessment of the personal utility of a lawsuit to individu-
als is obviously problematic. 391 Nevertheless, it is unclear whether it is a
violation of the principle of equal rights of all individuals to a lawyer, to de-
cide that X should be served and not Y when Y wants a lawyer to execute a
name change and X wants a lawyer to pursue a claim against his landlord, on
the basis that landlord-tenant problems are more important than name
changes and should have preference in situations of limited resources.
An acceptable general ranking principle might be one in which preference
is given to claims that are worth more to a client. In the private market,
clearly this could be ascertained by seeing which client would be willing to pay
the highest amount for a lawyer. If we say that, in legal services, an office
should choose to serve those clients who would have been willing to pay the
highest amount if all potential clients were wealthy, how do we assess intensity
of desire? One way would be by the amount at stake for the client. A paying
individual is usually more willing to pursue a risk for a claim when a great
deal is at stake. Similarly, an individual probably would be prepared to pay
more in a case in which there was certainty of success. Thus, the seriousness
of the claim and the probability of success could be interpreted as barometers
measuring the intensity of desire for a rational indigent. But in a client-ori-
ented perspective a client's expression of desire must count more than a third
391. An extensive literature has developed regarding the legitimacy of mature interpersonal
comparisons of utility and the extent to which such comparisons may lead to a rise in the overall
level of satisfaction of wants. See, e.g., Jeffrey, On Interpersonal Utility Theory, 68 J. Philosophy
647 (1971).
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party's inference of the intensity of that desire by either of the above criteria:
we would have to accept the seemingly idiosyncratic obsession of an individ-
ual for an issue that everyone else would deem trivial. Thus under a client-
oriented approach a man who felt that a name change was vital for his welfare
could not necessarily be relegated to the end of the line to free up time for
legal services to be given to a landlord-tenant suit.
Decisions in legal service resource allocation, moreover, must cover not
only who will receive services for which subject matters, and in what priority,
but also the amount and quality of legal services an indigent should re-
ceive.392 When resources are limited, the more hours of attorney time an indi-
vidual receives the less time remains to be distributed among other clients, and
fewer cases can be taken on. We have said that equality of access cannot
mean equal numbers of hours of lawyer time for every indigent. Different
legal problems require different amounts of lawyer time. If a person's right to
a lawyer is based on the right of access to a forum for the fair resolution of
disputes, then he must get sufficient quality lawyer time to ensure effective
access. It would not do for a legal services program to choose to serve many
clients inadequately rather than a few clients well.
The client-oriented perspective would not force a program into the spec-
tre of the uncontrolled caseload. The client-oriented perspective allows pro-
grams to reject clients for a variety of valid reasons. Foremost among these is
the lack of resources. If a lawyer has a large enough caseload so that he could
not handle any more clients adequately, he is free to decline service. Indeed,
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility requires that attorneys refuse
cases when they will be unable to do a professional job.393 This also means
that if any attorney lacks the necessary expertise to handle a case adequately,
he should refrain from accepting it. If an attorney in a legal aid office has a
conflict of interest, he must of course decline representation. In certain cir-
cumstances this rule has been relaxed in legal aid contexts because the client
has no other source of legal aid and the lack of a pecuniary interest diminishes
392. The Corporation considers that when resources are limited, multiple uses of the program
by the same individual should be scrutinized carefully, even when each claim is meritorious.
During hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on the 1977 Amendments to the
Corporation Act, Thomas Ehrlich was asked how LSC deals with the problem of excessive use
"by one or a numerous group of clients." He responded:
By the policy the Corporation has established of requiring each program to set its own
priorities. In the process, it insures client involvement in setting those priorities. It may
well be that the program would have to say one of these priorities is not to treat an
individual's problems who has been here so many times before that even though the
particular substantive problem involved might be relatively high on the priority list,
there is sufficient indication of his having come and cried wolf a dozen times, and that
other people have to be treated before at least this one can be again. This is the surest
protection.
Hearings on H.R. 3719 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1977). The issue of
repeated calls for service is somewhat ambiguous here in that Ehrlich's reference to the client's
"having come and cried wolf a dozen times" suggests the lack of merit of the previous claims, but
in general his answer deals with the repeat client who has many problems, all of which are merito-
rious claims.
393. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 6-101 (1975).
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concern that the attorney may betray his client's trust.394
But the problem of how extensive is an individual's right to legal service
remains to be resolved. Is there some lower limit of quality of service encom-
passed in the concept of a right to legal aid? Given unlimited resources is
there an upper limit? Clearly, quality of service cannot be reduced to a level
at which malpractice may result. Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether the
legal aid lawyer should be expected to provide the kind of legal effort that a
large law firm would provide to a corporate client. Should he provide a lesser
level of service-perhaps that which a lower-middle-class client might secure
if he went to a solo practitioner for a minor problem?395 In the private sector,
some rough constraint on service is available through determining the amount
a client is willing to pay. In public sector legal services the analogous cost
constraint is, by definition, unavailable. If the amount of legal care provided
depended on the desires of the client, a tenacious yet irrational client could
control a legal aid office's appointment book. At the same time the amount of
legal aid provided cannot depend merely on the idiosyncracies of the
attorney.3
96
Like private sector attorneys, legal aid attorneys have a duty to refuse
cases they consider frivolous. A frivolousness standard, however, will do little
to divert pressure from a legal aid office's caseload as claims with little chance
of success on the merits will often pass muster under such a standard. The
need for some standard of meritoriousness is noncontroversial. Few would
argue that the right to a lawyer encompasses a claim on a lawyer's time when a
problem is not suited to legal resolution. The issue, of course, is what standard
will be used. Many supporters of legal aid, however, have expressed fears that
use of a higher standard for selecting legal aid cases than the frivolousness
standard generally in use will adversely affect those indigent clients with inno-
vative legal claims. They argue that it is unfair to limit legal aid intake further
than the standard of meritoriousness applicable to the profession generally.
Nonetheless, access rights to legal services traditionally have been condi-
tioned on some standard of meritoriousness in the various informapauperis
statutes397 designed to "open the United States courts to a class of citizens who
394. See generally Breger, Ethical Problems of Conflict of Interest and the Legal Services and
Public Interest Lawyer (manuscript 1981).
395. Gary Bellow has urged that those poor persons whose problems are taken on by legal
services should receive a demonstrably higher level of service than the lower middle class client.
He argues that the poor should be proffered a complete preventive legal check-up so that an
individual entering a legal services office for a housing problem will receive legal aid and advice
on other legal problems as well. Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experi-
ence, 34 NLADA Briefcase, Aug. 1977, at 106, 108.
396. Contrast, for example, an indigent who secures Medicaid. He requests numerous second
opinions for the same symptoms. At a certain point the doctors would refuse. As commentators
have suggested, a patient-centered doctor will continue to provide numerous services to a patient
and will tend to give the specific patient he or she is treating more than his fair share of services.
For this reason commentators have suggested that physicians ought not to serve on committees
reviewing the level of services provided to their patients. For an analysis of the role of profes-
sional standards review organizations (PSROs), see Havinhurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quali-
ty/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 6 (1975).
397. See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1938); Duniway, The Poor
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW.REVIEW[
have rights to be adjudicated ' 398 but cannot afford the costs of litigation. The
statutes do not waive fees to all and sundry. Both indigency and merit tests
are employed. "Vexatious" litigants399 are excluded. "Frivolous or meretri-
cious actions" ° are to be dismissed. Some courts require plaintiffs to have a
reasonable chance of success, 4 1 others merely require plaintiffs to present a
rational argument.4°2 Through judicial interpretation of these statutes, courts
have developed a conditional entitlement of access to the legal system for poor
persons. The wealthy, absent frivolousness, are free to dispute for principle or
personal preference restrained only by the limits of their purse and the threat
of malicious prosecution. In contrast, those who request government subsidy
must meet some higher standard of merit.4°3
While comparisons between England and America are fraught with dan-
ger, a review of the British approach to screening for meritoriousness may
prove helpful. In England the decision to provide service is conditioned on a
test of meritoriousness, or more precisely, a test of reasonableness.404 The test
may be summarized as follows: "would the lawyers adjudicating upon the
application for legal aid have advised a paying client of their own to pursue
the matter?' '4 5 Reasonableness criteria are drawn up by local solicitors serv-
ing on legal aid committees who screen the merits of each proposed case. In-
evitably there are "variations in the criteria adopted by different
committees." 4°6 While the issue has been debated, one critical commentator
has suggested that "legal aid is primarily given for the 'sitting duck' type of
case.' '407 A similar, if not stronger, test is applied in Israel where legal aid
applicants' cases are taken only if "reasonably well-founded in law, in fact, or
Man in the Federal Courts, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 1270 (1966). See also Moore, Relief of Indigents
from Financial Barriers to Equal Justice in American Civil Courts (1971); Note, Petitions to Sue In
Forma Pauper/s in Federal Courts: Standards and Procedures for the Exercise of Judicial Discre-
tion, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 745 (1976). The federal rule can be found at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1976).
398. H.R. Rep. No. 1097, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1892).
399. Id.
400. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976). For an example of the application of this view, see Burket v.
Schultz, 62 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
401. See, e.g., Jones v. Ault, 67 F.R.D. 124 (S.D. Ga. 1974); Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 255 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
402. See, e.g., Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962), in which an infonnapauper/s
claim was deemed not clearly frivolous if the plaintiff 'makes a rational argument on the law or
facts." Id. at 448. See also Harbolt v. Aldredge, 464 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir. 1972); Blair v. Califor-
nia, 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965).
403. Indeed, historically plaintiffs who wished to sue informapaupers had first to have an
attorney certify that the petitioner had a good cause of action. See Lilly's Reg., ed. 1745, 851, tit.
Forma Pauperis, cited in Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 377 (1923).
404. Legal Aid Act, 1974, ch. 4, § 7(5).
405. S. Pollock, Legal Aid-The First Twenty-Five Years 40-44 (1975); Pollock, Legal Aid:
The Factor of Reasonableness, 118 Solicitors J. 123 (1974); White, Being Reasonable About Legal
Aid, 117 Solicitors J. 883, 885 (1973). See also I Royal Commission on Legal Services, Final
Report, Cmnd. No. 7648, at 113.24 to .26 (1979).
406. B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, In Search of Justice 245 (1968).
407. Id. at 246. See R. v. No. 1 (London) Legal Aid Area Comm. ex parte Rondel, [1967] 2
Q.B. 482; Rv. No. 14 (London West) Legal Aid Area Comm. ex parte Bunting, [1974] 118 Sol. J.
254. See also B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts 331 (1967).
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as to evidence."'4 S
The focus on the hypothetical paying client can lead to skewed determi-
nations, particularly if purely fiscal judgments are made. Many poverty law
claims may fail the test because the cost of an attorney may prove greater than
the amount of the consumer or welfare claim itself. For the reasonableness
calculus to succeed it must take into account both the seriousness of a claim
and the litigant's intensity, not merely the dollar value of the case.
The present legal services scheme contains no utilization review proce-
dure.4°9 The statute requires that the local program director approve any pro-
posed class action to ensure that taking on such a case does not unduly tax the
program's resources.4 10 Apart from other normal administrative supervision,
no specific control on the supply side exists that would constrain an attorney
from throwing all his resources into a case. On the demand side a client griev-
ance committee exists. Its function, however, is to review refusals to provide
service, not to inquire into the amount and quality of the service provided.
411
This returns us to the question of legal need. How much service does a
person need to handle a problem adequately? Disputes over what quantity of
service a client is entitled to will arise in a limited number of instances. The
vast bulk of cases handled by legal services, like the bulk of problems handled
by practitioners for the lower middle class, are cases that require a routine
response. Only in the unusual instance will time considerations come into
play. The problem is whether one should impart market considerations into
the government subsidy process. Should the amount of legal services a client
may claim reflect the stakes involved to the parties, or the merits of the cause?
A standard of reasonableness would set the outer limits of the access right. It
suggests that one could not claim a government subsidy to litigate if the
chance of success is slight or the damage sustained de minimus. This standard
would provide a principled rationale to limit service. Such a limiting condi-
tion is, of course, difficult to implement. The question of the quality of legal
services an individual can claim raises significant problems with allocation
procedures based on access principles.
An alternate method of limiting caseload is to provide some shadow mar-
408. Israel Legal Aid Law 5732-1972, § 4,26 Laws of the State of Israel 5732-1971-72, at 115.
409. The medical profession, which has more extensive experience in third party payments,
has developed a variety of review techniques for cost constraint purposes. Most of these mecha-
nisms, such as PSRO legislation or utilization review committees are peer review programs in
which the level or amount of care provided by a doctor is reviewed by his peers and a decision
made whether past care was necessary and whether future care should be provided. Such deci-
sions do not prevent a doctor from providing "excess" levels of care or prevent the patient from
requesting additional care. The levels merely prevent the government from paying for such care
and prohibit public subsidies for future care.
The philosophy behind the PSRO program has traditionally been cost driven. Its focus has
been to prevent unnecessary expenditures due to care that was, or could be considered, wasteful
The concern was to fit the level of care provided to the needs of the patient and to set reasonable
limits to such care when it would not prove productive. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320(c-1) to (c-
19) (1976).
410. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(d) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3-.4 (1980).
411. See 45 C.F.R. § 1621.1 (1980) (providing remedy for person who believes legal assistance
has been denied improperly or who is dissatisfied with the assistance provided).
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ket constraint such as a co-payment mechanism by which eligible clients must
make partial payment for legal services proffered. Such a mechanism would
test, albeit grossly, client intensity in a scarce resources context. A co-payment
formula will reduce demand on legal services and meet equity considerations
as well. The co-payment formula may take two forms. It could require some
modest payment, such as five or ten dollars, designed to reflect some client
commitment to the litigation. The sum chosen, of course, cannot be so great
so as to prevent clients from bringing just claims to a program. A second
approach would be to develop a partial-payment formula based on a sliding
scale of need. This latter approach, used in the English judicare scheme,
would mean that the poorest clients pay nothing towards legal service while
others pay a proportion of a standard fee depending upon income and eco-
nomic situation. The adoption of some variant of a co-payment scheme might
be considered both as a practical revenue-raising venture and as a method of
increasing an equitable distribution of services by capturing, at least in part,
some measure of client intensity and thus some measure of legal need.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF LEGAL SERVICES
This Article has explored the implications for the distribution of legal aid
resources of a principle of access rights. It is written in anticipation of "the
possibility of conversation 412 with those who espouse competing views re-
garding the provision of legal services and is an effort at justifying one ap-
proach to the struggle for scarce legal aid resources.413 It seeks to develop
principles that both recognize a social responsibility for the provision of legal
aid and stake out the limit of state responsibility as well.
As an attempt at conceptual analysis the Article does not pretend to docu-
ment fully the nuances of actual resource allocation among the more than 337
legal services programs. In assessing the extent to which present practices con-
form to a client-oriented model, the Article recognizes that local programs can
only approximate programmatic norms. Nonetheless, the implicit ideology of
legal services tells us a good deal both about what programs wish to do and
about what they in fact do.
In the end the debate over the role of government subsidy of legal aid is
in some sense a debate over the role of law and lawyers in modem society. To
the extent that courts and the legal process are viewed as capable of perform-
ing active law reform and social change roles, proponents of a particular ideol-
ogy will attempt to use legal aid to advance their political vision. From this
perspective, the most efficient use of legal aid resources may be to with-
draw from individual representation wherever possible and to focus adversary
efforts on group representation, test-case litigation and legislative advocacy.
412. B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 5 (1980).
413. Thus Ackerman underscores that "[r]ights talk presupposes only the conceptual possibil-
ity of an alternative way of regulating the struggle for power-one where claims to scarce re-
sources are established through a patterned cultural activity in which the question of legitimacy is
countered by an effort at justification." Id. [emphasis in original].
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By this view, persons will support legal aid not because of a commitment to
access-to-justice principles, but because of favorable political attitudes towards
the goals of the legal aid attorneys. If one views the legal order as responsive
to and a facilitator of social needs and aspirations,414 then law becomes a
political weapon. As a result, persons with differing political views will natu-
rally oppose legal aid funding. Thus, a maximalist vision for the legal services
enterprise carries within it the seeds of incessant political controversy. The
transformation of the principle of equal access to justice into a political dis-
pute between liberals and conservatives is an unfortunate consequence of the
use of the social utility perspective in the organization and distribution of legal
aid resources. Definitions of social utility are at best idiosyncratic and are, in
some sense, political. Importing utility perspectives with their concomitant fo-
cus on group advocacy and mass representation has brought legal aid to the
limit of the national consensus regarding access rights, thus endangering its
very existence.
In contrast, the client-oriented model places responsibility for the alloca-
tion of legal services resources on clients themselves. To that extent, it seeks to
model legal services on private-sector attorney-client relationships. The client-
oriented perspective in legal services, however, is not wed to any organiza-
tional structure or subsidy arrangement. Nor is it tied to any particular polit-
ical goal or agenda.415 Should local community organizers succeed in
arousing community support for a "law reform" issue, citizens who bring such
concerns to a legal aid office should receive service. Should clients in the com-
munity not make such demands, legal aid attorneys should service the requests
that are brought. Thus, the orientation and classification of a program's
caseload will depend on the political and social character of its client
community.
The central challenge faced in applying the client-oriented perspective is
the series of difficult and complex choices forced on the legal services lawyer
by the undeniable scarcity of resources. The severity of these micro-allocation
problems is inextricably bound up with macro-allocation decisions regarding
legal aid. Should Congress or the individual states increase the funding
414. This concept of responsive law is developed in P. Nonet & P. Selznick, Law and Society
in Transition: Toward Responsive Law 73-113 (1978). It sees the "legal order [as] redistributing
resources and groups." R. Unger, Law in Modem Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory
195-96 (1976). The legal services lawyer is viewed as engaged in "a deliberate effort to make the
legal process an alternative mode of political participation' to effectuate such a redistribution. R.
Nonet & R. Selznick, supra, at 96. The role of law in consciously advancing social ends is ques-
tioned in Griffiths, Is Law Important?, 54 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 339 (1979). The extent to which public
interest lawyers (and by extension activist legal service attorneys) serve as a legitimating instru-
ment of post-liberal capitalism is reviewed in Castelnuovo, Public Interest Law: Crisis of Legiti-
macy or Quest for Legal Order Autonomy, in 2 Research L. & Soc. 231, 235-36 (S. Spitzer ed.
1979).
415. See, e.g., Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness
in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. Rev. 337, 389 (1978), recognizing that increasing client au-
tonomy may be on a collision course with many of the real world outcomes that the authors
support. "We are, of course, aware that if, as we propose, lawyers assume greater responsibility
for the fairness or morality of the outcome they help clients achieve they may be more likely to
subvert their client's autonomy-particularly the autonomy of relatively powerless clients." Id. at
388.
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formula for legal services to a level necessary to meet "unmet legal needs"
many of the issues developed in this paper would become moot.
While it is clear that present funding levels are inadequate, it is not clear
that the solution to the allocation problem of legal services is simply more of
everything. The call for yet more legions, while well intentioned, may be mis-
placed. It envisions a society in which all disputes are resolved in formal legal
settings. A focus on courts as the primary mode of resolving personal and
social disputes may fail to serve clients adequately and may well create sys-
temic pressures on the operation of our legal system in ways we are only be-
ginning to understand.
A second approach to the micro-allocation problem of scarcity would be
to refashion the rules by which our legal system works so that effective access
rights need not require the assistance of counsel at all times.416 Such a radical
change in our legal culture would require the increased use of informal dis-
pute resolution and other diversion techniques as substitutes for formal litiga-
tion.417 These techniques may include arbitration, mediation, small-claims
courts, and neighborhood justice centers. It would also require extensive ef-
forts at simplifying legal processes so that the technical expertise of a lawyer
would not be necessary for effective access. If one could thus reduce the flow
of formal litigation, legal services could satisfy more claims of individual cli-
ents while preserving access rights. Our goal, after all, "is not to make justice
'poorer,' but to make it accessible to all.'
418
Such changes in our legal culture may also result in the provision of wider
roles for paralegals or lay advocates in legal services programs. It may even
allow lay persons to plead their own cause with minimal assistance from legal
services programs. If our societal dependence on legal expertise is reduced,
the problem of scarcity in resource allocation will be lessened. Access rights
would then require the assistance of counsel for both rich and poor in special
situations only and the problems of distributing legal aid would be lessened.
The existence of scarcity, then, should focus attention on the need to
416. One approach to resolving the problem of scarcity not analyzed in this Article is to de-velop alternative means of providing legal services which require fewer attorney resources. The
developing interest ininformal dispute resolution, legal clinics andpro se representation reflects
this concern. When the Florida Supreme Court recently found a secretary-paralegal who pre-
pared divorce pleadings to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, it ordered the Florida
Bar "to begin immediately a study to determine better ways and means of providing legal servicesto the indigent." Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d 378, 382 (Fla. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444
U.S. 1061 (1980). See Center for Governmental Responsibility, The Legal 
Neds ofthe Poor and
Underrepresented Citizens of Florida: An Overview (1980). Assuming that dispute resolution is
possible without formal lawyer input, the legal services dollar could serve more people. Similarly
if courts were to appoint attorneys to provide counsel without a fee or if some form of mandatory
pro bono service were instituted, the size of the legal services pie would increase. These solutions
to the problem of scarcity are not explored in this Article.
417. Some of these possibilities are discussed in No Access to Law: Alternatives to the Ameri-can Judicial System 3-110 (L. Nader e8. 1980).
418. Cappelletti & Garth Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to
Make Rights Effective, 27 Buffalo L. Rev. 181, 292 (1978). Cappelletti and Garth properly pon
out that "jiudicial and procedural refom... are not sufficient substitutes for political and
social reform." Id. at 289. An attempt to ensure a just allocation of access rights, then, is not
inconsistent with a healthy realism about the state of justice in our social order.
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restructure our legal rules and legal culture to accommodate access to the legal
system without requiring assistance of counsel This quest, while perhaps uto-
pian, may point the way to achieve allocative efficiency without abjuring those
values of justice and equality embedded in the notion of access rights.

